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Abstract
Marine populations are increasingly subjected to changing conditions whether through har-
vest or through broad-scale habitat change. Historically, few models have accounted for
such trends over time, and even fewer have been used to study how trends affect optimal
harvests.
I developed and analyzed several models that explore, first, endogenous change caused
by harvest and, second, exogenous change from factors (such as rising ocean temperatures)
outside harvesters’ control. In these models, I characterized the profit–or yield–maximizing
strategy when harvesting damages habitat in a multispecies fishery, when harvest creates a
selective pressure on dispersal, and when rising temperatures cause changes in vital rates.
I explore this last case in both deterministic and stochastic environments, and also allow
the harvester to learn about unknown parameters of the stock recruitment model while
harvesting. I also develop an unambiguous definition of and describe a statistical test for a
shift in a species’ spatial distribution.
My results demonstrate that optimal harvesting strategies in a changing environment
differ in important ways from optimal strategies in a constant environment.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Michael G. Neubert
Title: Senior Scientist
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A quote by Dr. Thomas Henry Huxley delivered at the Fisheries Exhibition is 1883 is often
presented to illustrate the now clearly erroneous belief that the ocean’s supply of fish is
limitless: “...it may be affirmed with confidence that, in relation to our present mode of
fishing, a number of the most important sea-fisheries, such as the cod fishery, the herring
fishery, and the mackerel fishery, are inexhaustible” (Huxley, 1883). Less frequently invoked
are his preceding words, noting that other fish stocks (such as salmon) might indeed be
exhaustible and that human actions, such as the addition of pollutants to streams, might
precipitate this exhaustion. His colleague, Mr. Charles E. Fryer, mentioned that some
contemporaries blamed “overfishing” or the “burning of seaweed, building of lighthouses”...
or the “wickedness of the people” for occasional fisheries fluctuations and failures (Fryer,
1883). While these words may seem comically antiquated now, they foreshadow the study
and debate about how and to what extent human actions deteriorate fisheries.
In the intervening years, we have augmented the list of ways in which humans impact
fish population dynamics. We now recognized that increased harvesting capacity and effort,
increased human population density and its associated eﬄuents–including the addition of
heat-trapping gases such as carbon dioxide to the atmosphere–may negatively impact the
health of fish stocks and their habitats. These ongoing alterations of both the oceanic
environment and the removal of its inhabitants create a regime characterized by change.
Understanding how these alterations affect the interactions between exploitation and the
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health of marine resources is critical, as humans rely on marine resources for food and em-
ployment (Food and of the United Nations, 2012), tourism (Madin et al., 2012), and other
ecosystem services (Worm et al., 2006). The repercussions of historical fisheries collapses
have been long-lasting and far-reaching. For example, high unemployment, government
subsidies, and low incomes among fishermen persisted long after the collapse of Newfound-
land’s cod fishery (Schrank, 2005). The 1970s El Nin˜o-related fisheries declines contributed
to a global drop in food production and negatively impacted the Peruvian economy (Glantz,
1979). Conflicts over fishing rights have even caused major international disputes, such as
the mid-20th century Cod Wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom.
Currently, many fish stocks are declining and could provide larger, sustainable harvests
(of 8 to 40% globally) if rebuilt (Costello et al., 2012); a more recent analysis suggests
that the median fishery is both historically and currently being overfished and that large
economic benefits could result from improved management (Costello et al., 2016). Several
high profile stocks, such as the New England and Newfoundland cod stocks, have yet to
recover from their collapses; recent work has further suggested that temperature induced
increases in natural cod mortality might have contributed to allowing recent overfishing on
the New England stock (Pershing et al., 2015). The current poor health of many fisheries,
coupled with the fact that well-managed stocks may suffer if changes to the stock are
not appropriately taken into account, provides strong motivation for trying to understand
fishery dynamics.
Mathematical models are an important tool in building such an understanding. Fisheries
models create a set of rules that describe (at a minimum) how the fish life-cycle and human
harvest influence the size of the population. Environmental or demographic variability,
stage structure, trophic interactions, environmental dependence, spatial structure, harvester
behavior, etc. may also be added. These models may be used to determine the harvest
strategies that maximize yield, profit, or conservation goals.
Many fisheries management models, however, assume a stationary environment; they
assume that the underlying processes are not changing over time. There are many good
reasons for the stationarity assumption including mathematical tractability and a lack of
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long term data to suggest trends. Our focus on stationary environments, however, leaves
many unanswered questions when change is considered. The goal of this thesis is to provide
theoretical models that address a few possible sources of such change in an integrated
framework that includes both the fish population dynamics and the human response.
There are two ways to classify the sources of environmental change on fisheries: endoge-
nous and exogenous. I consider endogenous change to be cases in which harvesting directly
changes the environment. Exogenous change, in contrast, is caused by an agent other than
the harvesters. In this thesis, I model both sources of change and organize the constituent
chapters according to this classification.
I first address endogenous change. The first two chapters of the thesis focus on the
feedback between harvesters’ actions on either habitat suitability or on the preferential
settlement of juvenile fish; these types of feedbacks–perhaps unimaginable in 1883 when
the high-sea fisheries seemed limitless–have been increasingly incorporated into models in
recent years. Then I address exogenous environmental change, in particular focusing on
climate change. I investigate a statistical method for characterizing when a population is
shifting in response to these changing conditions and then two models that characterize the
optimal harvesting response to a population whose vital rates change in response to the
rising temperatures.
In these next pages, I briefly describe the motivation, approach, and main results of the
chapters of my thesis.
Endogenous Impacts
Harvesting fish removes biomass and acts as an additional source of mortality for fish.
However, fishing activity may also damage habitat, while additional mortality to different
life-stages or trophic groups may alter ecosystem structure. From a management perspec-
tive, change caused by harvesting itself is interesting because of the actions of the harvester
feedback on the stock.
Habitat Damage (Chapter 2)
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One clear impact of fishing–apart from the direct removal of fish–is the disturbance caused
by the fishing gear itself. Understanding the impacts of fishing gear on habitat quality and
on community structure has been an active area of research (e.g., Collie et al., 2000). When
habitat damage is included as part of a single-species, spatial fishery model, its inclusion
qualitatively changes the optimal harvesting strategy (Moeller and Neubert, 2013).
Much less, if anything, is known about how habitat damaging fishing impacts multi-
species fisheries. The importance of species interactions on population dynamics has been
increasingly well documented (e.g., Casini et al., 2008) and the implications of these in-
teractions for management have also been of interest (e.g., Baskett et al., 2007; Kellner
et al., 2011; Matsuda and Abrams, 2006). The analysis of optimal management of a mul-
tispecies fishery is, however, difficult due to the large number potential interactions among
species that need to be accounted for (and potentially parameterized!). This difficulty is
compounded by our desire to include space. To address this issue, I employ a type of model
called a ‘patch-occupancy’ model that tracks the proportion of patches in a particular state.
Disturbance and subsequent recolonization have often been studied with patch-occupancy
models (e.g., Hastings, 1980; Caswell and Cohen, 1991; Nee and May, 1992). These types
of models allow the inclusion of spatial dynamics among multiple species in a relatively
mathematically tractable way. I couple such a model with a simple economic harvesting
model to understand how habitat damage and subsequent resettlement of the habitat influ-
ence optimal harvesting patterns, community structure, and economic productivity. I also
studied the efficacy of no-take marine reserves as a management tool. I found that when
ecosystems have a long recovery time, they produce lower profit and have lower optimal
harvest rates. I found that while no-take marine reserves are not part of a profit maximiz-
ing harvest strategy, they incur a relatively low cost, while potentially providing a large
diversity benefit.
Fisheries Induced Evolution (Chapter 3)
In addition to influencing the numbers of a fish population and potentially their habitat,
fishing pressure also exerts a strong selection pressure on the fish. Evidence of so-called
‘fisheries induced evolution’ has been found in the life-history traits of fish (especially in age
14
and size at maturation, e.g., Haugen and Vøllestad 2001; Grift et al. 2003; Olsen et al. 2004)
and recent work suggests that accounting for this evolution changes optimal management
(Eikeset et al., 2013).
Given the current interest in spatial management for fisheries, I was interested in how
the evolution of dispersal would impact the optimal spatial allocation of effort. In particular,
how would the evolution of a dispersal strategy that avoids harvested areas change optimal
harvester response? My co-authors and I constructed a two-patch model and allowed the
tendency to preferentially migrate to one patch evolve in response to fishing mortality. I
found that marine reserves ceased to be part of a profit-maximizing harvest strategy, but
that this strategy is unstable economically over short-time scales.
Exogenous Impacts
Exogenous impacts on fisheries are perhaps easier to identify–the introduction of pollutants
or invasive species. I was interesting in investigating exogenous impacts because the lack of
feedback from the harvester’s actions to the source of change will likely produce different
optimal management strategies. Furthermore, there are relevant exogenous stressors on
fisheries–like climate change–that are currently a focus for the scientific community. I focus
on climate change as the source of exogenous change.
While climate change encompasses a variety of changes, including changes in precipita-
tion patterns and storm frequency, I consider the average increase in temperature as the
motivating agent of change in this thesis. Temperature change is the hallmark of climate
change and is particularly relevant for fish. Fish are generally ectothermic, meaning they
rely on the external environment for heat, and poikilothermic so their internal tempera-
ture varies with their external environment. Temperature plays an important role in the
metabolism and function of fish; temperature of water controls the solubility of oxygen, in-
fluences metabolic demands, and affects the ability of hemoglobin to bind oxygen (Helfman
et al., 2009). Fish experiencing different temperatures may consequently have different vital
rates (e.g. Munday et al., 2008; Houde, 1989; Donelson et al., 2010; Tanasichuk and Ware,
1987; Reist et al., 2006) that ultimately determine the size and growth rate of populations.
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I investigate how fish stocks’ responses to changing temperatures influence the optimal
management of those stocks.
Detection (Chapter 4)
What gets measured gets managed. –management adage, often attributed to Peter Drucker
One common response to changing conditions is a shift in a species’ geographical location
to follow a suitable environment. This type of movement has been extensively studied as a
‘fingerprint’ of climate change impacts. There is a large body of literature reviewing range
shifts (e.g., Parmesan and Yohe 2003; Root et al. 2003; Sorte et al. 2010; Madin et al. 2012)
that have found evidence of poleward range shifts in many species (or shifts upwards in
elevation for terrestrial species or deeper in marine environments) or phenological shifts to
cooler periods in the year. However, the methodologies for testing for such shifts are not
standardized. For example, some authors have focused on the mean location of individuals
(e.g., Perry et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Pinsky et al., 2013) while others have focused on
the locations of the poleward boundary (e.g., Hickling et al., 2006; Solow et al., 2014). If
distributional shifts tended to translate individuals identically, these definitions would be
equivalent, but that type of shift appears to be uncommon (Hampe, 2004; Breshears et al.,
2008; Sunday et al., 2012).
To address this, I describe a methodology that both defines an unambiguous distribu-
tion shift and tests for it. I borrow a concept from the economics literature–stochastic
dominance–and apply it to the detection of unambiguous shifts in a species’ distribution.
In this chapter, I describe the concept of stochastic dominance and a test for it, and finally
illustrate its usage with a fisheries example.
Changing Vital Rates (Chapter 5)
Shifts in a species’ spatial distribution result from interactions between demographic rates
and dispersal and may take time to manifest. Alternatively, barriers to dispersal or an
organism’s tracking of another component of their habitat niche may result in their expe-
riencing different conditions. Locally, changing temperatures will impact vital rates, thus
it is important to understand how to manage a stock experiencing these fluctuating vital
rates. To this end, I investigate the harvest implications of a species that is experiencing
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changing conditions that negatively impact its vital rates. In particular, I consider a species
that has a vital rate–such as mortality or fecundity–that is a function of temperature; as
temperature increases, the vital rate changes. Few authors (but see e.g., Walters and Parma
1996) have investigated how optimal harvesting changes in response to changing vital rates.
I built a deterministic model to investigate how the optimal harvesting policy varies
with the changing vital rate and found that even for a compensatory growth function with
a monotonically decreasing vital rate, that the optimal number fish left to ‘escape’ in each
period may not be monotonic. I show that the interplay of density dependence is critical
in structuring this the shape of the optimal escapement policy.
Adaptive Management (Chapter 6)
Finally, I extend my work on the optimal management of a population with a changing vital
rate to include uncertainty. Unfortunately, as Professor Huxley bemoaned in 1883, we often
must regulate and manage fishing activities without perfect knowledge1 of the dynamics of
the stock. As stocks experience (warming) conditions that are increasingly outside of the
historical range, it seems likely that the response of the stock to those conditions are likely
to be imperfectly known.
To address this, I employ a methodology called adaptive management (Holling, 1978),
which allows for the inclusion of imperfect knowledge explicitly into the optimization of the
harvest. I construct several simple models that include learning about an uncertain pa-
rameter in both unchanging and changing environments to compare the optimal harvesting
strategies. I highlight how adding a trend in time removes the possibility of a stationary
policy over an infinite time horizon and that, for a broad class of models, the optimal
escapement only depends on the initial stock size (in that period) as a constraint.
1“In answer to questions relating to the habits, the food, and the mode of propagation of fishes–points,
be it observed, of fundamental importance in any attempt to regulate fishing rationally–I [am] usually met
with vague and often absurd guesses in the place of positive knowledge.” – Professor Huxley in an address
to the Fisheries Exhibition in 1883 (Huxley, 1883).
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Summary
In this thesis, I explore the optimal management of stocks undergoing change with either
endogenous or exogenous (to the fishery) sources of that change. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
I found that including novel feedbacks and trends produce qualitatively different optimal
management strategies. This suggests that the identification of the mechanisms creating
change for fisheries deserve attention both empirically and from a modelling perspective.
18
Bibliography
Baskett, M. L., Micheli, F., and Levin, S. A. (2007). Designing marine reserves for inter-
acting species: Insights from theory. Biological Conservation, 137(2):163–179.
Breshears, D., Huxman, T., Adams, H., Zou, C., and Davison, J. (2008). Vegetation
synchronously leans upslope as climate warms. PNAS, 105(33):11591–11592.
Casini, M., Lo¨vgren, J., Hjelm, J., Cardinale, M., Molinero, J.-C., and Kornilovs, G. (2008).
Multi-level trophic cascades in a heavily exploited open marine ecosystem. Proceedings
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 275(1644):1793–1801.
Caswell, H. and Cohen, J. (1991). Disturbance, interspecific interaction and diversity in
metapopulations. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 42:193–218.
Chen, I.-C., Shiu, H.-J., Benedick, S., Holloway, J., Chey, V. K., Barlow, H., Hill, J., and
Thomas, C. (2009). Elevation increases in moth assemblages over 42 years on a tropical
mountain. PNAS, 106(5):1479–1483.
Collie, J. S., Hall, S. J., Kaiser, M. J., and Poiner, I. R. (2000). A quantitative analysis of
fishing impacts on shelf-sea benthos. Journal of Animal Ecology, 69:785–798.
Costello, C., Ovando, D., Clavelle, T., Strauss, C. K., Hilborn, R., Melnychuk, M. C.,
Branch, T. A., Gaines, S. D., Szuwalski, C. S., Cabral, R. B., Rader, D. N., and Leland,
A. (2016). Global fishery prospects under contrasting management regimes. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(18):5125–5129.
Costello, C., Ovando, D., Hilborn, R., Gaines, S. D., Deschenes, O., and Lester, S. E. (2012).
Status and solutions for the world’s unassessed fisheries. Science, 338(6106):517–520.
Donelson, J., Munday, P., McCormick, M., Pankhurst, N., and Pankhurst, P. (2010). Effects
of elevated water temperature and food availability on the reproductive performance of
a coral reef fish. Marine Ecology Progress Series, 491:233–243.
Eikeset, A. M., Richter, A., Dunlop, E. S., Dieckmann, U., and Stenseth, N. C. (2013). Eco-
nomic repercussions of fisheries-induced evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 110(30):12259–12264.
Food and of the United Nations, A. O. (2012). The state of the world fisheries and aqua-
culture 2012.
Fryer, C. E. (1883). Conferences Held in Connection with the Great International Fisheries
Exhibition, Part I, chapter A National Fisheries Society, pages 197–243. William Clowes
and Sons.
Glantz, M. (1979). Science, politics and economics of the peruvian anchoveta fishery. Marine
Policy, 3(3):201–210.
Grift, R., Rijnsdorp, A. D., Barot, S., Heino, M., and Dieckmann, U. (2003). Fisheries-
induced trends in reaction norms for maturation in North Sea plaice. Marine Ecology
Progress Series, pages 247–257.
19
Hampe, A. (2004). Bioclimate envelope models: what they detect and what they hide.
Global Ecology and Biogeography, 13:496–497.
Hastings, A. (1980). Disturbance, coesxistence, history, and competition for space. Theo-
retical Population Biology, 18:363–373.
Haugen, T. O. and Vøllestad, L. A. (2001). A century of life-history evolution in grayling.
Genetica, 112-113:475–491.
Helfman, G., Collette, B. B., Facey, D. E., and Bowen, B. W. (2009). The diversity of
fishes: biology, evolution, and ecology. Wiley-Blackwell.
Hickling, R., Roy, D. B., Hill, J. K., Fox, R., and Thomas, C. D. (2006). The distributions
of a wide range of taxonomic groups are expanding polewards. Global Change Biology,
12(3):450–455.
Holling, C. S. (1978). Adaptive environmental assessment and management. Wiley.
Houde, E. D. (1989). Comparative growth, mortality, and energetics of marine fish larvae:
temperature and implied latitudinal effects. Fishery Bulletin, 87:471–495.
Huxley, T. H. (1883). Conferences Held in Connection with the Great International Fisheries
Exhibition Part I, volume IV, chapter Address by Professor Huxley, P.R.S., pages 4–22.
William Clowes and Sons.
Kellner, J., Sanchirico, J., Hastings, A., and Mumby, P. (2011). Optimizing for multiple
species and multiple values: tradeoffs inherent in ecosystem-based fisheries management.
Conservation Letters, 4(1):21–30.
Madin, E., Ban, N., Doubleday, Z., Holmes, T., Pecl, G., and Smith, F. (2012). Socio-
economic and management implications of range-shifting species in marine systems.
Global Environmental Change, 22:137–146.
Matsuda, H. and Abrams, P. (2006). Maximal yields from multipspecies fisheries systems:
rules for systems with multiple trophic levels. Ecological Applications, 16(1):225–237.
Moeller, H. V. and Neubert, M. (2013). Habitat damage, marine reserves, and the value of
spatial management. Ecological Applications, 23:959–971.
Munday, P., Kingsford, M., O’Callaghan, M., and Donelson, J. (2008). Elevated tempera-
ture restricts growth potential of the coral reef fish Acanthochromis polyacanthus. Coral
Reefs, 27:927–931.
Nee, S. and May, R. (1992). Dynamics of metapopulations: Habitat destruction and com-
petitive coexistence. Journal of Animal Ecology, 61 (1):37–40.
Olsen, E. M., Heino, M., Lilly, G. R., Morgan, M. J., Brattey, J., Ernande, B., and Dieck-
mann, U. (2004). Maturation trends indicative of rapid evolution preceded the collapse
of northern cod. Nature, 428(6986):932–935.
Parmesan, C. and Yohe, G. (2003). A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts
across natural systems. Nature, 421:37–42.
20
Perry, A. L., Low, P. J., Ellis, J. R., and Reynolds, J. D. (2005). Climate change and
distribution shifts in marine fishes. Science, 308(5730):1912–1915.
Pershing, A. J., Alexander, M. A., Hernandez, C. M., Kerr, L. A., Le Bris, A., Mills, K. E.,
Nye, J. A., Record, N. R., Scannell, H. A., Scott, J. D., Sherwood, G. D., and Thomas,
A. C. (2015). Slow adaptation in the face of rapid warming leads to collapse of the gulf
of maine cod fishery. Science.
Pinsky, M., Worm, B., Fogarty, M., Sarmiento, J., and Levin, S. (2013). Marine taxa track
local climate velocities. Science, 341:1239–1242.
Reist, J. D., Wrona, F. J., Prowse, T. D., Power, M., Dempson, J. B., Beamish, R. J., King,
J. R., Carmichael, T. J., and Sawatzky, C. D. (2006). General effects of climatepopula-
tionsArctic fishes and fish populations. Ambio, 35(7):370–380.
Root, T. L., Price, J. T., Hall, K. R., Schneider, S. H., Rosenzweig, C., and Pounds, J. A.
(2003). Fingerprints of global warming on wild animals and plants. Nature, 421:57–60.
Schrank, W. (2005). The newfoundland fishery: ten years after the moratorium. Marine
Policy, 29:407–420.
Solow, A., Beet, A., Roll, U., and Stone, L. (2014). A test for a shift in the boundary of
the geographical range of a species. Biology Letters, 10(2).
Sorte, C., Williams, S., and Carlton, J. (2010). Marine range shifts and species introduc-
tions: comparative spread rates and community impacts. Global Ecology and Biogeogra-
phy, 19:303–316.
Sunday, J., Bates, A., and Dulvy, N. (2012). Thermal tolerance and the global redistribution
of animals. Nature Climate Change, 2:686–690.
Tanasichuk, R. and Ware, D. (1987). Influence of interannual variations in winter sea tem-
perature on fecundity and egg size in pacific herring (Clupea harengus pallasi). Canadian
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 44:1485–1495.
Walters, C. and Parma, A. M. (1996). Fixed exploitation rate strategies for coping with the
effects of climate change. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 53:148–
158.
Worm, B., Barbier, E., Beaumont, N., Duffy, J., Folke, C., Halpern, B., J., Lotze, H.,
Micheli, F., Palumbi, S., Sala, E., Selkoe, K., Stachowicz, J., and Watson, R. (2006).
Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services. Science, 314(5800):787–790.
21
22
Chapter 2
Bioeconomics and biodiversity in
harvested metacommunities: a
patch-occupancy approach
2.1 Abstract
1We develop a coupled economic-metacommunity model to investigate the trade-off between
diversity and profit for multi-species systems. The model keeps track of the presence or
absence of species in habitat patches. With this approach, it becomes (relatively) simple to
include more species than can typically be included in models that track species population
density. We use this patch-occupancy framework to understand how profit and biodiversity
are impacted by (1) community assembly, (2) pricing structures that value species equally
or unequally, and (3) the implementation of marine reserves. We find that when local
communities assemble slowly as a result of facilitative colonization, there are lower profits
and optimal harvest rates, but the trade-off with diversity may be either large or small.
The trade-off is diminished if later colonizing species are more highly valued than early
colonizers. When the cost of harvesting is low, maximizing profits tends to sharply reduce
1Originally published as “Moberg, E.A., Kellner, Julie B., Neubert, M.G. (2015) Bioeconomics and
biodiversity in harvested metacommunities: a patch-occupancy approach. Ecosphere.” 6 (11):246. This
version differs only in formatting.
23
biodiversity and maximizing diversity entails a large harvesting opportunity cost. In the
models we analyze, marine reserves are never economically optimal for a profit-maximizing
owner. However, management using marine reserves may provide low-cost biodiversity
protection if the community is over-harvested.
Keywords: fisheries management, ecosystem-based management, marine reserves, multi-
species interactions, metacommunity
2.2 Introduction
There is growing evidence that biologically diverse ecosystems provide services to society
that are more valuable than the sum that would be provided by isolated individual species
(Boehlert, 1996; Worm et al., 2006); that is, biodiversity has real value (Halpern et al.,
2012). It follows that natural and anthropogenic threats to biodiversity, including over-
harvesting and habitat destruction, have real biodiversity costs (Halpern et al., 2008). As a
result, and particularly in marine systems, interest has begun to move from the management
of single species or populations, and toward ‘ecosystem-based management’ in which the
conservation of biodiversity is typically one of the explicit goals (Kellner et al., 2011).
Of course, the conservation of biodiversity will have costs. In harvested systems, maxi-
mizing biodiversity may come at the cost of reduced economic productivity or employment
(Cheung and Sumaila, 2008). In order for managers and policy makers to strike a reasoned
balance between economic productivity and biodiversity conservation they must be able to
estimate those costs, typically with the aid of mathematical models.
Although bioeconomic modeling studies have considered the management of several
interacting species (e. g., Finnoff and Tschirhart 2003; Fleming and Alexander 2003; Kellner
et al. 2011), these are typically limited in the number of species that they consider. A model
complex enough to capture all of the interactions both within and between its biological
and economic components, for realistically large communities, is difficult to construct and
often needs an prodigious amount of environmental, biological, and economic data in order
to estimate its parameters (Fulton et al., 2011; Fogarty, 2014). In most cases, such data is
simply not available. In addition, ecosystem-based management is “place-based” (McLeod
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et al., 2005; Crowder and Norse, 2008) and so requires models with a spatial component.
Spatial management has become an ubiquitous part of the marine conservation toolbox
(Neubert and Herrera, 2008; Botsford et al., 2009; Rassweiler et al., 2012) and, in a variety
of conditions, has been shown to improve management outcomes (e. g., Thrush et al. 1998;
Sanchirico and Wilen 1999; Neubert 2003; Kellner et al. 2007; Neubert and Herrera 2008;
Moeller and Neubert 2013). Marine reserves—spatial management in which some areas
are closed to fishing—have garnered interest as a way to potentially increase biodiversity,
population sizes, resilience of communities to perturbations (including climate change), and
spillover of biomass into fishable areas.
How, then, could one include multiple species in a mathematically-tractable bioeconomic
framework that is complex enough to address questions of spatial management? Here we
present one possibility, and demonstrate how it could be used to understand the trade-offs
(or synergies) between biodiversity conservation and economic productivity. Our approach
has, at its foundation, a so-called patch-occupancy model (e. g., Levins and Culver 1971;
Hastings 1980; Caswell and Cohen 1991; Leibold et al. 2004). Such models have been used
to investigate how species-specific differences in dispersal and colonization ability affect local
and regional diversity patterns (Levins and Culver, 1971; Gouhier et al., 2011), as well as
the role of disturbance in maintaining or eroding biodiversity (Nee and May, 1992; Prakash
and de Roos, 2004).
Here we develop a patch-occupancy metacommunity framework in order to understand
how profit and biodiversity are impacted by (1) the process of community assembly, (2)
pricing structures that treat species harvest values either equally or unequally, and (3) the
implementation of marine reserves.
In general, we are concerned with the trade-off between diversity and profit over a range
of harvest rates and reserve fractions. The curves in Fig. 2-1 are intended to illustrate the
different diversity and profit quantities discussed in the paper. Two quantities are useful
for summarizing this trade-off: the change in diversity–the ‘diversity gain’–and the change
in profit–the ‘foregone profit’– that accompany a change in harvest rate or reserve fraction
relative to their profit maximizing levels (Fig. 2-1). These quantities are useful for compar-
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Table 2.1: Definitions and concepts.
Term Units Definition
diversity (𝛼) # spp. average number of species in a patch
at equilibrium
profit (Π) $ per time revenue from selling fish minus har-
vest costs of fish at equilibrium
profit (𝜋) $ per patch per time revenue from selling fish minus har-
vest costs of fish at equilibrium per
patch
diversity gain # spp. change in diversity relative to that
at profit maximizing harvest level
forgone profit $ per time change in profit relative to maxi-
mum profit
open access – unregulated state in which profit is
zero
open access diversity # spp. diversity at open access harvest level
profit maximizing diver-
sity
# spp. diversity at the profit maximizing
harvest level
protected diversity # spp. difference between diversity at open
access with and without a reserve
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Figure 2-1: Schematic of the quantities related to profit-diversity tradeoffs with (a) effort
regulation and (b) effort regulation plus marine reserves. In each panel, the grey and black
curve represents the profit-diversity trade-off for a community with no marine reserve. The
orange curve indicates this trade-off for a community where some habitat is protected by
a marine reserve. The diversity gain (purple, horizontal bar) and forgone profit (green,
vertical bar) are calculated for a particular harvest rate (star). They are measured relative
to the diversity and profit at the profit maximizing harvest rate. Descriptions of ‘open
access diversity,’ ‘profit maximizing diversity,’ and ‘protected diversity’ are in the text and
Table 2.1. For each profit-diversity curve, the lighter portion of the curve indicates where
profit and diversity can be simultaneously increased by harvesting less.
ing the trade-off under different management scenarios. If no reserves are implemented, the
diversity gain and forgone profit result solely from a decrease in harvest rate (Fig. 2-1a).
When reserves are added (as in Fig. 2-1b), the changes in diversity and profit can result
from a combination of the effects of the reserve and harvest rate changes. With reserves,
we also introduce the concept of ‘protected diversity,’ which is the increase in diversity at
open access that results from implementing a reserve. The shape of these trade-off curves
is determined by the biotic interactions within the community; the shape shown here was
anticipated from biomass versus profit for single species models and serves as a compari-
son for the shape we may obtain when plotting diversity versus profit. One objective of
this study is to characterise and understand how biotic interactions influence the shape of
these trade-off curves. Table 2.1 details the relevant quantities that we calculate in our two
illustrative models.
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2.3 Patch Occupancy Framework
Patch occupancy models have several advantages over alternative approaches. First, by
using spatial models, we can incorporate ecologically important processes such as dispersal
and habitat disturbance. Second, because they are spatially implicit, and only consider
species’ presence or absence (rather than population density), patch-occupancy models tend
to be more amenable to analysis than their spatially explicit counterparts. Finally, coupling
the patch-occupancy model with a simple economic model enables us to optimize profit or
diversity and gain insights into the trade-offs between different management objectives.
The first step in formulating a patch occupancy model is to divide a site (e. g., a bay,
reef, or fishing ground) into a set of patches. Each of these patches is described by its state,
as defined by the identities of the species present. Patches can change state either because
they are colonized by individuals of a new species dispersing from other patches or by losing
species via local extinction. The dynamics of community assembly are determined by the
rules governing the colonization process—in particular how the state of a patch determines
which species may invade—and the rules governing species replacement (or coexistence)
after a colonization event.
In the following sections, we construct two illustrative models that capture two extreme
community assembly mechanisms. In the first, null model, we assume that the species do
not interact and may colonize any habitable patch at which they are not already present.
The simplicity of this model makes it a useful baseline against which to compare more
complicated and realistic processes. Such models are commonly used in community assembly
studies (e.g., Weiher and Keddy 1995; Neubert et al. 2006). In the facilitation model we
assume that species may only colonize patches already inhabited by a facilitating species.
This type of obligate facilitation operates, for example, when one species provides habitat for
another (e.g., anemones and clownfish (Dunn, 1981), which may be targeted for aquarium
trade, or crabs in mussel beds (Silliman et al., 2011)); for other examples, see Bruno et al.
(2003). In the facilitative model section below, we demonstrate the trade-offs that might be
present in these communities. The facilitation model is simple and readily compared with
a null model; in the discussion, we suggest possible model extensions to incorporate more
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complex community assembly dynamics.
In the framework we develop here, local extinction is the result of harvesting that can
be regulated by a resource manager. Harvest causes extirpation of all species within a patch
and renders the patch uninhabitable until the patch habitat recovers. Fishing frequently
damages habitat (for example, through trawling) and has been shown to have strong effects
on community composition (e. g., Thrush et al. 1998; Thrush and Dayton 2002). In addi-
tion, previous studies that have incorporated destruction of habitat have found it to be an
important driver of interspecies interactions (Caswell and Cohen, 1991; Klausmeier, 2001;
Prakash and de Roos, 2004) and optimal management (Moeller and Neubert, 2013). Below
we present a case in which harvesting is the only source of disturbance in the community;
we discuss the implications of this assumption in the discussion.
The structure of this model, the simplicity of which we exploit to facilitate analysis
over these broad ranges of ecological and economic parameters and relationships, comes in
the form of strong assumptions. For instance, we assume that harvesters do not know the
state of any particular patch—including one that they just harvested. Harvester avoidance
of recently fished areas would increase the effective fishing pressure applied to other areas.
The model is also spatially implicit, which means that the survival of relict populations in
space, as can occur with cellular automaton models, cannot occur. Our study of equilibrium
conditions also means that the study of systems that are perturbed or far from equilibrium
are not accommodated. However, as detailed below, many of these assumptions make
this framework suitably tractable to be coupled with a simple economic model in order to
address the role of community assembly, pricing structure, and profit-diversity trade-offs
under different types of management.
2.4 Null Model
In the null model, species do not interact and are identical in colonizing ability. Species may
colonize any habitable patch at which they are not already present; the rate of colonization is
independent of the presence or absence of other species. Some patches are also uninhabitable
until they recover.
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Imagine 𝑆 species which are distributed among a large set of 𝑁 patches. A simple way
of defining the state of a particular habitable patch is to label it with a 1 × 𝑆 vector, 𝜓,
composed of zeros and ones. The 𝑖th element of 𝜓, 𝜓𝑖, is one if species 𝑖 is present and zero
if it is absent. An uninhabitable patch is in state 𝜑. We will keep track of the number of
patches in these states with the variables 𝑋𝜓 and 𝑋𝜑. In general, there will be 2
𝑆 + 1 state
variables. Table 2.2 lists the variable and parameter names for reference.
It will be notationally convenient to define Ψ as the set of all possible 𝜓, and Ψ𝑖 as the
subset of Ψ whose members have 𝑖th element equal to one. Thus Ψ is the set of all possible
habitable states and Ψ𝑖 is the set of all states where species 𝑖 is present (regardless of other
inhabitants). It will also be useful to define the state where only species 𝑖 is present as e𝑖.
The state of an individual patch is changed when it is colonized, harvested, or recovers
from harvest. Patches are harvested at rate ℎ, causing the patch to become temporarily
uninhabitable. These patches recover at rate 𝑟, becoming habitable, but empty. Thus, the
number of uninhabitable patches changes at the rate
𝑑𝑋𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ
∑︁
𝜓∈Ψ
𝑋𝜓 − 𝑟𝑋𝜑 (2.1)
Next, let us consider the rate of change of the number of habitable patches that are in state
𝜓. These patches change state when they are colonized or harvested. In a given patch,
colonization by species 𝑖 occurs only when species 𝑖 is absent; i. e., when 𝜓𝑖 = 0. Propagules
of species 𝑖 are produced in state Ψ𝑖 patches. There are
∑︀
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖 𝑋𝜂 such patches. Because all
species are identical in this null model, these propagules are generated at constant per-patch
rates, 𝑐. Each of these propagules lands on a patch in state 𝜓 with probability 𝑋𝜓/𝑁 . We
now sum over all species to obtain the rate of colonization of patches in state 𝜓 as
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
⎡⎣(1− 𝜓𝑖) 𝑋𝜓
𝑁
𝑐
∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑋𝜂
⎤⎦ (2.2)
New state-𝜓 patches are created by the colonization of patches that, by the addition of
a single species, become a state-𝜓 patch. Let us focus on one such patch that is missing
species 𝑖; it is in state 𝜓 − e𝑖. At any time, there are 𝑐
∑︀
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖 𝑋𝜂 propagules of species 𝑖
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Table 2.2: Null model parameters and variables.
Term Units Definition
Parameters
r time−1 rate of recovery for uninhabitable
patches to become habitable
c time−1 rate of propagule production from a
single patch
𝑤 $patch−1 cost of effort
𝜀 [] efficiency of harvest
N # number of patches in the community
S # spp. number species in the community
Variables
h time−1 rate of harvest; this renders the har-
vested patch uninhabitable
𝑋𝜑 # patches number of uninhabitable patches
𝑋𝜓 # patches number of patches in state 𝜓
𝑥𝜑 [] proportion of patches in uninhabit-
able state
𝑦𝑖 [] proportion of patches with species 𝑖
(regardless of other inhabitants)
𝑥𝑓 [] proportion of patches in reserve,
with all 𝑆 species present
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being produced to colonize our focal patch. Only a fraction of these propagules, 1/𝑁 , will
land on it to possibly recruit. Summing over all species that are eligible to colonize patches
in state 𝜓−e𝑖 (those with 𝜓𝑖 = 1) gives us the total rate of addition of new state-𝜓 patches:
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
⎡⎣𝜓𝑖 𝑋𝜓−𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑐
∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑋𝜂
⎤⎦ (2.3)
Combining the effects of harvest and colonization, we obtain
𝑑𝑋0
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑋𝜑 −
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
⎡⎣𝑋0
𝑁
𝑐
∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑋𝜂
⎤⎦− ℎ𝑋0 (2.4)
and
𝑑𝑋𝜓
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
⎡⎣(1− 𝜓𝑖) 𝑋𝜓
𝑁
𝑐
∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑋𝜂
⎤⎦+ 𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
⎡⎣𝜓𝑖 𝑋𝜓−𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑐
∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑋𝜂
⎤⎦− ℎ𝑋𝜓 (2.5)
for Ψ ̸= 0. By defining
𝑥𝜑 = 𝑋𝜑/𝑁, and 𝑥𝜓 = 𝑋𝜓/𝑁 (2.6)
(so that 𝑥𝜑 and 𝑥𝜓 track the fraction of patches in these states) and rearranging we further
simplify the null model to
𝑑𝑥𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ
∑︁
𝜓∈Ψ
𝑥𝜓 − 𝑟𝑥𝜑 (2.7)
𝑑𝑥0
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑥𝜑 −
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
⎡⎣𝑥0𝑐 ∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑥𝜂
⎤⎦− ℎ𝑥0 (2.8)
𝑑𝑥𝜓
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
∑︁
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖
𝑥𝜂 [𝜓𝑖 𝑥𝜓−𝑒𝑖 − (1− 𝜓𝑖)𝑥𝜓]− ℎ𝑥𝜓. (2.9)
Eqs. 2.7–2.9 comprise the biological and harvesting component of our null model. A
simple example of this model, with only two species, is illustrated in Fig. 2-2; we show the
corresponding equations, for the reader’s entertainment, in Appendix 2.6.
A manager of such a multispecies fishery might choose ℎ to maximize profit. The profit
depends on the cost of harvesting, the price for the harvested fish, and the intra- and in-
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Figure 2-2: (a) Schematic of null model states (boxes), transitions (arrows; solid is coloniza-
tion, dashed is harvest), and rates (arrow labels) for a community with 2 species. The model
equations are described in Appendix 1. Uninhabitable patches (gray box) can recover to
become habitable (white boxes) are rate 𝑟. These empty patches can then be colonized by
either species 1 or 2 (pink and blue boxes) at a rate proportional to the number of patches
producing propagules and the number of patches being colonized. Finally, these patches
may transition to a patch with both species. All patches may become habitable but empty
through harvest. (b) Schematic of how the transitions in (a) manifest for many patches.
The circles, which represent patches, are colored using the same meanings as in (a). Each
panel corresponds roughly to the time steps marked in (c). Note that in the last two boxes,
while an equilibrium has been reached (so the number of patches in each state is the same),
individual patches may change state. (c) Plot showing the simulations of the system of
equations from Appendix 1 through time. While the proportion of patches started evenly
distributed among states, the proportions reach equilibrium values.
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terspecific interactions that determine the dynamics of the metacommunity. In the section
(Null model: diversity and profit), we focus on a manager who wants to understand the
potential trade-off between long-term, sustainable profit (i.e, the profit at equilibrium) and
biodiversity. Before this, we explore how the equilibrium configuration of the metacommu-
nity depends upon the control variable ℎ, which we will take to be a constant. This allows
us to formulate relatively simple static optimization problems and facilitates identification
of profit-diversity trade-offs. An alternative approach, and an ambitious next step, might
include the consideration of the dynamic control of harvest in time and the stability of
solutions to imperfect control; the importance of such analyses in understanding fisheries
collapse is illustrated for a single species by Roughgarden and Smith (1996).
2.4.1 Null Model: Equilibria
The dynamics of our null model are dominated by equilibria. While the state of any
particular patch will continue to change as it is harvested, recovers, and is colonized, the
proportion of patches in those states converges to a set fraction determined by the parameter
values. Thus, at any time the patches are in a mosaic with some patches containing all
species, some uninhabitable, et cetera. As long as all 𝑆 species are initially present in
the community, the fraction of patches in the uninhabitable state will converge to the
equilibrium value 𝑥*𝜑, and the fraction of patches in the various habitable states will converge
to 𝑥*𝜓. An easy way to calculate the equilibria is to introduce the new variable 𝑦𝑖 =
∑︀
𝜂∈Ψ𝑖 𝑥𝜂
which gives the fraction of all patches that contain species 𝑖. The dynamics of 𝑦𝑖 are given
by
𝑑𝑥𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ(1− 𝑥𝜑)− 𝑟𝑥𝜑, (2.10)
𝑑𝑦𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐𝑦𝑖(1− 𝑥𝜑 − 𝑦𝑖)− ℎ𝑦𝑖, for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑆. (2.11)
We can solve for the proportions of patches in these states at equilibrium as
𝑥*𝜑 =
ℎ
𝑟 + ℎ
(2.12)
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and
𝑦*𝑖 = 𝑦
* =
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ
𝑐
. (2.13)
All 𝑆 species persist as long as the harvest rate satisfies 𝑐 ≥ ℎ(𝑟 + ℎ)/𝑟. At higher harvest
levels, all species are extirpated and 𝑦* = 0. We show that this solution is stable in Appendix
2.6.
To calculate 𝑥*𝜓, we take advantage of the symmetry among species’ equilibrium values
and use the binomial formula. Specifically,
𝑥*𝜓 =
(︃
𝑦*
1− 𝑥*𝜑
)︃𝑘(︃
1− 𝑦
*
1− 𝑥*𝜑
)︃(𝑆−𝑘)
(1− 𝑥*𝜑) (2.14)
where 𝑘 is the number of species present in state 𝜓 (i.e., the sum of the elements of 𝜓).
The proportion of patches with exactly 𝑖 species, 𝑧𝑖, is
𝑧𝑖 =
𝑆!
𝑖!(𝑆 − 𝑖)!
(︃
𝑦*
1− 𝑥*𝜑
)︃𝑖(︃
1− 𝑦
*
1− 𝑥*𝜑
)︃(𝑆−𝑖)
(1− 𝑥*𝜑). (2.15)
At low harvest rates, most patches have all species, although there are some patches in
every state (Supplemental fig. 2-3). At sufficiently high harvest levels, 𝑐 < ℎ(𝑟 + ℎ)/𝑟, all
species are extirpated from the system.
2.4.2 Null Model: Diversity and Profit
We use the equilibrium values (Equations 2.14 to 2.15) to calculate diversity and profit. We
focus on 𝛼 diversity, or the expected number of species at a patch:
𝛼 =
∑︁
𝑖
𝑖𝑧𝑖 = 𝑆𝑦
*. (2.16)
For the null model (2.10)-(2.11), 𝛼 diversity declines monotonically with harvest rate in all
cases (Fig. 2-4 (a)). Higher colonization rates or recovery rates increase the diversity at
a particular harvest level. When the diversity curve intersects the ℎ-axis, all species are
extirpated.
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Figure 2-3: Proportion of patches with differing numbers (labelled) of coexisting species
(𝑧𝑖) for a fifteen-species version of the null model (equations 2.10 and 2.11). ‘0’ includes
only empty, habitable patches. 𝑆 = 15, 𝑐 = 5 and 𝑟 = 1. At very low harvest levels, there
are some patches in all states, just as at higher harvest levels, there are still some patches
with all fifteen species.
To calculate profit, we need to specify the monetary value of the harvest from a patch
in each state. Because species are identical and do not interact, each contributes the same
amount of biomass and value to a patch. Without loss of generality then, we set the value of
the harvest from a patch equal to the number of species that are present. Any unoccupied
(or uninhabitable) patch is worth 0. We call the price of a patch with 𝑖 species present, 𝑝𝑖;
for the null model, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑖.
There is also a cost to harvest. We will assume the per patch harvest cost is 𝑤. The
revenue gained from all inhabited patches, which are harvested with efficiency 𝜀 minus the
effort costs is the equilibrium profit, Π:
Π = 𝜀𝑁ℎ
∑︁
𝑖
𝑧𝑖𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤ℎ𝑁. (2.17)
The per patch profit rate 𝜋 = Π/𝑁 gives the average profit obtained from harvest of an
individual patch and is obtained by dividing equation (2.17) by 𝑁 .
A manager who can regulate the harvest level is able to maximize the profit rate. With-
out such oversight, we will assume the system is at open-access, i.e. profits are driven to
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Figure 2-4: For the null model (top row; Eqns. 2.10 and 2.11) and facilitation model
(bottom row; Eqs. 2.25-2.28) , 𝛼 diversity (a) and profit (b) depend upon harvest rate.
Together these determine the trade-off between profit and diversity and equilibrium (c).
For the parameter values 𝑟 = 1 and 𝑐 = 5 (solid curve), the profit maximizing harvest
rate is marked ℎ𝑃𝑀 and the open access harvest rate is marked ℎ𝑂𝐴. The diversity gain
(relative to profit maximizing harvest level) and profit loss (when diversity is maximized)
are labelled in (c). For all panels, 𝑆 = 15, 𝑤 = 0.5, and 𝜀 = 1.
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zero (Clark, 1973). Profit is maximized at an intermediate harvest level, ℎ𝑃𝑀 . The open
access harvest level, ℎ𝑂𝐴, is higher (Fig. 2-4 (b)).
We can now compare the diversity and profit at different harvest levels or among fisheries
with different biological or economic parameters (Fig. 2-4 (c)). 𝛼 diversity is maximized
when ℎ = 0, thus 𝜋 = 0 as well. We focus on the maximal diversity gain (recall Fig. 2-1)–
the increase in diversity from the profit maximizing harvest rate relative to the diversity at
no harvest. The monetary cost of maximizing diversity is the difference in profit at ℎ𝑃𝑀
and at the diversity maximizing level. In the null model, ℎ = 0 maximizes diversity, so the
‘profit loss’ or cost to maximize diversity is equivalent to the maximal profit.
As can be seen in Fig. 2-5, if propagule production rates (𝑐) are high relative to the
recovery rate, both the profit lost (a) and the diversity gained (b) by maximizing diversity
are more sensitive to variation in harvest costs (𝑤) than propagule production rates. Higher
propagule production rates and lower effort costs (northwest of both plots) boost the max-
imum profit attainable in a given community, which incentivizes a heavy harvest and thus
reduces diversity.
However, the trade-off is not always large. Both low costs or high propagule production
rates can make a community profitable to harvest; however, they do not impact the trade-
off between diversity and profit in identical ways. For example, when propagule production
rates are low, the profit loss is very low, whereas the diversity gain may still be large. When
propagule production rates are low, a small increase in harvest rate increases the proportion
of empty patches dramatically. As a result, even the small profit-maximizing harvest levels
can cause large diversity losses. A community with low propagule production rates and
high harvest costs will still face high diversity losses when harvesting occurs, but the high
harvest cost reduces optimal harvest rates, so this potential diversity loss is not realized.
However, it is important to note that these results are for a profit-maximizer; the costs
associated with managing an open-access fishery may be very different.
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Figure 2-5: (a) Potential profit lost from harvesting at the diversity maximizing level (ℎ =
0); i.e., the maximum profit. For a particular 𝑤, 𝑐 combination, this is the vertical arrow
shown in Figure 2-4 c. (b) Diversity gain at no harvest relative to harvesting at the profit
maximizing level (ℎ = ℎ𝑃𝑀 ). For a particular 𝑤, 𝑐 combination, this is the horizontal arrow
shown in Figure 2-4 c. For both panels, 𝑆 = 15, 𝑟 = 1 and 𝜀 = 1.
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2.4.3 Null Model: Spatial Management
To investigate the cost of conserving diversity using marine reserves we modify our models
to keep track of the proportion of patches that cannot be harvested. Since harvest is the
only source of disturbance, we will assume that protected patches harbor all species. These
reserves have the potential to provide the maximum benefit to biodiversity. Let us call
the fixed fraction of patches that are set aside as protected reserves 𝑥𝑓 . The dynamics are
governed by the following systems of equations, which modify equations 2.10 and 2.11:
𝑑𝑥𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ(1− 𝑥𝜑 − 𝑥𝑓 )− 𝑟𝑥𝜑 (2.18)
𝑑𝑦𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐(𝑦𝑖 + 𝑥𝑓 )(1− 𝑥𝜑 − 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑓 )− ℎ𝑦𝑖 (2.19)
The equilibria are then
𝑥*𝜑 =
ℎ(1− 𝑥𝑓 )
𝑟 + ℎ
(2.20)
𝑦*𝑖 = 𝑦
* =
−ℎ + 𝐴− 𝑐𝑥𝑓 +
√︀
(ℎ−𝐴 + 𝑐𝑥𝑓 )2 + 4𝑐𝑥𝑓𝐴
2𝑐
(2.21)
where 𝐴 = 𝑐(1 − 𝑥*𝜑 − 𝑥𝑓 ). This is the equilibrium as long as 𝑦* is positive (otherwise
𝑦*𝑖 = 0).
We calculate 𝛼 diversity and profit, which are now
𝛼 = 𝑆(𝑦*𝑖 + 𝑥𝑓 ) (2.22)
𝜋 = 𝜀ℎ
∑︁
𝑧𝑖𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤ℎ (2.23)
where 𝑧𝑖 is modified from Eqn.(2.15) as
𝑧𝑖 =
𝑆!
𝑖!(𝑆 − 𝑖)!
(︃
𝑦*
1− 𝑥*𝜑 − 𝑥𝑓
)︃𝑖(︃
1− 𝑦
*
1− 𝑥*𝜑 − 𝑥𝑓
)︃(𝑆−𝑖)
(1− 𝑥*𝜑 − 𝑥𝑓 ). (2.24)
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We use these to compare the trade-off between diversity and profit (Fig. 2-6, left column).
At a particular harvest level, 𝛼 diversity is always higher when reserves are present,
as a set of patches with all species present is preserved. The maximum profit attainable
is, however, lower if reserves are implemented (Fig. 2-6 (b)). Hart (2006) found a similar
pattern in a single-species model, maximizing yield. The harvest rate that maximizes profit
and the harvest rate at open access both increase. Consistent with this finding, Halpern
et al. (2004) showed that concentrated effort outside reserves cannot produce comparable
harvest to a community without reserves, unless there is a compensatory increase to the
production rate.
In addition to increased diversity at all harvest rates, reserves provide an additional
benefit: a diversity buffer. Whatever the harvest rate, diversity cannot fall below a lower
limit (equal to 𝑥𝑓𝑆). Even when the community is harvested at extreme (open access)
harvest levels, some diversity is preserved. We define ‘protected diversity’ as the difference
in diversity in the community at open-access when no reserve is present and when it is. At
very high harvest rates, the diversity gain is almost entirely due to the diversity of patches
in the reserve state; outside the reserves, most patches will be in uninhabitable states.
We can calculate the forgone profit necessary to achieve different combinations of the
two types of diversity: protected diversity and the realized diversity gain. In Fig. 2-7 we
show that the cost of adding relatively large amounts of protected diversity is consistently
low (i.e., the iso-cost curves are approximately flat over large ranges of protected diversity).
The white line shows the diversity at the profit maximizing harvest rate for a given amount
of protected diversity. Above the white line, one can often gain protected diversity without
sacrificing much profit by increasing the reserve fraction. Below the white line, for a fixed
protected diversity, one can always increase the diversity gain and profit by decreasing the
harvest rate. Overall, while increasing the diversity in a community (relative to the profit
maximizing level) has a cost, the cost of using marine reserves to do so—which provides a
degree of guaranteed diversity even if over-harvested—is relatively cheap. These patterns
are consistent for other parameter values.
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Figure 2-6: Both left panels show a fifteen-species version of the null model (Eqs. 2.18 -
2.19), while the right panels show the facilitation model (Eqs. 2.25-2.28) with parameter
values 𝑐 = 5, 𝑟 = 1, 𝜀 = 1, and 𝑤 = 0.5. The black, dashed line indicates a community with
20% in reserve and the solid line indicates a community with no reserves. (top) 𝛼 diversity
as a function of harvest rate. The open access harvest rates are marked. The vertical arrow
shows the ‘protected diversity’, which is the difference between the diversity at open access
with no reserves and at open access with a reserve. (bottom) Profit as a function of harvest
rate. The vertical arrow shows the difference in maximal profit rate without and with a
reserve.
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Figure 2-7: The cost, in forgone profit, necessary to achieve different levels of protected
diversity and diversity gain for a fifteen-species version of the null model (Eqs. 2.18-2.19)
and facilitation model (Eqs. 2.25-2.28) with parameter values 𝑐 = 5, 𝑟 = 1, 𝑤 = 0.5 and
𝜀 = 1. Since 𝛼 diversity is positive at ℎ = ℎ𝑃𝑀 , the diversity gain does not extend
to 𝑆 = 15. The white line shows the profit-maximizing diversity gain for each level of
protected diversity. Points below this line are sub-optimal in both diversity and profit.
2.5 Facilitation Model
Real communities are more complicated than our null model: species interact, have different
life-history traits, and are differentially valuable when harvested. In this section we present
a model in which interspecies interactions are strong, as a contrast to the null model.
As in the null model, species accumulate in a patch as they colonize, but in this “facil-
itation” model, species colonize in sequential order, (i.e., species 2 cannot colonize unless
species 1 is present, and species 3 cannot colonize without species 2, etc.). Once a species
has colonized, it does not displace the previous inhabitants, so a patch with species 5 nec-
essarily will contain species 1 through 4 as well. Uninhabitable patches, which are created
by harvest, must recover from this disturbance before they can be colonized by the first
species.
Because of this strong facilitative interaction, the number of states is tremendously
reduced compared to the null model with the same number of species. One can now specify
the state of a patch with a scalar quantity indicating the number of species in a patch. We
call the proportion of patches in state 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖. As before, we write a system of differential
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Figure 2-8: Schematic of facilitation model (Eqs. 2.25-2.28) states (boxes), transitions (ar-
rows), and rates (arrow labels). Like in the null model, patches can transition from being
uninhabitable from habitable and empty at rate 𝑟, but subsequent colonization can only
be by species 1. Those patches may then be colonized by species 2, etc. at rates that
are proportional to the propagule production rate 𝑐 and the number of patches able to be
colonized and to colonize. All patches may be harvested at rate ℎ.
equations to track how colonization, harvest, and recovery change the proportion of patches
in these states. (For parameters and variables see Table 2.3.) We again imagine 𝑁 patches
inhabited by 𝑆 species. 𝑥𝜑 indicates the fraction of patches that are uninhabitable. These
are created through harvest (at rate ℎ) and recover at rate 𝑟:
𝑑𝑥𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑟𝑥𝜑. (2.25)
Let us focus on patches in state 𝑖. The proportion of such patches changes when propagules
from species 𝑖 colonize state 𝑖 − 1 patches, propagules from species 𝑖 + 1 colonize state
𝑖 patches, or state 𝑖 patches are harvested and rendered uninhabitable. Colonization by
species 𝑖 occurs via propagules which are produced at a per patch rate of 𝑐𝑖. Combining
these, we obtain (c.f. Fig. 2-8):
𝑑𝑥0
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑥𝜑 − 𝑐1𝑥0
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖 − ℎ𝑥0, (2.26)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑐𝑖+1𝑥𝑖
⎛⎝ 𝑆∑︁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑥𝑗
⎞⎠+ 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖−1
⎛⎝ 𝑆∑︁
𝑗=𝑖
𝑥𝑗
⎞⎠− ℎ𝑥𝑖, (2.27)
𝑑𝑥𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐𝑆𝑥𝑆𝑥𝑆−1 − ℎ𝑥𝑆 . (2.28)
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Table 2.3: Facilitation model parameters and variables.
Term Units Definition
Parameters
r time−1 rate of recovery for uninhabitable
patches to become habitable
c time−1 rate of propagule production from a
single patch
𝑤 $patch−1 cost of effort
𝜀 [] efficiency of harvest
N # number of patches in the community
S # spp. number species in the community
Variables
hline h time−1 rate of harvest; this renders the har-
vested patch uninhabitable
𝑥𝜑 [] proportion of patches in uninhabit-
able state
𝑥𝑖 [] proportion of patches with species 1
through 𝑖
𝑥𝑓 [] proportion of patches in reserve,
with all 𝑆 species present
𝜌𝑗 $ the value of species 𝑗
𝜅 [] constant that relates the value of
patches in state 𝑗 − 1 to those in
state 𝑗
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2.5.1 Facilitation Model: Equilibria
As in the null model, while individual patches continue to change state, the proportions of
patches in different states equilibrate. These equilibria are straightforward to calculate for
arbitrary parameter values (Appendix 3). Here we focus on the case when the propagule
production rate is equal among species (i.e., 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all 𝑖). We illustrate this case for
comparison with the null model.
For the model given by Eqns. (2.25)-(2.28), the number of species that can persist is
given by
𝑆* = min
(︂
𝑆,
⌊︁ 𝑐𝑟
ℎ(𝑟 + ℎ)
⌋︁)︂
, (2.29)
where ⌊ ⌋ indicates the floor function.
If the harvest rate is high relative to the propagule production and recovery rates, all
𝑆 species cannot co-exist in the community at equilibrium. Thus, species 1 through 𝑆*
occupy positive proportions of the habitat, while species above 𝑆* are absent. The stable
solution when 𝑆* > 0 (Appendix 3) is
𝑥*𝜑 =
ℎ
𝑟 + ℎ
, (2.30)
𝑥*𝑖 =
ℎ
𝑐
, for 𝑖 = 0, . . . , 𝑆* − 1, (2.31)
𝑥*𝑆* =
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− 𝑆
*ℎ
𝑐
, and (2.32)
𝑥*𝑗 = 0, for 𝑗 > 𝑆
*. (2.33)
The proportion of patches in the uninhabitable state is the same as in the null model. In the
null model, all species are extirpated when ℎ(𝑟 + ℎ)/𝑟 > 𝑐. In contrast, in the facilitation
model, species are sequentially extirpated from the community as harvest rate increases
from zero, with the late colonizers being the most vulnerable to overfishing (Supplementary
fig. 2-9). The earliest colonizer (species 1), which is the most resilient in the face of
harvesting, is eliminated at the same harvest rate that would eliminate all species in the
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Figure 2-9: Proportion of patches with differing numbers (labelled) of coexisting species in
the facilitation model (Eqs. 2.25-2.28) with parameter values 𝑆 = 15, 𝑐 = 5, and 𝑟 = 1.
Unlike in the null model, the number of species also uniquely identifies the patch type.
null model.
2.5.2 Facilitation Model: Diversity and Profit
Using Eqns. (2.30)-(2.33), we can calculate equilibrium diversity and profit. The expected
number of species in a patch, or 𝛼 diversity is
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𝛼 =
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑖𝑥𝑖, (2.34)
=
[︂
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ(𝑆
* + 1)
2𝑐
]︂
𝑆*, (2.35)
since a patch in state 𝑖 has 𝑖 species present and 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐.
Diversity declines monotonically with harvest in the facilitation model, but more pre-
cipitously at low harvest levels than in the null model (Fig. 2-4 (a)). Diversity vanishes
(i.e., all species are extirpated) at the same harvest rate for both types of communities.
In the facilitation model, species are not identical. It is reasonable then to allow different
species to have different economic value. Let 𝜌𝑗 be the value of species 𝑗. A simple model
for species values is the geometric series:
𝜌𝑗 = 𝜌1𝜅
𝑗−1. (2.36)
If the constant 𝜅 is less than 1, early colonizing species are worth more than later colonizers;
𝜅 > 1 indicates the opposite. We use 𝜌1 = 1 and 𝜅 = 0.9, 1, and 1.1 to explore different
value relationships.
The value of a patch in state 𝑖 is then
𝑝𝑖 =
𝑖∑︁
𝑗=1
𝜌𝑗 , (2.37)
and the total harvest value is
𝜋 = ℎ
[︃
𝜀
𝑆∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖)− 𝑤
]︃
. (2.38)
As in the null model, profit is maximized at an intermediate harvest rate (Supplemental
fig. 2-11). At open-access, profit is zero and the harvest rate is higher. As might be expected,
profits are larger, and profit-maximizing harvest rates are smaller, if later colonizing species
are more valuable relative to early colonizers (i. e., for larger 𝜅). Profit is maximized at
lower harvest rates than in the null model (compare Supplemental fig. 2-11 with Fig. 2-
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Figure 2-10: (a) 𝛼 versus 𝜋 for a fifteen-species version of the facilitation model (Eqs. 2.25-
2.28), with 𝑤 = 0.05, 𝑟 = 1, 𝜀 = 1, and 𝑐 = 5. Price per patch was determined by 𝜅, as
marked. (b) Potential profit lost from harvesting at the diversity maximizing level (ℎ = 0).
(c) The diversity gain from no harvest relative to harvesting at the profit maximizing level
(ℎ = ℎ𝑃𝑀 ). For all panels, 𝑆 = 15, 𝑟 = 1, 𝜌1 = 1, and 𝜀 = 1.
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4(b)). At sufficiently high harvest levels, when only early colonizing species persist, the
profit is essentially independent of 𝜅.
We can now compare the diversity and profit among fisheries with different biological or
economic parameterizations (Fig. 2-10). Diversity is again maximized at 𝛼 = 𝑆 when ℎ = 0
and 𝜋 = 0. Fig. 2-10(b) shows the potential profit that is lost by maximizing diversity.
Fig. 2-10(c) shows the diversity that is gained by not harvesting, relative to harvesting to
maximize profit; this is the difference between maximum diversity, 𝑆, and the diversity at
the profit maximizing-harvest level. Below, we highlight several qualitative patterns in the
trade-off between diversity and profit.
First note that low harvest costs (𝑤) and high propagule production rates (𝑐) increase
profits. In such profitable systems, the trade-off between diversity and profit is relatively
large; however, as later colonizers become more valuable (higher 𝜅), the trade-off between
diversity and profit is diminished. In contrast, communities with high effort costs and low
propagule production rates do not tend to have a large trade-off, as both the profit loss and
diversity gain are low.
One interesting case to consider is a low 𝜅 community (first column of Fig. 2-10) with
low 𝑤 and low 𝑐. While the monetary loss from maximizing diversity is low, the diversity
gain is still high. In this case, even though the profit maximizing harvest level is low
(and thus profits are low), diversity declines even more rapidly (as the community re-builds
species slowly), making the profit maximizing diversity level low. As 𝜅 increases, and the
trade-off between diversity and profit decreases, this low 𝑤, low 𝑐 region ceases to have such
high diversity costs.
2.5.3 Facilitation Model: Spatial Management
Let 𝑥𝑓 be the proportion of patches that are set aside in a reserve. These patches cannot be
fished and we assume they are in the unharvested equilibrium state with all species present.
We modify Eqns. (2.25)-(2.28) to obtain a set of 𝑆 + 2 differential equations which describe
the dynamics of a facilitation system with reserves:
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Figure 2-11: Harvest rate versus profit for the facilitation model (Eqs. 2.25-2.28) with
𝑆 = 15, 𝑟 = 1, 𝜀 = 1, 𝑤 = 0.05, 𝜌1 = 1, and 𝑐 = 5. Three different pricing schemes are
shown (legend). The ‘kinks’ in the profit curve occur when species are extirpated from the
community.
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𝑑𝑥𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ(1− 𝑥𝜑 − 𝑥𝑓 )− 𝑟𝑥𝜑, (2.39)
𝑑𝑥0
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑥𝜑 − 𝑐1𝑥0
𝑆∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑗 − ℎ𝑥0, (2.40)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑐𝑖+1𝑥𝑖
⎛⎝𝑥𝑓 + 𝑆∑︁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑥𝑗
⎞⎠+ 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖−1
⎛⎝𝑥𝑓 + 𝑆∑︁
𝑗=𝑖
𝑥𝑗
⎞⎠− ℎ𝑥𝑖, (2.41)
𝑑𝑥𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐𝑆(𝑥𝑓 + 𝑥𝑆)𝑥𝑆−1 − ℎ𝑥𝑆 . (2.42)
Using a modification of Eqn. (2.35) to calculate diversity:
𝛼 =
𝑆∑︁
𝑖
𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑆𝑥𝑓 (2.43)
and Eqn. (2.38) along with the (numerically derived) equilibria of this system, we can
calculate diversity and profit for communities with and without reserves (Fig. 2-6).
As in the null model, diversity is always higher in communities with reserves, and at
high harvest levels the diversity is almost entirely within the reserves. The implementation
of reserves reduces the maximum profit rate (Fig. 2-6(b)), but higher harvest levels can still
be profitable. In these instances, the open-access harvest rate is larger.
We again calculate the ‘protected diversity’, ‘forgone profit’, and ‘diversity gain’ for all
combinations of harvest rates and reserve fractions. These quantities are calculated in the
same way as in the null model and are shown schematically in Fig. 2-1b. The cost in forgone
profit of different levels of protected diversity and diversity gain is shown in Fig. 2-6.
Qualitatively, the trade-offs among cost and the two diversity metrics are the same as
in the null model, although the maximum foregone profit and maximum diversity gains are
lower in the facilitation model. For a given reserve fraction, the protected diversity is the
same between the two models. The cost of adding protected diversity to a given level of
diversity gain is still minimal and is generally cheaper than in the null model.
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2.6 Discussion
The coupled metacommunity-economic modeling framework we have described provides a
way to examine the ecological and economic factors that influence profit-diversity trade-offs.
The quantities we highlighted—foregone profit, diversity gain, and protected diversity—are
useful for structuring thinking about the trade-offs in a complex bioeconomic system (Fig. 2-
1).
Our framework is, perhaps, best suited for identifying the types of harvested communi-
ties that are cost-effective to manage. For example, our analysis showed that in communities
structured by facilitative colonization dynamics, a manager could often increase diversity
without sacrificing much profit from reduced harvest, especially when propagule production
rates and harvest costs are low.
An advantage of the framework is that it permits inclusion of a variety of ecological
rates and types of interactions. This is important, because such variation exists in real
marine systems. For example, strongly competitive systems that exhibit trophic cascades
have been observed (Casini et al., 2008), while other systems show strong facilitative in-
teractions (Silliman et al., 2011). These communities may change at vastly different rates.
Recovery from harvest disturbance may take a long time—hundreds of years for deep water
corals, which grow on the order of a few millimeters per year (Lartaud et al., 2012)—or
a short time—for habitats which are not damaged by fishing, such as long-line fished sys-
tems or those with muddy substrates. Additionally, colonization rates can vary widely in
marine metacommunities and may depend upon oceanographic features, the distribution
of habitat, and species’ attributes. Strategic models of the kind we developed here can
accommodate this ecological variability and complement the system specific analyses that
model the interactions and management of a particular community (e.g., Rassweiler et al.,
2012).
In our analysis, we compared a null-community with no interactions to one with strong,
facilitative colonizing interactions. The facilitative interaction results in a community that
is more sensitive to harvest; it loses species sequentially as harvest rates increase. In con-
trast, all species persist in the null model until the harvest rate exceeds a threshold value.
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Facilitative community assembly also reduces profits and profit-maximizing harvest rates.
Both the magnitude and shape of the profit-diversity trade-off are changed by the type
of ecological interaction (Figs. 2-5 and 2-10). Decreasing propagule production rates or
colonization rates affect the diversity-profit trade-off in similar ways in both the null and
facilitation models; the magnitude of the trade-off is changed, but not the shape.
The reader should not expect that the relationship between profit and diversity will
always have be as simple as the curves depicted in Figs. 2-1, 2-4(c), and 2-10(a); other
types of ecological interactions will produce even more interesting, complicated trade-offs.
For example, in a competitive metacommunity where species displace each other at a patch
(modeled by Hastings (1980)), there is non-monotonic relationship between the harvest
rate and the number of species that persist. Our preliminary analysis of optimal harvest in
this type of community suggests that the relationship between diversity and profit is more
complex. In addition, other measures of diversity (e.g., beta-diversity or species richness)
may be better suited to capturing these trade-offs.
The models we formulated can include potentially large numbers of species. The exten-
sive literature on two species metacommunities has illustrated how important interspecies
interactions are for species persistence and diversity patterns (e.g., Caswell and Cohen
(1991), Nee and May (1992), Klausmeier (2001), Prakash and de Roos (2004), Gouhier
et al. (2011)). When these models are extended to include marine reserves, species interac-
tions may change the optimal reserve size and configuration (Baskett et al., 2007; Baskett,
2007). We extended these results by showing that such interactions continue to be impor-
tant in much larger communities. Our results comport with those of Matsuda and Abrams
(2006) who studied yield in multispecies fisheries and found, like we did, that few species
are driven to extinction at yield (or in our case, profit) maximizing harvest levels. In ad-
dition, the authors found that constraining the harvest to prevent species extinction could
be done without substantially reducing yield, which is analogous to our result for the cost
of protected diversity.
We also investigated the cost of using marine reserves as a diversity-preserving man-
agement technique. In particular, we highlighted differences in the diversity gains achieved
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when the harvest rate maximizes profit or dissipates it at open access. For both the null
and facilitation models, we found that that the cost of achieving some protected diversity
tends to be low. At least for the theoretical communities we studied, marine reserves are
an efficient way to prevent the erosion of diversity at high harvest levels.
In contrast with some previous results, we found that marine reserves are not economi-
cally optimal in this model. (I.e., reserves never increase the maximum profit attainable).
Different per patch pricing methods that we examined did not reverse this result. Other,
single-species models (e.g., Neubert 2003; Sanchirico et al. 2006; Neubert and Herrera 2008;
White et al. 2008; Moeller and Neubert 2013) have found reserves to be economically opti-
mal; these models incorporate spatial heterogeneity, which our models do not.
Our models also neglect natural disturbance. Thus, the inclusion of marine reserves
here shows the maximum diversity benefit of reserves, as reserves have all species present.
Natural disturbance primarily affects the role of marine reserves (in the non-reserve section,
a disturbance rate that reduces all patches to being uninhabitable is additive with harvest
and can be easily separated), as an additional 𝑆 + 2 equations to track the natural destruc-
tion and re-building of non-fished patches would be required. The magnitude of natural
disturbance relative to the colonization, harvest, and recovery rates will determine whether
natural disturbance is critical to the trade-offs we described here.
We assume that harvesters do not know the state of a particular patch, but rather only
know the mean conditions of the entire metacommunity. They are additionally harvesting all
fish present at a patch. In reality, harvesters with modern technology are increasingly able to
target specific species of fish at specific locations. Allowing fishermen to target either species
(species-specific harvest rates) or areas in space would dramatically increase the number of
states and/or controls. This would certainly make harvesters more economically efficient
and likely qualitatively change the shape of the trade-off between profit and diversity.
This framework allowed us to investigate broad scale patterns of diversity-profit trade-
offs and identify regions where conservation would be cost-effective. We believe there are
many interesting directions to extend this work. For example, our model is spatially im-
plicit and does not allow us to investigate spatial patterns in connectivity (for colonization)
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or in harvest (such as ‘fishing the line around marine reserves’). The inclusion of spatial
complexity allows for spatial variation in harvest, which can result in non-intuitive configu-
rations of harvesting effort (Wilen et al., 2002; Neubert, 2003; Kellner et al., 2007; Costello
and Polasky, 2008). These analyses show that complicated patterns that are not intuitively
obvious may appear when harvester behavior in space is accounted for. Spatial variation in
harvest may mitigate the trade-off between harvest and biodiversity objectives.
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Appendix: Null Illustration
Fig. 2-2 is an illustration of the two-species version of the null metacommunity model.
The states of this model are listed in Table 2.4. The dynamics of the state transitions are
governed by
𝑑𝑥𝜑
𝑑𝑡
= ℎ
∑︁
𝑖
∑︁
𝑗
𝑥𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑟𝑥𝜑 (2.44)
𝑑𝑥[0,0]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑥𝜑 − 𝑐(𝑥[1,0] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[0,0] − 𝑐(𝑥[0,1] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[0,0] − ℎ𝑥[0,0] (2.45)
𝑑𝑥[1,0]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐(𝑥[1,0] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[0,0] − 𝑐(𝑥[0,1] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[1,0] − ℎ𝑥[1,0] (2.46)
𝑑𝑥[0,1]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐(𝑥[0,1] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[0,0] − 𝑐(𝑥[1,0] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[0,1] − ℎ𝑥[0,1] (2.47)
𝑑𝑥[1,1]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐(𝑥[1,0] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[0,1] + 𝑐(𝑥[0,1] + 𝑥[1,1])𝑥[1,0] − ℎ𝑥[1,1]. (2.48)
States Description
𝜑 uninhabitable
[0, 0] habitable, empty
[1, 0] only species 1 present
[0, 1] only species 2 present
[1, 1] both species present
Table 2.4: Definition of states for the null model (Eqns. 2.1 and 2.2).
Appendix: Stability of the null model
The Jacobian matrix, which consists of partial derivatives of the differential equations, is:
𝐽 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−(ℎ + 𝑟) 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
−𝑐𝑦𝑖 0 · · · 𝑐(1− 𝑥𝜑)− ℎ− 2𝑐𝑦𝑖 0
...
...
...
...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(2.49)
Because the determinant for this matrix is just the product of the diagonal entries, the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian are described by
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0 = (−(ℎ + 𝑟)− 𝜆)Π𝑆𝑖=1 (𝑐(1− 𝑥𝜑)− ℎ− 2𝑐𝑦𝑖 − 𝜆) . (2.50)
𝑦𝑖s are equivalent for all 𝑖, so we can simplify to
0 = (−(ℎ + 𝑟)− 𝜆) (𝑐(1− 𝑥𝜑)− ℎ− 2𝑐𝑦𝑖 − 𝜆)𝑆 . (2.51)
𝜆 thus can take two values, −(𝑟 + ℎ) or 𝑐(1− 𝑥𝜑)− ℎ− 2𝑐𝑦𝑖. The first is always negative,
since 𝑟 and ℎ are non-negative. When 𝑦𝑖 = 0, 𝜆 =
(︁
𝑐𝑟
𝑟+ℎ − ℎ
)︁
is negative (and thus this
solution is locally stable) whenever 𝑐 < ℎ(𝑟+ℎ)𝑟 .
The other solution is 𝑦𝑖 =
𝑟
𝑟+ℎ − ℎ𝑐 .
𝜆 = 𝑐
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ− 2𝑐
(︂
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ
𝑐
)︂
. (2.52)
Setting 𝜆 < 0, we find that this solution is stable when 𝑐 > ℎ(𝑟+ℎ)𝑟 .
Appendix 3: Solutions and stability of the facilitation model
Equations 2.25 and 2.26-2.28 are set to zero to solve for the equilibria. 𝑥*𝜑 is the same as
in the null model and is equal to ℎ/(𝑟 + ℎ). We then solve for the equilibrium of the next
highest state, 𝑥*0. The roots of the quadratic are
𝑥0 =
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
and
ℎ
𝑐1
. (2.53)
𝑥*0 = ℎ/𝑐1 when 𝑥1 > 0. Because when 𝑥0 = 𝑟/(𝑟 + ℎ), 𝑥𝜑 + 𝑥0 = 1, only the second
solution makes sense if there are patches in other states.
We repeat the same procedure to solve for 𝑥1, using 𝑥0 = ℎ/𝑐1; the roots are
𝑥*1 =
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ
𝑐1
and
ℎ
𝑐2
. (2.54)
Again, the first solution corresponds to a case in which species 2 (and above) are absent.
Because of this structure, we can solve for an arbitrary 𝑖.
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𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 0 = −𝑐𝑖+1𝑥𝑖
𝑆∑︁
𝑗=𝑖+1
𝑥𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖−1
𝑆∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑗 − ℎ𝑥𝑖 (2.55)
0 = −𝑐𝑖+1𝑥𝑖
⎛⎝1− 𝑥𝜑 − 𝑖∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑗
⎞⎠+ 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖−1
⎛⎝1− 𝑥𝜑 − 𝑖−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑗
⎞⎠− ℎ𝑥𝑖 (2.56)
0 = −𝑐𝑖+1𝑥𝑖
⎡⎣ 𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ
⎛⎝ 𝑆∑︁
𝑗=1
1
𝑐𝑗
⎞⎠− 𝑥𝑖
⎤⎦+ 𝑐𝑖 ℎ
𝑐𝑖
⎡⎣ 𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ
⎛⎝ 𝑆∑︁
𝑗=1
1
𝑐𝑗
⎞⎠⎤⎦− ℎ𝑥𝑖
𝑥*𝑖 is either
𝑥𝑖 =
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− ℎ
𝑆∑︁
𝑗=1
1
𝑐𝑗
(2.57)
𝑥𝑖 =
ℎ
𝑐𝑖+1
(2.58)
If 𝑥𝑖 =
ℎ
𝑐𝑖
pushes the sum of all uninhabitable and lower hierarchy patches higher than one,
the first solution must hold. Alternatively 𝑟𝑟+ℎ − ℎ
∑︀𝑆
𝑗=1
1
𝑐𝑗
must always be non-negative,
since this expresses the proportion of patches ‘left over’ for state 𝑖. When 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐, this
simplifies to 𝑐 ≥ 𝑖ℎ𝑟 (𝑟 + ℎ). The highest species number that can persist, 𝜙 is
𝜙 = min
(︂
𝑆, ⌊ 𝑐𝑟
ℎ(𝑟 + ℎ)
⌋
)︂
. (2.59)
Thus, for that case, the total solution is expressed as
x* =
[︂
ℎ
𝑟 + ℎ
,
ℎ
𝑐
,
ℎ
𝑐
, ...,
𝑟
𝑟 + ℎ
− 𝜙ℎ
𝑐
, 0, ...
]︂
. (2.60)
Cases in which 𝑐𝑖 is not the same among species follow a similar pattern.
To test local stability, we constructed the Jacobian, 𝐽 , for this system:
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⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−(ℎ + 𝑐∑︀𝑆𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖)− 𝑟 −𝑐𝑥0 − 𝑟 −𝑐𝑥0 − 𝑟 · · · −𝑐𝑥0 − 𝑟
0 𝑐
∑︀𝑆
𝑗=𝑖 𝑥𝑖 −(ℎ + 𝑐
∑︀𝑆
𝑗=𝑖+1 𝑥𝑗) + 𝑐𝑥𝑖−1 𝑐(𝑥𝑖−1 − 𝑥𝑖) · · ·
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 0 𝑐𝑥𝑆 −ℎ + 𝑐𝑥𝑠−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(2.61)
We substituted the solutions from equation 2.60 for systems with randomly generated pa-
rameter values for 𝑆, 𝑟, 𝑐 over harvest rates ranging from 0 to 10. The eigenvalues, calculated
with MATLAB, were always negative for these solutions, while other solutions (specifically,
that for 𝜙 one species lower) were unstable.
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Chapter 3
On the Bioeconomics of Marine
Reserves when Dispersal Evolves
3.1 Abstract
1Marine reserves are an increasingly used and potentially contentious tool in fisheries man-
agement. Depending upon the way that individuals move, no-take marine reserves can be
necessary for maximizing equilibrium rent in some simple mathematical models. The im-
plementation of no-take marine reserves often generates a redistribution of fishing effort in
space. This redistribution of effort, in turn, produces sharp spatial gradients in mortality
rates for the targeted stock. Using a two-patch model, we show that the existence of such
gradients is a sufficient condition for the evolution of an evolutionarily stable conditional
dispersal strategy. Thus, the dispersal strategy of the fish depends upon the harvesting
strategy of the manager and vice versa. We find that an evolutionarily stable optimal har-
vesting strategy (ESOHS)—one which maximizes equilibrium rent given that fish disperse
in an evolutionarily stable manner—never includes a no-take marine reserve. This strategy
is economically unstable in the short run because a manager can generate more rent by
disregarding the possibility of dispersal evolution. Simulations of a stochastic evolutionary
1Originally published as “Moberg, E.A., Shyu, E., Herrera, G., Lenhart, S., Lou, Y., Neubert, M.G.
(2015) On the bioeconomics of marine reserves when dispersal evolves. Natural Resource Modelling.” 28 (4):
456-474. This version differs only in formatting.
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process suggest that such a short-run, myopic strategy performs poorly compared to the
ESOHS over the long run, however, as it generates rent that is lower on average and higher
in variability.
Keywords: evolution of dispersal, evolutionarily stable strategy, fisheries management, ma-
rine protected areas, optimal harvesting.
3.2 Introduction
No-take marine reserves are a type of “marine protected area” in which fishing is prohib-
ited. Closed areas like marine reserves have been used to manage artisanal fisheries on small
spatial scales for many years (Fogarty et al., 2000). The advent of geographical position-
ing systems (which make the possibility of enforcing closures more feasible (Pala, 2014))
combined with the decline of fish stocks, an increased demand for marine fish protein (FAO
Fisheries Department, 2014), and a call for ecosystem-based management, have led not only
to increased study of the efficacy of marine reserves but also to an increase in their imple-
mentation. Marine protected area coverage worldwide has increased by over 150% since
2003 (Toropova et al., 2010).
A number of studies have shown that marine reserves can contribute to the conserva-
tion of stocks and to the ecosystems that support them (e. g., Halpern and Warner, 2002;
Halpern, 2003; Lester et al., 2009). Increases in individual size, biomass, population density
and species diversity have been shown to increase subsequent to reserve establishment (see
examples in, for example, Lester and Halpern, 2008).
The potential economic costs or benefits of reserves are less clear (Kaiser, 2005; White
et al., 2008; Hart and Sissenwine, 2009; Fletcher et al., 2015, in press). Some modeling
studies (e. g., Neubert, 2003; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2005; Sanchirico et al., 2006; Armstrong,
2007; Neubert and Herrera, 2008; Joshi et al., 2009; Moeller and Neubert, 2013) have shown
that the establishment of marine reserves for conservation purposes does not necessarily
require a reduction in economic productivity. Indeed, in some models reserves are necessary
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to maximize yield or sustainable rent. Others (including Polacheck, 1990; Quinn et al.,
1993; Man et al., 1995; Holland and Brazee, 1996; Nowlis and Roberts, 1999; Guenette
and Pitcher, 1999; Hastings and Botsford, 1999; Li, 2000; Pezzey et al., 2000; Sanchirico
and Wilen, 2001; Apostolaki et al., 2002) have shown that reserves may be yield-neutral
or produce minor improvements when compared with non spatial effort-control policies. In
some cases, the establishment of a reserve decreases yield (Tuck and Possingham, 1994).
The optimality of reserves, then, would seem to depend both on the objective as well as
the ecological and economic circumstances. One phenomena, however, emerges from all of
these modeling studies, as well as from real-world observations (Fig. 3-1): the imposition
of marine reserves can produce a radical redistribution of fishing effort in space. Effort is
displaced from reserve areas and frequently concentrates near their borders as harvesters
attempt to catch the “spillover” from the reserves. As a consequence, the establishment of
marine reserves can produce sharp spatial gradients in mortality (Neubert, 2003; Kellner
et al., 2007; Joshi et al., 2009; Abbott and Haynie, 2012; Moeller and Neubert, 2013).
It is easy to imagine, that as a result of these gradients, there would be strong selective
pressure to evolve context-dependent dispersal (McPeek and Holt, 1992)—that is, low dis-
persal rates within the reserve and high dispersal rates outside—or, equivalently, the ability
for dispersing individuals to detect and preferentially settle in better patches. Since the
potential economic benefits of reserves rely on dispersal of individuals from reserves into
fished areas, evolution of dispersal might work against the generation of sustainable rent.
In this paper we explore that possibility with the aid of a simple,“two-patch” model
(Holt, 1985). We begin by briefly demonstrating that, in the absence of evolution, reserves
can be economically optimal when the two patches are sufficiently different in either their
biological or economic properties (Sanchirico et al., 2006). We then ask whether reserves
are ever optimal (in the sense of maximizing equilibrium rent) when dispersal evolves.
Our analysis of this second problem builds on the work of Law and Grey (1989) and Grey
(1993) who were perhaps the first to seriously investigate the interplay between harvest and
evolution, i. e., the inclusion of evolutionary change in the constrained optimization problem
of the resource manager. They developed the concept of an evolutionarily stable optimal
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Figure 3-1: Marine reserves (blue polygons) designed to manage scallop harvest off the New
England Coast. Dots indicate estimates of fishing effort in 2003, based on satellite tracking
of vessels. Warmer colors (green to red) denote more intense activity. The highest intensity
of fishing occurred right at MPA borders. Graphic from Fogarty and Murawski (2004).
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harvest strategy (ESOHS)2—a harvesting strategy “which gives the greatest sustainable
yield, after evolution caused by cropping has taken place.” Law and Grey (1989) were
particularly concerned with the problem of how age-specific harvesting selects for changes
in the age at maturity, so they developed the ESOHS concept in the context of life-history
theory (which generally ignores dispersal). We extend their idea here to the evolution of
dispersal in a spatially managed fishery and find that evolution qualitatively changes the
nature of the optimal distribution of fishing effort.
3.3 Model
The model we use is similar to those of Clark (1990, pg. 337) and Sanchirico et al. (2006),
both of which derive from the classic model of Gordon (1954). The model describes the
dynamics of a stock distributed across two spatial locations, or “patches,” connected by
dispersal. Each patch is characterized by an intrinsic rate of growth 𝑟𝑖 and a carrying
capacity 𝑘𝑖. Individuals leave a patch at a constant per capita rate 𝑚 and enter a common
pool of dispersers. From this pool a fraction 𝜀 (instantaneously) choose to settle into
patch 1; the remaining fraction, 1 − 𝜀, settle in patch 2. In this sense, 𝜀 can be thought
of as a disperser’s preference for patch 1. Patches are harvested at nonnegative patch-
dependent effort rates 𝐸𝑖. If the population size of the stock in patch 𝑖 is 𝑥𝑖, this fishing
effort generates yield at the rate 𝑞𝑖𝐸𝑖𝑥𝑖. The proportionality constants 𝑞𝑖 are called the
“catchability coefficients.”
Under this model, the dynamics of the stock in the two patches are given by the ordinary
differential equations
𝑑𝑥1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟1𝑥1
(︂
1− 𝑥1
𝑘1
)︂
−𝑚(1− 𝜀)𝑥1 + 𝑚𝜀𝑥2 − 𝑞1𝐸1𝑥1, (3.1)
𝑑𝑥2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟2𝑥2
(︂
1− 𝑥2
𝑘2
)︂
+ 𝑚(1− 𝜀)𝑥1 −𝑚𝜀𝑥2 − 𝑞2𝐸2𝑥2. (3.2)
If the price of fish is 𝑝, and the cost per unit of effort in patch 𝑖 is 𝑐𝑖, then the rent
2We prefer the pronunciation ess-oh-ess for this acronym.
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generated by harvesting is
𝜋[𝐸1, 𝐸2; 𝜀] =
2∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)𝐸𝑖. (3.3)
At first, we concern ourselves with the case in which a manager is able to control the levels
of effort in each of the patches (for example by limiting the number of boat-days available
for fishing or by taxing effort) and does so with the objective of maximizing the rent, 𝜋, at
equilibrium.
It is a simple matter to numerically calculate the equilibrium stock sizes from equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.2) for any combination of 𝐸1 and 𝐸2. These can be substituted into
formula (3.3) to determine the equilibrium rent. We call the effort levels that maximize the
equilibrium rent 𝐸*𝑖 , the corresponding stock sizes 𝑥
*
𝑖 , and the maximum equilibrium rent
𝜋*.
The optimal solution in patch 𝑖 will fall into one of three categories depending upon the
signs of 𝐸*𝑖 and the marginal rent in patch 𝑖, 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑥
*
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖. If
1. 𝐸*𝑖 > 0, we say the patch is fished ; if
2. 𝐸*𝑖 = 0 and 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑥
*
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 0, we say the patch is unfished ; and if
3. 𝐸*𝑖 = 0 and 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑥
*
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 > 0, we say the patch is in reserve.
We distinguish between unfished and reserve patches because the latter would require en-
forcement by the regulator—an individual harvester would have incentive to fish in that
patch, but doing so would reduce the total rent at equilibrium. In unfished patches the
marginal rent is negative, and rational harvesters (which we assume) avoid it of their own
accord.
The optimal equilibrium effort levels in each patch are determined by the model pa-
rameters (Fig. 3-2). When the patches are economically and ecologically identical, and
dispersers settle indifferently (i. e., 𝜀 = 0.5), the optimal strategy is to ensure that both
patches are harvested at the same rate (or not fished at all if 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 0). Asymmetric
settlement, or differences in intrinsic growth rates, carrying capacities, or harvest costs can
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Figure 3-2: Optimal fishing effort, in the absence of evolution, in each patch as patch
2 quality varies. Patch 2 is the ‘poorer’ patch in every case, with variations in patch 2
parameters noted on the abscissae. All other parameters are equal between patches, with
𝑘𝑖 = 10, 𝑟𝑖 = 2, 𝑞𝑖 = 1, 𝑐𝑖 = 0.25,𝑚 = 4, 𝑝 = 1. Note that the axis for 𝑐2 is flipped, because
patch 2 becomes ‘better’ (less costly to fish) as 𝑐2 decreases.
result in the optimal closing of one patch (blue and red regions of Fig. 3-2). For the rest of
the paper, we will explore cases in which patch 1 is in one way (and only one way) better
(for the harvesters) than patch 2; that is, all of the inequalities
𝑟1 ≥ 𝑟2, 𝑘1 ≥ 𝑘2, 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐2, 𝑞1 ≥ 𝑞2, (3.4)
are satisfied and only one is satisfied as a strict inequality. This is the case for all of the
parameter combinations encompassed by Fig. 3-2 and subsequent figures.
3.4 Evolution of dispersal and the ESS
In general, the optimal harvesting effort, and thus the per capita mortality rate, in each
patch will differ. The dispersal strategy may evolve in response to this mortality gradient.
Evolution, in turn, affects optimal fishing strategies, including the optimality of reserves,
through changes in dispersal. Here, we consider the evolution of 𝜀, the proportion of dis-
persers that settle into patch 1. We derive the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), 𝜀, the
dispersal phenotype against which no alternative phenotype can increase under selection.
In this section, we find an expression for 𝜀 and show that it is a “weak form ESS.” This ESS
is also convergence-stable, making it an evolutionary attractor to which the population will
converge in the long run.
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3.4.1 Calculating the ESS
To determine 𝜀, we begin by considering a population composed of a single “resident”
phenotype with dispersal preference 𝜀. The equilibrium stock sizes, ?¯?1 and ?¯?2, satisfy
[︂
𝑟1
(︂
1− ?¯?1
𝑘1
)︂
− 𝑞1𝐸1
]︂
?¯?1 −𝑚(1− 𝜀)?¯?1 + 𝑚𝜀?¯?2 = 0, (3.5)[︂
𝑟2
(︂
1− ?¯?2
𝑘2
)︂
− 𝑞2𝐸2
]︂
?¯?2 + 𝑚(1− 𝜀)?¯?1 −𝑚𝜀?¯?2 = 0. (3.6)
We will find it useful to define 𝛼𝑖 as the per capita growth rate, including fishing mortality,
in patch 𝑖 if it were isolated (i. e., if 𝑚 = 0). That is,
𝛼𝑖 =
[︂
𝑟𝑖
(︂
1− ?¯?𝑖
𝑘𝑖
)︂
− 𝑞𝑖𝐸𝑖
]︂
. (3.7)
𝛼𝑖 can be thought of as the fitness of an individual in patch 𝑖 at equilibrium.
The phenotype that characterizes the resident population evolves through invasions
(and sequential replacement) by rare mutants—alternative phenotypes that appear at low
frequencies. Mutants are identical to residents, save for their dispersal preference, which we
will denote as 𝜀′. A mutant’s fate depends on its invasion fitness—its initial growth rate
in the resident population. When it first appears, the mutant is rare, and its effect on the
resident’s population dynamics is negligible (Metz, 2008). Thus if 𝑥′1 and 𝑥′2 are the mutant
populations in the two patches, their dynamics are initially given by the linear system
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
⎛⎜⎝ 𝑥′1
𝑥′2
⎞⎟⎠ = A′
⎛⎜⎝ 𝑥′1
𝑥′2
⎞⎟⎠ (3.8)
where
A′ =
⎛⎜⎝𝛼1 −𝑚(1− 𝜀′) 𝑚𝜀′
𝑚(1− 𝜀′) 𝛼2 −𝑚𝜀′
⎞⎟⎠ . (3.9)
The invasion fitness is then given by the dominant eigenvalue of A′ (which is always real):
𝜆′ =
1
2
(︁
𝛼1 + 𝛼2 −𝑚 +
√︀
(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)2 + 2(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)(2𝜀′ − 1)𝑚 + 𝑚2
)︁
. (3.10)
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Note that the invasion fitness is a function of both the mutant phenotype and the resident
phenotype (because the 𝛼’s depend upon the equilibrium population sizes of the resident,
which, in turn depend on 𝜀).
If the invasion fitness (3.10) is positive, the mutant can replace the resident, inducing
evolutionary change; if negative, the mutant will be extirpated. An ESS, 𝜀, is a resident
phenotype that cannot be replaced by any 𝜀′, making it resistant to further evolution (Geritz
et al., 1998). A condition that must be satisfied by any ESS is that the selection gradient
𝑑𝜆′/𝑑𝜀′ vanishes when 𝜀′ = 𝜀 = 𝜀. Differentiating the invasion fitness (3.10) with respect to
𝜀′ and evaluating at 𝜀′ = 𝜀 = 𝜀 gives
𝜕𝜆′
𝜕𝜀′
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀′=𝜀=𝜀
=
(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)𝑚√︀
(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)2 + 2(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)(2𝜀− 1) + 𝑚2
= 0. (3.11)
Since we have assumed that 𝑚 is positive, a vanishing selection gradient (3.11) implies
that 𝛼1 = 𝛼2; but, adding (3.5) and (3.6) we find that
𝛼1?¯?1 + 𝛼2?¯?2 = 𝛼1(?¯?1 + ?¯?2) = 0. (3.12)
Thus, when the resident population sizes are positive, 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 0. That is, when the patch
preference is at its ESS value, 𝜀, the per capita growth rates in the two patches (including
fishing mortality) are identical and zero.
By setting 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 0 in equilibrium equations (3.5) and (3.6), we see that the only
potential ESS is
𝜀 =
?ˆ?1
?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2
, (3.13)
where
?ˆ?𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖
(︂
1− 𝑞𝑖𝐸𝑖
𝑟𝑖
)︂
(3.14)
are the corresponding population sizes.
Substituting the condition 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 0 into (3.10), we see that the invasion fitness of
any mutant is 0 whenever the resident phenotype is given by (3.13). Because the invasion
fitness is never positive, no mutant phenotype can increase under selection, confirming that
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(3.13) is a local ESS. Because the invasion fitness is always 0, however, every mutant will
have the same fitness as the resident, making (3.13) a ‘weak form ESS’ (sensu Uyenoyama
and Bengtsson, 1982).
3.4.2 Convergence stability of the ESS
As we show next, the evolutionarily stable dispersal strategy (3.13) is also convergence
stable—an evolutionary attractor to which a monomorphic population will converge through
small, successive mutations (Geritz et al., 1998). We thus expect the settlement preference
to evolve to, and remain at, 𝜀.
We demonstrate the convergence stability of 𝜀 using the second derivatives of the invasion
fitness (3.10). Convergence stability requires that
(︂
𝜕2𝜆′
𝜕𝜀 𝜕𝜀′
+
𝜕2𝜆′
𝜕𝜀′2
)︂ ⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀′=𝜀=𝜀
< 0. (3.15)
That is, the sum of these second derivatives, taken with respect to the resident and mutant
phenotypes, must be negative at the ESS 𝜀 (Eshel, 1983; Geritz et al., 1998).
Because 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 do not depend on the mutant strategy 𝜀
′, it follows that 𝜕2𝜆′/𝜕𝜀′2 =
0 when 𝛼1 = 𝛼2. Thus, (3.13) will be a convergence-stable ESS if 𝜕
2𝜆′/𝜕𝜀 𝜕𝜀′ < 0 at
𝜀′ = 𝜀 = 𝜀.
To calculate 𝜕2𝜆′/𝜕𝜀𝜕𝜀′, first differentiate the invasion fitness (3.10) with respect to 𝜀′:
𝜕𝜆′
𝜕𝜀′
=
(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)𝑚√︀
(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)2 + 2(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)(2𝜀′ − 1)𝑚 + 𝑚2
. (3.16)
Next, recall that 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 depend on the resident trait 𝜀, and rewrite the equilibrium
conditions (3.5) and (3.6) as
𝛼1 = 𝑚
[︂
1− 𝜀(?¯?1 + ?¯?2)
?¯?1
]︂
, (3.17)
𝛼2 = 𝑚
[︂
𝜀− (1− 𝜀)?¯?1
?¯?2
]︂
. (3.18)
Note that the equilibrium stock sizes ?¯?1 and ?¯?2 are both functions of 𝜀.
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We can substitute (3.17) and (3.18) into (3.16), and then differentiate with respect to
𝜀 to obtain 𝜕2𝜆′/𝜕𝜀𝜕𝜀′. After evaluating the resulting expression at 𝜀′ = 𝜀 = 𝜀, as given by
(3.13), we find that
𝜕2𝜆′
𝜕𝜀 𝜕𝜀′
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀′=𝜀=𝜀
=
𝑚
?ˆ?1?ˆ?2
[︂
?ˆ?2
𝑑?¯?1
𝑑𝜀
− ?ˆ?1𝑑?¯?2
𝑑𝜀
− (?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)2
]︂
. (3.19)
The derivatives 𝑑?¯?1/𝑑𝜀 and 𝑑?¯?2/𝑑𝜀 can be found by differentiating the equilibrium equa-
tions (3.5) and (3.6) with respect to 𝜀. When evaluated at 𝜀′ = 𝜀 = 𝜀 and ?¯?𝑖 = ?ˆ?𝑖, as given
by (3.14), these derivatives are
𝑑?¯?1
𝑑𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀′=𝜀=𝜀
=
𝑚𝑘1𝑟2?ˆ?2(?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)
2
𝑚𝑘2𝑟1?ˆ?21 + 𝑟2?ˆ?2 [𝑚𝑘1?ˆ?2 + 𝑟1?ˆ?1(?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)]
, (3.20)
𝑑?¯?2
𝑑𝜀
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀′=𝜀=𝜀
= − 𝑚𝑘2𝑟1?ˆ?1(?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)
2
𝑚𝑘2𝑟1?ˆ?21 + 𝑟2?ˆ?2 [𝑚𝑘1?ˆ?2 + 𝑟1?ˆ?1(?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)]
. (3.21)
After substituting (3.20) and (3.21) into (3.19), we find that
𝜕2𝜆′
𝜕𝜀 𝜕𝜀′
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜀′=𝜀=𝜀
= − 𝑚
?ˆ?1?ˆ?2
(︂
𝑟1𝑟2?ˆ?1?ˆ?2(?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)
3
𝑚𝑘2𝑟1?ˆ?21 + 𝑟2?ˆ?2 [𝑚𝑘1?ˆ?2 + 𝑟1?ˆ?1(?ˆ?1 + ?ˆ?2)]
)︂
< 0. (3.22)
It follows that inequality (3.15) is satisfied and the ESS settlement preference (3.13) is a
convergence-stable strategy.
3.5 The ESOHS and effects of evolution on optimal manage-
ment
In general, the rent that is generated in each patch depends upon the fishing effort in both
patches. This is not the case when the patch preference 𝜀 is at its ESS value 𝜀, which
becomes clear upon substituting the equilibrium stock sizes (3.14) into the rent (3.3):
𝜋[𝐸1, 𝐸2; 𝜀] = ?ˆ? =
2∑︁
𝑖=1
(︂
𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘𝑖
(︂
1− 𝑞𝑖𝐸𝑖
𝑟𝑖
)︂
− 𝑐𝑖
)︂
𝐸𝑖. (3.23)
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This means that when we maximize rent over 𝐸1 and 𝐸2, we are maximizing the rent in
the patches independently of each other. Thus, a reserve cannot be part of an ESOHS; a
patch should never be closed unless it is unprofitable to harvest (i. e., falls in the ‘unfished’
category). Specifically, the ESOHS is
?ˆ?*𝑖 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑟𝑖(𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘𝑖−𝑐𝑖)
2𝑝𝑞2𝑖 𝑘𝑖
if 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 > 0,
0 otherwise.
(3.24)
The resulting stock sizes in each patch at the ESOHS are
?ˆ?*𝑖 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(︁
𝑘𝑖 +
𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑞𝑖
)︁
if 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 > 0,
𝑘𝑖 otherwise.
(3.25)
The evolutionarily stable settlement preference at optimal harvest, 𝜀*, can be calculated
using (3.13) with stock sizes ?ˆ?𝑖 = ?ˆ?
*
𝑖 .
Spatial heterogeneity in biological or economic parameters is reflected in the ESOHS
(Fig. 3-3). When the patches differ in their biological parameters (𝑟 or 𝑘), the ESOHS
effort level in the worse patch is smaller than it would be if the patches were identical
and the parameter values were equal to their values in the good patch (Fig. 3-3, first two
columns). If the only difference between the patches is due to a difference in intrinsic growth
rate (i. e., if 𝑟2 < 𝑟1), the ESOHS settlement preference, 𝜀
*, remains 1/2, and the stock sizes
are equal to one half of the (identical) carrying capacity in each patch. In contrast, when
the carrying capacities of the two patches differ (i. e., 𝑘2 < 𝑘1), 𝜀 > 1/2, and settlement in
patch 1 is more frequent than settlement in patch 2. In combination with the lower carrying
capacity, this dispersal asymmetry results in a smaller equilibrium stock size in patch 2.
When the patches differ in one of their economic parameters (either 𝑐 or 𝑞; Fig. 3-3, last two
columns), 𝜀* < 1/2; that is, settlement is more frequent in the economically poorer patch.
If the patches only differ in the cost of fishing (i. e., 𝑐2 > 𝑐1), then the ESOHS effort in the
more expensive patch, as expected, is lower than in the less expensive patch. Combined
with the settlement asymmetry, this results in a larger standing stock in the poorer patch.
Similarly, there is a larger standing stock in patch 2 when fish are harder to catch there
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Figure 3-3: ESOHS settlement preference (𝜀*), fishing efforts (?ˆ?*𝑖 ), stock sizes (?ˆ?
*
𝑖 ) and
sustainable rent (?ˆ?*). Parameters not plotted are the same as in Fig. 3-2. In the middle
two rows, the solid curves indicate effort or stock size in patch 1; the dashed curves depict
the same quantities in patch 2. Note that the abscissa is reversed when it denotes the value
of 𝑐2. This makes those figures consistent with the rest in that patch 2 becomes either
biologically or economically “worse” as one moves from right to left along the abscissa.
Patch 2 is unfished for parameter values to the left of the vertical, red, dashed line in each
plot.
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(i. e., 𝑞2 < 𝑞1). In contrast with differences in cost, however, the ESOHS effort level in the
patch with lower catchability (?ˆ?*2) is higher than it is in the patch where fish are easier to
catch (at least until fish become so difficult to catch that it is no longer worth harvesting
in patch 2 at all).
3.5.1 Management with reserves
Marine reserves may be part of an economically optimal, equilibrium management strategy
when dispersal does not evolve; however, as (3.24) shows, this is not the case when dispersal
does evolve. While marine reserves are not part of the ESOHS, they may be desirable for
other purposes. It is therefore interesting to know how the establishment of a reserve would
impact profits. The impact of a reserve is contingent upon whether the organisms evolve
in response to differences in growth or mortality conditions.
We placed either patch 1 or patch 2 in reserve and calculated the unconstrained rent-
maximizing level of effort in the other patch. We also calculated the effort level when the
resulting settlement preference was constrained to be evolutionarily stable. We found that
using reserves when the settlement preference 𝜀 evolves can produce dramatically lower
profits (Fig. 3-4). When a patch is placed in reserve, 𝜀 evolves to increase the tendency
of fish to disperse to that patch (i.e., when patch 1 is in reserve, 𝜀 increases relative to its
value when both efforts are optimized to the ESS settlement preference). At least for the
parameter values we studied, 𝜀 varies most with variation in 𝑘2 and varies least with 𝑟2
(Fig. 3-4, top row).
3.5.2 Is the ESOHS economically stable?
The ESOHS represents the best equilibrium harvesting strategy under the constraint that
the strategy will not produce further evolutionary change. At the ESOHS no mutant phe-
notypes can invade and displace the resident phenotype. We have assumed that those
mutants are rare, so that there will generally be a long time between mutation events. In
between such events, however, the ESOHS is suboptimal. More rent could be extracted
from the resource if the manager were to set the effort levels at their unconstrained levels
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Figure 3-4: Percent of equilibrium rent lost, relative to an optimally managed system with
no evolution (in blue) or with evolution (in green). Either patch 1 is in reserve (solid line) or
patch 2 is in reserve (dashed line), and effort in the other patch is managed so as to maximize
equilibrium rent. Note that when there is no evolution, closing patch 2 may be part of the
optimal management strategy (when the dashed blue line is at 100%). Parameters are the
same as in Fig. 3-2.
(i. e., 𝜋[?ˆ?*1 , ?ˆ?*2 ; 𝜀*] ≤ 𝜋[𝐸*1 , 𝐸*2 ; 𝜀*]), and the manager will be sorely tempted to do so. As a
result, we should not expect the ESOHS to be economically stable.
As a consequence of fishing at (short-term) optimal levels, rather than according to the
ESOHS, the resident phenotype would no longer be an ESS and would be vulnerable to
an invasion by a more fit mutant. Of course the manager could simply change his or her
harvesting strategy to optimize the rent given this new phenotype. Because of the way
it disperses, the potential profitability of a new phenotype would likely be different than
that of the resident. Imagine that this iterative process—harvesting at rent-maximizing
rates, invasion of a new phenotype, adjustment of the harvesting rates, etc.—continued for
a long time. At some times the instantaneous rent would be larger than that that could be
generated by the ESOHS; in some instances, it would be less.
We simulated this “reactionary” policy by introducing a mutant phenotype according
to a Poisson process with rate constant 𝜇. We drew the mutant phenotype 𝜀′ from a
normal distribution with mean equal to the resident phenotype 𝜀, and standard deviation
𝜎, truncated so that 0 < 𝜀′ < 1. Whenever a mutant appeared, we computed the invasion
fitness (3.10). If the invasion fitness was positive, we replaced the resident by the mutant
phenotype and calculated a new harvesting policy that would maximize equilibrium rent for
the new phenotype. (In doing so, we implicitly assume that invasion implies displacement.
For sufficiently small mutations, Geritz et al. (2002) have proved that this substitution does
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occur.)
We show a single realization of such a reactionary harvesting policy in Fig. 3-5. When
the mutant invades, the efforts in each patch, the population levels, and the profits also
fluctuate. In the case illustrated, 𝜀 tends to be less than the ESOHS 𝜀 value, while the
effort and population levels tend to be higher than the ESOHS level in patch 1 (blue
lines) and lower in patch 2 (orange lines). The rent derived from the reactionary policy
tends to be less than the ESOHS rent for this realization. We simulated this stochastic
process for a variety of parameter values to assess the average performance of a reactionary
versus ESOHS harvesting policy; we found that the rent generated by the ESOHS always
exceeded the average rent generated by reactionary harvesting (Fig. 3-6, top row). It
appears that, on average, harvesting at rates that maximize short-term profits selects for
new phenotypes that are inimical to expected long-term sustainable rent. In addition to
boosting average rent, using the ESOHS has the additional advantage of reducing (to zero)
the variability in profits that would accompany reactionary harvesting (Fig. 3-6, bottom
row). Our simulations suggest that the more different the two patches are, the lower and
the more variable are the reactionary rents.
3.6 Discussion
In a simple two-patch model, we have shown that almost every optimal harvesting strategy is
unstable in the face of dispersal evolution. The exception is a unique evolutionarily stable
optimal harvesting strategy, or ESOHS, where dispersal, as described by the settlement
preference, is a convergence-stable, weak-form ESS. The ESOHS, however, is potentially
economically unstable: in the short term, a manager could always generate more rent using
a different distribution of effort (sometimes using a reserve), at least until a new phenotype
invades. A manager who employs a myopic, reactionary strategy of constantly maximizing
equilibrium rent, assuming that the current phenotype will not change, suffers reduced
average rent, and higher variation in rent, over long timescales. In the real world, there
would be economic and social benefits of a consistent harvest strategy, compared to one
that changed unpredictably in response to evolutionary changes.
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Figure 3-5: ESOHS harvesting (dotted lines) versus “reactionary” harvesting (solid lines)
in which the manager sets effort so as to maximize rent at the current settlement preference
(𝜀) without regard to evolutionary stability. Effort and stock size in patch 1 are shown in
blue; in patch 2, orange. Mutants (red dots) appear according to a Poisson process with
rate 𝜇 = 0.01. Each mutant phenotype 𝜀′ is drawn from a normal distribution with mean
given by the resident phenotype 𝜀, and standard deviation 𝜎 = 0.05, truncated so that
0 < 𝜀′ < 1. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 3-2, except 𝑘2 = 1.
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the ESOHS strategy (?ˆ?*) compared to “reactionary” harvesting (𝜋*) in which the manager
sets effort so as to maximize rent at the current settlement preference (𝜀) without regard to
evolutionary stability (cf. Fig. 3-5). As in earlier figures, all parameters are equal between
patches, except that which is noted on the abscissa. Mutants appear according to a Poisson
process at the rate 𝜇 = 0.01; their phenotype is drawn from a normal distribution with
mean given by the resident phenotype, and standard deviation 𝜎 = 0.05 (green stars) or
𝜎 = 0.5 (black circles), truncated so that 0 < 𝜀′ < 1. Averages were calculated over the
time interval [0, 100,000].
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Marine reserves do not play a role in the ESOHS for the two-patch model. This is
because evolution of dispersal acts to equalize fitness between the two patches and push
population densities to levels that result in no net movement between them. Without this
net movement of individuals, or “spillover,” from the reserve patch into the fished patch,
reserves only reduce economic benefits. The equilibration of fitness across habitats is the
sine qua non of the so-called ideal free distribution (Fretwell and Lucas, 1969). Based on
our results with the two-patch model, we conjecture that, more generally, marine reserves
will never be economically optimal when the dispersal behavior of individuals leads to the
ideal free distribution of the population. The evolution of dispersal, however, does not
inevitably lead to the ideal free distribution. In particular, the ideal free distribution does
not emerge as the result of an evolutionary stable dispersal strategy when the environment
has a source-sink structure and is characterized by temporal variability in fitness (Holt and
Barfield, 2001; Schreiber, 2012). Describing the ESOHS in such circumstances, if one exists,
would be challenging.
Our results, when combined with the results from Baskett et al. (2007), who found
that increased fragmentation of a reserve network tended to reduce dispersal distance (i. e.,
increase local retention), suggests that evolution of dispersal may be an important consid-
eration for spatially managed fisheries. However, our understanding of the likely effects of
dispersal evolution on optimal management is still nascent. For example, dispersal may
encompass a host of traits, including larval duration, the proportion of offspring which dis-
perse or migrate (a` la Baskett et al., 2007; Dunlop et al., 2009), or adaptive movements of
mature individuals (a` la Abrams et al., 2012). How reserves impact population sizes and
selection pressures will depend on the particular dispersal trait.
Of course, settlement preference is not the only life history trait that may evolve in
response to harvesting (Borisov, 1978; Jørgensen et al., 2007; Allendorf et al., 2008; Heino
and Dieckmann, 2009). Most other studies have focused on size-selective harvest, evolution
of age or size at maturity (Kuparinen and Merila¨, 2007) and the consequences (both negative
and positive) that such fisheries induced evolution can have on sustainable yield or rent(Law
and Grey, 1989; Heino, 1998; Law, 2000; Ratner and Lande, 2001; Eikeset et al., 2013).
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Intriguingly, it has been suggested that marine reserves might ameliorate the consequences
of fisheries induced evolution of such traits (Baskett et al., 2005; Miethe et al., 2010). The
ramifications of marine reserves in real evolving systems are likely to be complicated by the
simultaneous evolution of multiple traits which may have countervailing effects.
While our study suggests that evolution of dispersal may reduce the efficacy of reserves
as a rent-maximizing strategy, our analysis focused on equilibrium management on very long
timescales. As Sanchirico et al. (2006) highlighted, solving for the optimal harvest trajectory
between two patches through time is much more difficult; different results regarding marine
reserve optimality may emerge in this case.
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Chapter 4
Testing for an Unambiguous Shift
in a Species Distribution
4.1 Abstract
Climate change is expected to lead to a shift in the distributions of many species. Al-
though there is considerable interest in detecting such shifts in recent historical data, ex-
isting methods can be sensitive to changes that do not constitute an unambiguous shift.
Here, we propose stochastic dominance as an unambiguous way to characterize such a shift
and describe a test for it. We describe a test for stochastic dominance using a one-sided
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. We first conduct a simulation study to assess the valid-
ity and power of the test. We then illustrate the test on locational data for Atlantic cod.
The described test reliably rejects dominance when appropriate, especially at larger sample
sizes (≥500). Our illustration shows one case in which the null hypothesis is rejected and
another in which it is not. Stochastic dominance has yet to be applied in ecology, although
it has the potential to allow better comparison and comprehensive understanding of species
distributional changes. This unambiguous definition of a distributional shift may be a useful
tool in ecology.
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4.2 Introduction
One of the clearest predicted impacts of climate change is a shift in the distributions of plant
and animal species (e.g., higher in elevation or in the direction of their local temperature
gradient) (IPCC, 2007). Such shifts can have both ecological and economic consequences
(Sumaila et al., 2011; Pinsky and Fogarty, 2012) and numerous methods have been pro-
posed for detecting them in recent historical data. In broad terms, these methods involve
focusing on some property of a species distribution - such as the mean latitude / location
of individuals (e.g., Perry et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Pinsky et al., 2013) or the location
of the poleward boundary (e.g., Hickling et al., 2006; Solow et al., 2014) - and determining
whether the observed locations of individuals in two periods are consistent with a shift in
this property. These methods implicitly define a distributional shift in different ways and
can give contradictory results. However, these disparate properties of the distribution-and
the implicit definition of a shift that accompanies them-are likely to differ; distributional
shifts that translate population density uniformly in a single direction appear to be excep-
tion rather than the norm (e.g., Hampe and Petit, 2005; Breshears et al., 2008; Sunday et al.,
2012); see also Fig. 4-1 for examples of distributional changes, many of which may produce
contradictory results depending on what character the shift is defined for. An unambiguous
definition of a shift across an entire distribution fills a necessary gap in our study of the
impact of environmental change on species (Tingley and Beissinger, 2009). The definition
we propose characterizes the difference between two spatial distributions at every point in
space, capturing information about the changes in central tendency and in the ‘tails’ of the
distribution. This strict, unambiguous definition of a shift thus allows comparison among
data-sets in which shifts occur in different ways.
Here, we propose as a novel definition of an unambiguous poleward distributional shift
based on the notion of stochastic dominance. Stochastic dominance is commonly used in
economics to compare income distributions or returns on uncertain investments (Davidson,
2008). However, it appears not to have been used in ecology. We go on to describe a test for
stochastic dominance and apply it to some survey data for Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua)
in the northwest Atlantic. It is important to emphasize that we are not simply proposing
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a new test for a poleward shift, but a new and unambiguous definition of a poleward shift.
Existing tests are based on definitions that are not unambiguous. For example, the mean
location and the range boundaries may shift in opposite directions. Because the underlying
definitions do not comport with each other, the test we propose is not comparable to earlier
tests and we make no such comparison here.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Definition
Suppose that in the first time period 𝑛1 individuals are observed at coordinates (𝑥1𝑗 , 𝑦1𝑗), 𝑗 =
1, 2, . . . , 𝑛1. These locations are assumed to arise from a 2-dimensional Poisson process with
rate function 𝜆(𝑥, 𝑦). It is a general result that, conditional on 𝑛1, these locations repre-
sent a random sample from a bivariate distribution with probability density function (pdf)
𝑓1(𝑥, 𝑦) that is proportional to 𝜆(𝑥, 𝑦). It follows that, conditional on 𝑛1, the latitudes 𝑦1𝑗
of these locations represent a random sample from the corresponding marginal distribution
with pdf 𝑓1(𝑦) =
∫︀
𝑓𝑧(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑑𝑥 and cumulative distribution function (cdf) 𝐹1(𝑦). Similarly,
the latitudes 𝑦2𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛2 of 𝑛2 individuals observed in a later period represent a
random sample from a distribution with cdf 𝐹2(𝑦). For concreteness, we focus on a North-
ern Hemisphere species so that y increases toward the pole. However, stochastic dominance
can be defined along other one-dimensional axes, such as elevation or in the direction of a
pertinent climate velocity (sensu Pinsky et al. (2013)).
Our interest centers on whether the latitudes in the later period lie poleward of the
latitudes in the earlier period. This can be formalized through the notion of (first order)
stochastic dominance. By definition, a random variable 𝑌1 with cdf 𝐹1 is dominated by
another random variable 𝑌2 with cdf 𝐹2 if 𝐹1(𝑦) ≥ 𝐹2(𝑦) for all 𝑦 with the inequality strict
for at least one value of 𝑦. Importantly, if 𝑌1 is dominated by 𝑌2 then it is possible to
transform 𝐹1 into 𝐹2 solely by shifting probability mass to the right. It is in this sense that
stochastic dominance constitutes an unambiguous shift to higher values.
In the situation considered here, 𝑌1 represents the location of an individual in an earlier
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period and 𝑌2 the location of an individual in a later period. The stochastic dominance of
𝑌1 by 𝑌2 means that the density of individuals has shifted only in the poleward direction
with no local shifts toward the equator. For this to be true, the mean of 𝑌2 is larger than
that of 𝑌1. Figure 4-1 shows a number of common types of distributional changes and
identifies those that constitute an unambiguous shift according to this definition. Note that
some of these examples may conflict with the mean or boundary shifts; in particular, for a
‘lean’ polewards (sensu Breshears et al. (2008)), neither range margin moves, or for a range
expansion or contraction, the mean and one may shift northward, while the other boundary
shifts southward.
4.3.2 Statistical Test
We turn now to the general problem of testing stochastic dominance based on samples from
two distributions. It is fair to say that the literature in this area is unsettled. Briefly, one
body of work in this area focuses on testing the null hypothesis that two (or more) random
variables have the same distribution against the alternative of stochastic dominance (e.g.,
El Barmi and Mukerjee, 2005). This formulation is not useful here because such a test
is sensitive to alternatives other than dominance (e.g., a bi-directional range expansion).
A number of tests have been proposed of the null hypothesis that one random variable
dominates another against the alternative hypothesis of the reverse (e.g., Linton et al.,
2010). Again, this formulation is inadequate here; it rules out the plausible possibility
that neither random variable dominates the other. Most common are tests of the null
hypothesis that one random variable dominates another against the alternative that it does
not (e.g., McFadden, 1989; Schmid and M., 1996; Barrett and Donald, 2003; Ledwina and
Wylupek, 2011). Finally, Davidson and Duclos (2013) described a test of the more natural
null hypothesis of non-dominance against the alternative hypothesis of dominance but only
over a restricted range of values of the random variables. While this proposal deserves
further study, we will follow the bulk of the literature here and test the null hypothesis
𝐻0 : 𝐹1(𝑦) ≥ 𝐹2(𝑦) for all 𝑦 against the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 : 𝐹1(𝑦) < 𝐹2(𝑦) for at
least one 𝑦.
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Let
𝐹1(𝑦) =
1
𝑛1
𝑛1∑︁
𝑗=1
𝐼(𝑦1𝑗 ≤ 𝑦) (4.1)
be the empirical distribution function of the observed latitudes in the earlier period where
we define the indicator function 𝐼(𝑦1𝑗 ≤ 𝑦) = 1 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let 𝐹2(𝑦) be the
empirical distribution function of the observed latitudes in the second period. A natural
statistic for testing 𝐻0 against 𝐻1 is the one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic:
𝑇 = max
𝑦
(︁
𝐹2(𝑦)− 𝐹1(𝑦)
)︁
(4.2)
with 𝐻0 being rejected for large values of 𝑇 .
The significance level of 𝑇 can be assessed through the following bootstrap procedure
(Fig. 4-2). Let 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 be the maximum likelihood estimates of 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 under the
restriction that 𝐹1(𝑦) ≤ 𝐹2(𝑦) for all 𝑦. These are given by
𝐹1(𝑦) = 𝐹1(𝑦), 𝐹2(𝑦) = 𝐹2(𝑦) if 𝐹1(𝑦) ≥ 𝐹2(𝑦) (4.3)
𝐹1(𝑦) = 𝐹2(𝑦) =
𝑛1
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝐹1(𝑦) +
𝑛2
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝐹2(𝑦) otherwise (4.4)
(El Barmi and Mukerjee, 2005). Simulate multinomial samples of sizes 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 from 𝐹1
and 𝐹2, respectively, and form the corresponding value 𝑇
* of 𝑇 . Repeat the procedure a
large number of times. As the test is one-sided, in sampling under 𝐻0, the distribution of
𝑇 * will have a point mass at 0. For this reason, we use the so-called mid-p method (Berry,
1995) specifically, 𝐻0 is rejected at significance level 𝛼 if the proportion values of 𝑇
* that
exceed the observed value of 𝑇 plus one-half the proportion values of 𝑇 * that are equal to
the observed value of 𝑇 is less than 𝛼. In the next section, we present simulation results
showing that this test works well.
4.4 Simulation Results
We conducted a simulation study aimed at assessing the performance of the test described
in the previous section. All calculations were carried out using MATLAB (Mathworks,
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Figure 4-2: Schematic of the test for stochastic dominance described in the text. The blue
color indicates the early distribution, while the orange indicates the later distribution, as
in other figures. Note that a p-value which is less than the nominal significance level means
we reject the null hypothesis that the late distribution dominates the early.
R2015a). The study proceeded in the following way. For selected values of 𝑛1 and 𝑛2,
sample locations were simulated from selected distributions 𝐹1 and 𝐹2, chosen as realistic
representations of species distributions. The test was applied (with 200 bootstrap samples)
to each such pair of samples at nominal significance level 0.05. The procedure was repeated
500 times and the rate at which 𝐻0 was rejected was recorded. As noted above, because
they are based on potentially conflicting definitions of a range shift, we do not present
results for other tests.
The first part of the simulation study was aimed at assessing the agreement between the
nominal and achieved significance levels of the test. In testing a composite null hypothesis
like 𝐻0, the significance level is defined as the maximum rate at which the null hypothesis
is rejected when it is, in fact, true. This maximum rate occurs when 𝐹1 = 𝐹2. As reported
in Table 4.1, the estimated rate at which 𝐻0 is rejected when 𝐹1 = 𝐹2 is in all cases close
to 0.05. We conclude that the test is valid.
The second part of the simulation study was aimed at assessing the power of the test.
In this case, sample locations were simulated from distributions satisfying 𝐹1(𝑦) < 𝐹2(𝑦)
for at least one value of 𝑦. The results are summarized in Table 4.2. In overall terms, the
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Early Dist. Late Dist. Rej. Rate (𝑛1 =
250, 𝑛2 = 500)
Rej. Rate (𝑛1 =
𝑛2 = 500)
Rej. Rate (𝑛1 =
500, 𝑛2 = 250)
N(0,1) N(0,1) 0.064 0.066 0.048
B(2,2) B(2,2) 0.058 0.040 0.046
U(0,1) U(0,1) 0.054 0.048 0.062
Table 4.1: Results of simulated data drawn from equal distributions. The first and second
columns show the distributions from which the simulated data were drawn (N indicates a
normal distribution, B is a beta distribution, and U is a uniform distribution; the numbers
in parentheses give the parameter values for the distributions). The grey columns show the
rejection rate at the 5% significance level for different sample sizes (as marked).
test has good power provided 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 are not too small. Simulations across a range of
samples sizes indicate that the power is largely controlled by the size of the smaller sample.
4.5 Illustration
In this section, we illustrate the described test through an application to trawl survey data
for the commercially important Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the US northwest Atlantic.
Cod are associated with cool bottom waters, and temperature appears to impact their
condition, spawning, growth rates as juveniles and adults, and egg incubation (Drinkwater,
2005). Temperature may also indirectly influence cod through their food, the composition
and abundance of which has been changing (Friedland et al., 2013). The expected response
of different cod stocks to increasing temperatures is different; some are expected to increase
in size, while others are expected to decrease or have no change (Drinkwater, 2005). Analysis
of the cod survey data in this region show that the catch rate decreases with increasing
bottom temperatures, in addition to an overall decline in abundance with time (Fogarty
et al., 2008).
Annual surveys for cod (and other groundfish) have been conducted by Northeast Fish-
eries Science Center (NEFSC) in this region since 1968. Briefly, NEFSC conducts trawls
in a stratified random sampling design in this region twice a year. This stratified design
takes into account hydrological and geographic features relevant for marine species. At
each sampling location, the abundance and biomass per species is reported. Here, we use
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Early
Dist.
Late Dist. Rej.
Rate
(𝑛1 =
250,
𝑛2 =
500)
Rej.
Rate
(𝑛1 =
𝑛2 =
500)
Rej.
Rate
(𝑛1 =
500,
𝑛2 =
250)
U(0,1) U(-0.125,1.125) 0.948 1 0.908
N(0,1) N(0.1,1.7) 0.982 0.994 0.968
N(0,1) N(0,1.5) 0.926 0.984 0.892
N(0,1) N(-.1,1) 0.272 0.392 0.294
N(0,1) N(-.2,1) 0.718 0.872 0.768
U(0,1) U(0.125,0.875) 0.99 1 1
N(0,1) N(0.1,0.5) 0.996 1 0.998
N(0,1) N(0,0.5) 1 1 1
U(0,1) U(-0.25,1) 1 1 1
B(1,2) B(3,1), -0.5 shift 0.946 0.994 0.844
U(0,1) U(0,0.75) 1 1 1
G(2,2) G(9,0.5) 0.85 0.982 0.886
Table 4.2: Results of simulated data drawn from distributions in which the later distribution
does not dominate the earlier distribution, i.e., for which the null hypothesis is false. The
first column shows the qualitative description of the type of shift which has occurred.
The second and third columns show the distributions from which the simulated data were
drawn (letter indications of distribution types are as in Table 1). The grey columns show
the rejection rate at the 5% significance level for different sample sizes (as marked).
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the total number of Atlantic cod at each location as our data. Details on the collection
methodology and sampling design are provided in Grosslein (1969). The data are available
at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/epd/ocean/MainPage/ioos.html. Cod in this region are
considered to belong to two stocks, a Georges Bank stock in the south and a Gulf of Maine
stock in the north; these stocks are defined geographically (Mayo et al., 2009).
In this application, we tested the null hypotheses that latitude over the period 1968-1975
was dominated by latitude over the period 2005-2011 for the George’s Bank stock and that
the latitude over the period 2005-2011 was dominated by latitude over the period 1968-
1975 for the Gulf of Maine stock. The latter case may reflect that Gulf of Maine currents
often travel southward (Ruoying et al., 2005). Sample sizes for George’s Bank cod were
𝑛1 = 4203, 𝑛2 = 6528 and 𝑛1 = 6084, 𝑛2 = 2841 for the Gulf of Maine. The empirical cdfs
of the latitudes for each stock are shown in Figure 4-3, along with a map of cod abundance.
The p-value for the George’s Bank stock based on 1000 bootstrap samples was less than
0.001, so the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0.05 significance level, indicating that an
unambiguous northward shift did not occur between the two periods; the mean may have
shifted, but the population did not shift only northwards. In contrast, the p-value for the
Gulf of Maine stock was 0.50, indicating an unambiguous southward shift between the two
periods.
4.6 Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to propose an unambiguous definition of a directional
shift in a species distribution based on stochastic dominance and to describe and illustrate
a test of such a shift. While existing methods can provide useful information, they can
also give contradictory results. For example, Nye et al. (2009) identified significant south-
ward shifts in the mean and northern boundary of the distribution of Gulf of Maine cod
but a significant northward shift in the southern boundary. The possibility of this kind of
contradiction has been recognized in the literature, leading to ad hoc approaches involv-
ing multiple criteria. The test described here assumes that the observed locations follow a
Poisson process. Note that this assumption, which appears to be implicit in other methods,
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Figure 4-3: Latitudinal distribution of cod abundance in survey trawls 1968-1975 (blue)
and 2005-2011 (orange). (a) Distribution of the Georges Bank stock. (b) Distribution of
the Gulf of Maine stock. Insets show the spatial distribution of the observations; navy blue
shows locations which were sampled but contained no cod, while the dark magenta shows
locations with more than 50 cod. For the insets (not for data analysis), observations were
binned in 0.3 lat. and lon. squares.
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applies to the locations of individuals that are sighted and not necessarily to the locations of
all individuals. Even if the latter are not Poisson, under some conditions on the observation
process, the former will tend to be (e.g., Westcott, 1976). In addition, it is assumed that
the spatial sampling of individuals is unbiased. This would not be the case, for example, if
the allocation of spatial sampling effort changes over time. In addition, this methodology
tests for stochastic dominance along a specified axis. Here, this axis was chosen because
of the presumed influence of climatic change acting along that axis. However, it is im-
portant to distinguish that other factors in this case, spatially heterogeneous harvesting
of the cod, changes in depth, or movements in space for non-temperature related reasons
may influence the spatial distribution. Thus, the signal of distributional change may be
eroded or enhanced by other factors. Finally, as noted, in keeping with the bulk of the
literature, the test proposed here takes stochastic dominance “rather than non-dominance”
as the null hypothesis. Although there are good technical reasons for this, it is somewhat
unnatural. We are currently exploring the approach of Davidson and Duclos (2013) as an
alternative. Extending this test to more than two periods may be an attractive area of
future investigation.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Harvest in a Deteriorating
Environment
Abstract
1Deteriorating environmental conditions (e.g., due to climate change) negatively impact
the vital rates of marine fish, with implications for fisheries management. While the rent-
maximizing harvesting strategy in a constant environment has been well characterized,
optimal management under changing conditions is less understood. We develop a bioeco-
nomic model for a fishery with compensatory growth and decreasing marginal harvest cost
in a deteriorating environment. With it we show that (1) optimal escapement is largely
independent of the stock size; (2) the stock is ‘fished down’ to a rent-dissipating level at a
characteristic time after which fishing ceases; and (3) non-monotonic escapement policies
are often optimal. Using the Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment model with Schaeffer harvest
costs, we show that non-monotonic escapement can be optimal when fecundity decreases
in time. Analysis of a simpler piecewise-linear model shows that non-monotonicity gener-
ally arises from an interaction between the deteriorating vital rate and density-dependent
mechanisms of population regulation.
1This paper has been submitted as “Moberg, E.A., Neubert, M.G. and Costello, C. Optimal harvest in
a deteriorating environment.”
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5.1 Introduction
Recent human impacts on Earth’s biota are dramatic and unprecedented (Ceballos et al.,
2015). These impacts can take many forms, ranging from habitat degradation to climate
change. Some populations are able to adapt to local impacts by moving to more favorable
locations (Parmesan and Yohe, 2003). Other populations, however, cannot track their habi-
tat niche (or all parts of it), and, as a result, experience changing environmental conditions
that may alter their vital rates. These vital rates ultimately determine the growth rate
and size of the population. This paper concerns the optimal management of a population
subject to a systematically deteriorating environment.
Fish are particularly vulnerable to temperature changes. They are generally poikilo-
thermic–their internal temperature depends on the external temperature–and temperature
strongly impacts their metabolism and health. Studies have found temperature effects on,
for example, individual growth (Munday et al., 2008) and developmental (Houde, 1989)
rates, breeding probability and spermatogenesis (Donelson et al., 2010), and fecundity
(Tanasichuk and Ware, 1987). Temperature may also influence food availability, expo-
sure to toxins, predation, disease, and foraging behaviour (Reist et al., 2006). The response
to temperature trends may be heterogenous across species (see, for example Persson, 1986).
While the scientific literature examining the many ways that species may be impacted
by changing conditions is growing, little research examines how continuing environmental
change affects management. Recently, the importance of these interactions was highlighted
for the western North Atlantic cod stock. Pershing et al. (2015) determined that this stock
has been overharvested, in part due to improper accounting for temperature driven declines
in recruitment and increases in mortality.
In this paper, we focus on the coupled biological-economic system of a harvested popu-
lation in a deteriorating environment. While managers of wild populations may have many
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(potentially conflicting) goals—including employment, conservation, and rent—we focus on
rent maximization here as it is easily quantifiable and is likely important. It is also necessary
for estimating the costs of alternative management policies.
There is a well developed theoretical literature on the optimal exploitation of stocks in
unchanging environments (see, e.g., Reed, 1979; Moussalli and Hilborn, 1985; Costello et al.,
2001; Clark, 2010). A classic result is that constant escapement strategies, in which a fixed
number of fish are left unharvested each time period, are optimal for a wide range of growth
and cost functions in temporally constant (or stationary, stochastic) environments (Reed,
1979). Mathematical models suggest that the optimal harvest strategy in changing condi-
tions may be qualitatively different. For example, Walters and Parma (1996) found that
when fish mortality rates increase, the best constant exploitation-rate strategy (in which a
fixed proportion of the population is harvested each time period) dramatically outperforms
the best constant escapement policy for maximizing yield. Polasky et al. (2011) character-
ized environmental change as an exogenous probability of a regime shift, and suggested the
optimal policy may be unaffected by the potential regime shift. We extend these analyses
by focusing more generally on how the properties of deterministically deteriorating vital
rates can qualitatively alter optimal harvest strategies. We then demonstrate these effects
with examples of climate-change impacted fisheries.
A priori, we might expect that as conditions deteriorate, optimal escapement ought
to decrease because unharvested individuals will be less productive, eroding their in situ
value. Indeed, for a forecast of poor conditions in a stationary stochastic environment,
the optimal escapement is reduced for just this reason (Costello et al., 2001). Carson et al.
(2009) arrive at a similar conclusion for populations subject to cyclical population dynamics.
However, this logic oversimplifies the potential for a complex interplay between changing
vital rates and density dependence. We show that, for some vital rates, deteriorating
conditions can actually first necessitate a temporary increase in escapement followed by
decreasing escapement after conditions deteriorate sufficiently.
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5.2 Optimal Harvest in a Constant Environment
We first consider a population in an unchanging environment managed by a single harvester.
We define 𝑥𝑡 as the population size at time 𝑡; the function 𝑓(𝑥𝑡) projects the population to
the next time period.
In each period, the harvester knows the size of the population as well as the population
projection function 𝑓 and its parameters and can make a harvesting decision based on this
information (closed-loop decision making, sensu Bertsekas (2000)). By setting the harvest
size, ℎ𝑡, the harvester controls both the population size and her revenue stream. The fish
that are left behind after harvest (𝑥𝑡 − ℎ𝑡) are able to reproduce and grow, so that the
population grows (or shrinks) according to:
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑡 − ℎ𝑡). (5.1)
It will be mathematically convenient to track the escapement, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 − ℎ𝑡, rather than ℎ𝑡.
Assume the harvester’s goal is to maximize the present value of the stream of discounted
rent resulting from her choice of escapement over a period from 𝑡 = 0 to 𝑇 . This rent results
from the revenue gained by selling the harvest at price 𝑝, per unit biomass, minus harvest
costs. The harvester is price-taker, so 𝑝 is not influenced by the harvester’s actions. Harvest
costs are incurred when effort is exerted for harvest. We assume that the cost of a given
harvest is a function of the population size, with higher marginal costs, 𝑐(𝑥), associated
with smaller populations, (i.e., 𝑐′(𝑥) < 0). Thus, the cost of harvesting a stock from size
𝑥 down to size 𝑦 is
∫︀ 𝑥
𝑦 𝑐(𝑠)𝑑𝑠. The rent attained in a period is then discounted by factor
𝛿 (0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1), which relates the value of money in earlier and later periods. The present
value of the total rent is
Π(𝑦0, 𝑦1, ..., 𝑦𝑇 ) =
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=0
[︂
𝑝 (𝑥𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡)−
∫︁ 𝑥𝑡
𝑦𝑡
𝑐(𝑠) 𝑑𝑠
]︂
𝛿𝑡. (5.2)
The manager’s problem is to choose the escapement sequence, 𝑦𝑡, with 0 ≤ 𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡, so as
to maximize Π given the population projection function (5.1) and a given initial stock size
𝑥0. We will denote this optimal escapement policy by {𝑦𝑡}.
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It will be useful to define 𝑦∞ as the escapement at which marginal revenue equals
marginal cost; i.e., 𝑦∞ satisfies
𝑝 = 𝑐(𝑦∞). (5.3)
Harvesting below 𝑦∞ incurs higher costs than revenue, making it economically unattractive,
even in the short-run. Since 𝑐(𝑥) is a strictly decreasing function, there is at most one
positive value of 𝑦∞. If 𝑝 > 𝑐(0) then 𝑦∞ is zero.
Following Reed (1979) and Costello et al. (2001), we will use dynamic programming to
maximize Π. Those authors found it useful (as will we) to introduce the immediate harvest
value, 𝑄(𝑥𝑡):
𝑄(𝑥𝑡) ≡ 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑦∞)−
∫︁ 𝑥𝑡
𝑦∞
𝑐(𝑠)𝑑𝑠. (5.4)
𝑄(𝑥𝑡) is the maximum one-period profit at time 𝑡 given the stock size 𝑥𝑡. With 𝑄(𝑥𝑡)
in hand, we can break the problem of maximizing Π(𝑦𝑡) into subproblems consisting of
two pieces. The first piece is the value of the harvest in time 𝑡, which, conveniently is
𝑄(𝑥𝑡) − 𝑄(𝑦𝑡). The second piece is the value of the remaining future harvests, given that
these harvests are optimal from time 𝑡 + 1 to the end of the time horizon given 𝑥𝑡+1. Let
us define this second piece as 𝑉 (𝑥𝑡+1). Putting these two pieces together we have
𝑉 (𝑥𝑡) = max
0≤𝑦𝑡≤𝑥𝑡
[︁
𝑄(𝑥𝑡)−𝑄(𝑦𝑡) + 𝛿𝑉 (𝑥𝑡+1)
]︁
(5.5)
= 𝑄(𝑥𝑡) + max
0≤𝑦𝑡≤𝑥𝑡
[︁
−𝑄(𝑦𝑡) + 𝛿𝑉 (𝑓(𝑦𝑡))
]︁
. (5.6)
To find the optimal escapement policy 𝑦𝑡, we first find 𝑦𝑇 by maximizing 𝑄(𝑥𝑇 ) − 𝑄(𝑦𝑇 ).
Typically, 𝑦𝑇 = 𝑦∞. We then use the recursion (5.6) to calculate the optimal escapements,
𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑦𝑇−2, ..., 𝑦0.
Reed (1979) showed that if 𝑓(𝑥) is a differentiable, strictly concave, and non-decreasing
function (i.e., 𝑓 ′(𝑥) ≥ 0 and 𝑓 ′′(𝑥) < 0 for all 𝑥 ≥ 0), and 𝑐(𝑥) is non-increasing, then a
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Figure 5-1: Schematic of the typical ‘constant escapement policy’ for an unchanging en-
vironment. In this example, initially no harvest occurs to allow the population to build.
In the last period, the population is harvested down to 𝑦∞. In intervening periods, the
population and escapement are constant.
‘constant escapement policy’ is optimal (Figure 5-1);
𝑦𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑦*, if 𝑥𝑡 ≥ 𝑦*,
𝑥𝑡, if 𝑥𝑡 < 𝑦
*,
(5.7)
where 𝑦* is a time-invariant optimal escapement level that we call the ‘interior solution.’
We impose these same conditions on 𝑓(𝑥), along with the slightly more restrictive condition
that 𝑐(𝑥) be strictly decreasing.
5.3 Optimal Harvest in a Deteriorating Environment
Now we prescribe that one of the vital rates of this population changes in time; in general,
let this changing parameter be 𝜃𝑡. To explicitly recognize this change, we now write the
population projection function as
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡). (5.8)
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Noting that 𝜃𝑡 has no effect on the function 𝑄(·), we can rewrite the value function 𝑉 (𝑥𝑡)
(5.6) as
𝑉 (𝑥𝑡, 𝜃𝑡) = 𝑄(𝑥𝑡) + max
0≤𝑦𝑡≤𝑥𝑡
{︁
−𝑄(𝑦𝑡) + 𝛿𝑉 [𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡), 𝜃𝑡+1]
}︁
. (5.9)
We say conditions are deteriorating for all 𝑦 > 0 if 𝑓(𝑦, 𝜃𝑡) ≥ 𝑓(𝑦, 𝜃𝑡+1), with strict
inequality for at least one 𝑡. That is, the population projection function does not yield
more fish for the same escapement in period 𝑡 + 1 than it would in period 𝑡. Deteriorating
environments can produce an increase in 𝜃 (e.g., if 𝜃 is a mortality rate) or a decrease in 𝜃
(e.g., if 𝜃 is fecundity). Thus, 𝜕𝑓(𝑦, 𝜃)/𝜕𝜃 may be either positive or negative.
5.3.1 Interior Solution
To find 𝑉 (𝑥𝑡, 𝜃𝑡) we must find the escapement 𝑦𝑡 that maximizes the term in braces in
equation (5.9). We seek 𝑦𝑡 by setting the derivative of the maximand with respect to 𝑦𝑡
equal to 0:
0 =
[︂
−𝑑𝑄(𝑦𝑡)
𝑑𝑦𝑡
+ 𝛿
𝑑𝑉 (𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡), 𝜃𝑡+1)
𝑑𝑦𝑡
]︂ ⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
𝑦𝑡=𝑦*𝑡
. (5.10)
We define 𝑦*𝑡 as the escapement that satisfies equation (5.10); it is analogous to 𝑦* in
equation (5.7), excepting that we do not expect it to be constant over time.
Equation (5.10) can be interpreted as stating that at the escapement level 𝑦*𝑡 , the
marginal loss from leaving an additional unit of escapement is balanced by the marginal
gain of leaving that individual unharvested and harvesting it or its progeny later. If 𝑦*𝑡
satisfies 𝑦∞ < 𝑦*𝑡 < 𝑥𝑡, we call it feasible.
From equation (5.9), observe that the derivative of 𝑉 (𝑥𝑡, 𝜃𝑡) with respect to 𝑥𝑡 is equiv-
alent to the derivative of 𝑄(𝑥𝑡). Using this fact and upon applying the chain rule, the
first-order condition for an interior optimum (5.10) becomes
0 =
⎡⎣−𝑑𝑄(𝑦𝑡)
𝑑𝑦𝑡
+ 𝛿
𝑑𝑄(𝑢)
𝑑𝑢
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
𝑢=𝑓(𝑦𝑡,𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑦𝑡
⎤⎦⃒⃒⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑦𝑡=𝑦*𝑡
. (5.11)
Note that 𝑦*𝑡 does not depend on the stock in period 𝑡 (or any other period). This
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observation leads directly to our first result:
Proposition 1 For a population growing according to equation (5.8) (with 𝜕𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃)/𝜕𝑥 ≥ 0
and 𝜕2𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃)/𝜕𝑥2 < 0 for all 𝑥 ≥ 0) and marginal harvesting cost 𝑐(𝑥) decreasing in 𝑥, the
interior solution escapement, 𝑦*𝑡 , does not depend on the stock size at the beginning of the
period or on vital rates (𝜃) in other periods.
Thus, for a stock subject to a changing vital rate (non-constant population projection
function), there exists a feedback control law that is pseudo-independent of the stocks,
analogous to the ‘constant escapement policy’ in Reed (1979):
𝑦𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑦*𝑡 , if 𝑥𝑡 ≥ 𝑦*𝑡 ,
𝑥𝑡, if 𝑥𝑡 < 𝑦
*
𝑡 ,
(5.12)
while 𝑦*𝑡 > 𝑦∞ (see section 5.3.2). Thus, if the stock is initially small (for example, due to
overfishing), 𝑦𝑡 < 𝑦
*
𝑡 (no harvest) while the stock recovers.
Following Costello et al. (2001), we establish a condition under which 𝑦*𝑡 is a unique
maximum. Equation (5.11) can be rewritten as
1
𝛿
=
𝑑𝑄(𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡))
𝑑𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡)
[︂
𝑑𝑄(𝑦𝑡)
𝑑𝑦𝑡
]︂−1 𝑑𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡)
𝑑𝑦𝑡
. (5.13)
Call the right-hand side of equation (5.13) Φ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡). When Φ is non-negative and 𝑑Φ/𝑑𝑦𝑡 is
negative (for 𝑦𝑡 > 𝑦∞)2, Φ = 1/𝛿 for at most one value of 𝑦𝑡, at 𝑦*𝑡 . The negativity condition
on 𝑑Φ/𝑑𝑦𝑡 is equivalent to the second-order condition, guaranteeing 𝑦
*
𝑡 is a maximum.
Note that in each period 𝑡, the interior solution 𝑦*𝑡 is equal to the constant optimal
escapement in an unchanging environment with parameter 𝜃 = 𝜃𝑡.
In some cases, the interior solution will be blocked by the constraint 𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡. If 𝑦*𝑡 > 𝑥𝑡,
the optimal escapement 𝑦𝑡 is 𝑥𝑡 (no harvest). This allows the stock to recover and approach
the interior solution for harvest at a later time. If the interior solution 𝑦*𝑡 falls below 𝑦∞,
the harvester makes her final harvest, leaving the escapement 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦∞, and exits the fishery.
2At 𝑦∞, the second-order condition is undefined, but the limit from from positive direction is arbitrarily
negative
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The time at which this last harvest occurs we call 𝑡.
5.3.2 Exiting the Fishery
Unlike a harvester in a constant environment, a rent maximizing fisherman in a deteriorating
environment may choose to exit the fishery prior to the time horizon, 𝑇 , if conditions have
declined sufficiently. This early exit time, 𝑡, is independent of the specified time horizon 𝑇 .
Proposition 2 If there exists a time 𝑡 < 𝑇 such that 𝑓(𝑦∞, 𝜃𝑡) ≤ 𝑦∞ for all 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡, then at
𝑡 = 𝑡 the optimal escapement 𝑦𝑡 is 𝑦∞, and 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 (no harvest) thereafter.
When 𝑡 > 𝑡, the interior solution 𝑦*𝑡 is no longer optimal, because 𝑦*𝑡 < 𝑦∞. To
see this, let us calculate the conditions for which 𝑦∞ = 𝑦*𝑡 . From equations (5.3) and
(5.4), 𝑑𝑄(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 |𝑢=𝑦∞ = 0, so it follows that equation (5.13) (which defines 𝑦*𝑡 ) holds only if
𝑑𝑄(𝑓(𝑢,𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡))
𝑑𝑓(𝑢,𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡)
|𝑢=𝑦∞ = 0. This 𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 is, by definition, the value of the vital rate at which the
escapement 𝑦∞ yields 𝑦∞ fish in the next period; i.e., 𝑓(𝑦∞, 𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) = 𝑦∞. Once 𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 is
passed, 𝑦*𝑡 < 𝑦∞; future stock sizes will be below 𝑦∞ and no fishing will occur.
To develop an intuition as to why this occurs, it is helpful to consider this same process
in a different way. Let us define 𝑦𝑡 as an escapement such that 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡). 𝑦𝑡 is interesting
first because 𝑦*𝑡 must be less than 𝑦𝑡. In order that the first-order condition (5.13) is satisfied,
at 𝑦𝑡, both derivatives the 𝑑𝑄(𝑦𝑡)/𝑑𝑦𝑡 and 𝑑𝑄(𝑓(𝑦𝑡))/𝑑(𝑓(𝑦𝑡)) have the same value, while
the derivative of 𝑓 at that point must be less than 1. Recall that 𝛿 is also less than 1. At
𝑦 > 𝑦, 𝑓(𝑦) will be smaller and thus the derivative of 𝑄 with respect to 𝑓(𝑦, 𝜃𝑡) will be
smaller than that with respect to 𝑦 alone; equation (5.13) cannot be satisfied above 𝑦𝑡. 𝑦𝑡
is also non-increasing in time. Because 𝑓(𝑦, 𝜃𝑡) ≤ 𝑓(𝑦, 𝜃𝑡+1), if, at time 𝑡, 𝑦𝑡 fish yields a
recruitment of 𝑦𝑡 in the next period, leaving 𝑦𝑡 will yield fewer than 𝑦𝑡 fish; thus, 𝑦𝑡+1 must
be smaller. This also implies that once the harvester fishes down to 𝑦∞ at 𝑡, the future
stocks sizes will be less than or equal to 𝑦∞.
Note that if 𝑓(𝑦∞, 𝜃) > 𝑦∞ for all 𝑡, the harvester will fish down to 𝑦∞ only the end of
the time horizon, 𝑇 .
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5.3.3 Qualitative Behavior of Optimal Escapement Policy
In most cases, the basic structure of the optimal harvest has three parts: an approach to
the ‘interior solution’, a series of periods during which the interior solution is optimal, after
which harvest ceases. This is similar to the optimal escapement policy in a non-deteriorating
environment, except that the interior solution changes in time and the fish-down time may
come prior to 𝑇 . In this section, we focus on the qualitative behavior of the interior solution,
𝑦*𝑡 , as it depends on 𝜃𝑡, and in particular on 𝑑𝑦*𝑡 /𝑑𝜃𝑡.
Since 𝑦*𝑡 is a function of 𝜃𝑡, we use implicit differentiation of equation (5.13) to calculate
𝑑𝑦*𝑡 /𝑑𝜃𝑡. If we define 𝐹 as
𝐹 (𝜃𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) =
⎡⎣−𝑑𝑄(𝑦𝑡)
𝑑𝑦𝑡
+ 𝛿
𝑑𝑄(𝑢)
𝑑𝑢
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
𝑢=𝑓(𝑦𝑡,𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑦𝑡
⎤⎦ , (5.14)
then equation (5.13), which implicitly defines 𝑦*𝑡 , is 𝐹 (𝜃𝑡, 𝑦*𝑡 ) = 0.
It follows that
𝑑𝐹 (𝜃𝑡, 𝑦
*
𝑡 (𝜃𝑡))
𝑑𝜃𝑡
= 0 (5.15)
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜃𝑡
+
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝑦*𝑡
𝑑𝑦*𝑡
𝑑𝜃𝑡
= 0 (5.16)
𝑑𝑦*𝑡
𝑑𝜃𝑡
=
−𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝜃𝑡
𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝑦*𝑡
. (5.17)
Because 𝑦*𝑡 is a maximum, the second-order condition 𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝑦*𝑡 < 0 holds. Thus the sign
of 𝑑𝑦*𝑡 /𝑑𝜃𝑡 is the sign of 𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝜃𝑡. In turn,
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜃𝑡
= 𝛿
[︃
𝜕2𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝜃𝑡𝜕𝑦*𝑡
[𝑝− 𝑐(𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡))]
−𝜕𝑓(𝑦
*
𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑦*𝑡
𝜕𝑐(𝑓(𝑐*𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡))
𝜕𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝜃𝑡
]︃
.
(5.18)
Most of the terms in equation (5.18) do not change sign as 𝜃𝑡 changes. Following
from our assumptions about the cost and population projection functions we have: (i)
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[𝑝− 𝑐(𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡))] is positive when 𝑦*𝑡 > 𝑦∞, so it will be positive for all interior maxima; (ii)
𝜕𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝑦*𝑡
is positive; (iii)
𝜕𝑐(𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡))
𝜕𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡)
is negative; (iv)
𝜕𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝜃𝑡
has a fixed sign by our definition
of deteriorating conditions. The sign of
𝜕𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝜃𝑡
may be negative or positive depending on
how 𝜃𝑡 appears in the population projection function, but it does not change.
The term
𝜕2𝑓(𝑦*𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡)
𝜕𝜃𝑡𝜕𝑦*𝑡
, however, may change sign as time progresses and the vital rate
𝜃𝑡 changes. This raises the possibility that 𝑑𝑦
*
𝑡 /𝑑𝜃𝑡 may change sign as well, i.e., optimal
escapement may not be monotonic even if 𝜃𝑡 changes monotonically. This is the basis of
our third proposition:
Proposition 3 For a fishery governed by a relatively simple compensatory population pro-
jection function (𝑓 ′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑓 ′′(𝑥) < 0) and marginal cost function (𝑐′(𝑥) < 0), the resulting
optimal escapement policy defined by the ‘interior solution’ may be non-monotonic in the
monotonically varying vital rate, 𝜃𝑡.
The non-monotonic optimal escapement policy appears to be the result of the counter-
valing effects of biological parameters that delay the onset of density dependent mortality
and those that hasten it; the former tends to increase optimal escapement levels while the
latter tends to decrease it. For some parameters (e.g., per capita fecundity) the behavior
shifts depending on the value of the parameter (see Section 5.5).
The existence of both monotonic and non-monotonic optimal escapement policies is
shown by example. In the next section, we develop a Beverton-Holt model, and allow one
of two vital rates to vary–density dependent morality or per capita fecundity. The former
(examined in section 5.4.1) produces a strictly decreasing 𝑦*𝑡 trajectory while the latter
(section 5.4.2) produces non-monotonic optimal escapements.
5.4 Example: Beverton-Holt Stock Recruitment Model
A simple characterization of stock dynamics that accounts for both density-independent
and density-dependent mortality is the Beverton-Holt stock recruitment model (Beverton
and Holt, 1957; Clark, 2010). Let 𝑥𝑡+1 be the individuals that escaped harvest in period 𝑡
and survived until the next period plus their progeny which also survived (Figure 5-2).
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Figure 5-2: Schematic of the life-cycle of the iteroparous fish population. The initial 𝑥𝑡 fish
are harvested down to 𝑦𝑡, the escapement. The escaped fish then reproduce at a per capita
rate 𝛼, to produce 𝛼𝑦𝑡 new fish. The fish that survive (governed by 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃)) are described
by 𝑥𝑡+1; in this case, both the newly hatched and adult fish survive into the next period.
If each adult produces 𝛼 offspring, there are 𝛼𝑦𝑡 initial juveniles at time 𝑡. If those juve-
niles experience density-independent mortality at rate 𝜇1 and density-dependent mortality
at rate 𝜇2𝛼𝑦𝑡, the proportion to survive to 𝑡 + 1 is
𝜇1𝑒
−𝜇1
𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝛼𝑦𝑡(1− 𝑒−𝜇1) . (5.19)
During the period between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, the mortality rates and fecundity are constant;
changes to these vital rates occurs between discrete periods and the value at 𝑡 governs until
𝑡 + 1.
The adults survive with probability 𝜎. Thus, the number of fish in the next period is
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡) = 𝜎𝑦𝑡 +
𝜇1𝑒
−𝜇1𝛼𝑦𝑡
𝜇1 + 𝜇2(1− 𝑒−𝜇1)𝛼𝑦𝑡 . (5.20)
We may investigate a semelparous species by setting 𝜎 = 0.
Now, we analyze two examples where vital rates are functions of time, reflecting de-
teriorating conditions. First, we imagine the density-dependent mortality rate 𝜇2 in-
creases in time (𝜇2,𝑡 = 𝜇2,0 + 𝛽𝑡). Second, we let the fecundity 𝛼 decrease in time
(𝛼𝑡 = max{𝛼0 − 𝛽𝑡,0}). These two cases produce qualitatively distinct patterns of op-
timal escapement.
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5.4.1 Increasing density-dependent mortality rate (𝜇2)
First, we allow the density-dependent mortality rate, 𝜇2, to increase with time. Figure 5-3
shows an example when the cost function is 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐0/𝑥. The rapid decline in escapement
initially, followed by a long tail approaching 𝑦∞ is typical for increasing 𝜇2.
In fact it can be shown that 𝑑𝑦*𝑡 /𝑑𝜇2,𝑡 is always negative. Recall that it is the sign
of 𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝜃𝑡 (equation (5.18)) in the numerator that determines the sign of the optimal es-
capement. There are two components of equation (5.18) that have signs dependent on the
population projection function. The value of these terms is
𝜕2𝑓
𝜕𝜇2,𝑡𝜕𝑦*𝑡
=
−2𝜇21𝛼2𝑦*𝑡 𝑒−𝜇1 (1− 𝑒−𝜇1)
[𝜇1 + 𝜇2,𝑡(1− 𝑒−𝜇1)𝛼𝑦*𝑡 ]3
, (5.21)
and
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜇2
=
−𝜇1𝛼2𝑦*2𝑡 𝑒−𝜇1 (1− 𝑒−𝜇1)
[𝜇1 + 𝜇2(1− 𝑒−𝜇1)𝛼𝑦*𝑡 ]2
. (5.22)
The derivatives (5.21) and (5.22) are always negative, so 𝑑𝑦*/𝑑𝜇2,𝑡 is also always nega-
tive. As mortality increases, the optimal escapement always decreases, in agreement with
our initial intuition.
5.4.2 Decreasing fecundity (𝛼)
In contrast, if 𝛼 varies in time, we find that the optimal escapement policy may not be
monotonic. In particular 𝜕
2𝑓
𝜕𝛼𝑡𝜕𝑦*𝑡
may change sign as 𝛼𝑡 changes and may then also change
the sign of 𝑑𝑦*𝑡 /𝑑𝛼𝑡.
As fecundity decreases, the optimal escapement often changes from increasing to de-
creasing (Fig. 5-4).
The reason for this non-monotonic behavior is more apparent in a simpler model, de-
veloped in the next section.
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Figure 5-3: Optimal escapement for a population in which 𝜇2 increases at rate 𝛽. The stock
is fished down to 𝑦∞ at 𝑡 = 45, although harvest is very small for a while prior (see inset).
𝛼 = 10, 𝜎 = 0.7, 𝛽 = 0.01, 𝑐0 = 7, 𝑝 = 1, 𝛿 = 0.95, 𝜇1 = 0.05, 𝜇2,0 = 0.01.
time
0 20 40 60
bi
om
as
s
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
escapement
population size
t
Figure 5-4: Optimal escapement for a population in which 𝛼 changes over time at rate
𝛽. Initial population size is the resulting population size for an optimal escapement cor-
responding with the initial conditions. The population is fished down to 𝑦∞ at 𝑡 = 49.
𝛼0 = 10, 𝜎 = 0.7, 𝛽 = 0.2, 𝑐0 = 7, 𝑝 = 1, 𝛿 = 0.95, 𝜇1 = 0.05, 𝜇2 = 0.01.
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Figure 5-5: Schematic of how a Beverton-Holt model’s recruitment (y-axis) varies with
escapement (x-axis) over a decreasing fecundity (shaded lines) for the same parameters as
Fig. 5-4. Selected 𝛼 values are labeled on the right margin. The stars show optimal, interior
solution. Circles show the optimal 𝑦𝑡 policy; once the interior solution is below the stock
size, no harvest occurs.
5.5 Yield Maximizing Harvest
To develop our intuition, we constructed a model that is simpler than (5.2) and (5.20) in
two ways. First, we set 𝑐(𝑥) = 0 for all 𝑥 and 𝑝 = 1, reducing the objective (5.2) to the
maximization of discounted yield
Π(𝑦0, 𝑦1, . . . , 𝑦𝑇 ) =
𝑇∑︁
0
(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡)𝛿𝑡. (5.23)
Second, we replace the nonlinear recruitment function (5.20) with the piecewise linear func-
tion:
𝑥𝑡+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑎𝑦𝑡 if 𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝜂
𝑘 if 𝑦𝑡 > 𝜂;
(5.24)
where 𝜂 = 𝑘/𝑎 is the escapement at which the two pieces intersect (Fig. 5-6a). The
population grows at rate 𝑎 when the population is small; for stock sizes larger than 𝜂,
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strong density dependence caps the population at the size 𝑘. We can imagine that either
the carrying capacity 𝑘 or the low-density growth rate 𝑎 decreases in time as the environment
deteriorates (Fig. 5-6b,c).
Recall that in an environment in which a vital rate 𝜃𝑡 is changing in time, the optimal
escapement in period 𝑡 is the same as the optimal (constant) escapement in an unchanging
environment in which 𝜃 = 𝜃𝑡 for all 𝑡. For the constant environment model (5.24), the
optimal escapement is 𝜂:
𝑦 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝜂 if 𝑥𝑡 ≥ 𝜂
𝑥𝑡 otherwise,
(5.25)
as long as 𝛿𝑎 > 1. Thus 𝜂 is our interior solution, 𝑦*, towards which we build the stock if
𝑥0 < 𝜂 or reduce the stock via harvesting, if 𝑥0 ≥ 𝜂. To see why, first note that it is not
optimal to allow an escapement larger than 𝜂 because a smaller harvest does not increase
subsequent recruitment. We can also show that 𝜂 is preferable to a smaller escapement,
provided 𝛿𝑎 > 1.
Harvesting for 𝑇 periods to 𝜂 (starting with a stock size, larger than 𝜂) yields
Π(𝜂, 𝜂, . . . , 𝜂) = (𝑥0 − 𝜂) +
(︂
𝛿 − 𝛿𝑇
1− 𝛿
)︂
(𝑎𝜂 − 𝜂). (5.26)
Similarly, the yield obtained from harvesting to a smaller escapement, 𝜁, is
Π(𝜁, 𝜁, . . . , 𝜁) = (𝑥0 − 𝜁) +
(︂
𝛿 − 𝛿𝑇
1− 𝛿
)︂
(𝑎𝜁 − 𝜁). (5.27)
The difference between these two constant escapement policies is
(𝜂 − 𝜁)
[︂
(𝑎− 1)
(︂
𝛿 − 𝛿𝑇
1− 𝛿
)︂
− 1
]︂
. (5.28)
By construction, 𝜂− 𝜁 is positive, so the relationship between 𝑎 and 𝛿 determines whether,
overall, harvesting the entire expression is positive (𝑦 = 𝜂) or negative (𝑦 = 0). As 𝑇 goes
to infinity, we find that 𝑎𝛿 > 1 for 𝜂 to be the optimal escapement. If there is no discounting
(𝛿 = 1), the stock must be self-sustaining (𝑎 > 1) for the constant escapement policy to
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outpeform removing all fish in the first period. If we are discounting, this growth rate must
be slightly higher to incentivize sustained harvest.
Now let us imagine that the vital rate of the population changes between periods. In
each period, we choose the optimal escapement as if it were a constant environment.
First let us consider a case in which the maximum population size, or carrying capacity
𝑘, for the stock decreases (Fig. 5-6b). This manifests as a decreasing 𝜂; saturation of the
population occurs at smaller escapement levels. Thus, we have the behavior we initially
expected–decreasing optimal escapement as conditions decline, until eventually we harvest
all the remaining fish.
Now consider a case in which 𝑎–the initial rate of growth–declines. This merely slows
the approach the the ultimate population size; the onset of that saturation now occurs at
larger escapement levels. The intersect point, 𝜂, increases as 𝑎 decreases, implying a larger
optimal escapement each period. Eventually, we expect 𝑎𝛿 to decline below 1, at which
point it is optimal to harvest all the fish to maximize yield.
These two cases show how processes that induce saturation of the population at lower or
higher escapement levels tends to decrease or increase the optimal escapement respectively.
Parameter changes in more complicated biological models (e.g., Beverton-Holt) tend to
change the shape of the entire recruitment curve (Fig. 5-5), making the overall behavior a
mixture of the two processes in this simpler model. For some parameter values (e.g., high
per capita fecundity in (5.20)), the population projection function changes more similarly
to a decrease in initial growth rate, while at others (e.g., low fecundity) it behaves more
similarly to a decreasing carrying capacity. Ultimately, it is this property that determines
how the optimal escapement changes and allows a non-monotonic optimal escapement.
5.6 Discussion
Numerous studies have documented the ways that climate change may impact the physiol-
ogy, development, or behavior of individuals and how these impacts determine vital rates
(Wood and McDonald, 1997). Nevertheless, few analyses (e.g. Walters and Parma, 1996)
focus on the implications of changing vital rates for fishery policy design. In the face of
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Figure 5-6: (a) Simple recruitment func-
tion with linear growth at low density
(escapement less than 𝜂) and saturated
growth at high densities (escapement
larger than 𝜂). (b) Recruitment curves,
when the size of the saturating population
decreases. (c) Recruitment curves, when
the slope of the initial growth is lowered.
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deteriorating environmental conditions, a naive strategy might be to decrease escapement
over time. We find that such a strategy may not be optimal. In particular, we find that
decreasing fecundity may mitigate the impacts of density dependence and, as a result,
temporarily increase the optimal escapement. This result holds even for simple models
with compensatory stock-recruitment and monotonic harvest cost functions. We suggest
that more attention should be paid to the consequences of dynamic vital rates in optimal
management.
We analyzed deterministic models. Fish populations, in contrast, frequently suffer the
slings and arrows of stochastic environmental variability. A preliminary investigation sug-
gests that environmental stochasticity does not change our results qualitatively. In nu-
merical simulations, we applied a multiplicative, uniform shock to the stock-recruitment
function, 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃), at each time step3 and calculated the escapement policy that maximizes
the expected rent using stochastic dynamic programming (Appendix 1). These simula-
tions suggest that the the interior solutions are quantitatively similar to their deterministic
counterparts.4
We also investigated the impact of simultaneous variation in two or more vital rates,
a likely outcome for populations experiencing changing conditions. We found that mono-
tonic or non-monotonic optimal escapement may result, although we have not found non-
monotonic escapement to result from changing two variables that would only produce mono-
tonic escapements in isolation.
Another ecological complication that our analysis ignores is the possibility of overcom-
pensation (negative population growth at high population densities) which is a common
phenomenon (Abrams, 2009; Schroder et al., 2014). An analysis similar to section 5.3.3
with the Ricker model (Ricker, 1954), 𝑓(𝑦𝑡) = 𝑦𝑡𝑒
𝑟(1−𝑦𝑡/𝑘), showed that non-monotonic
optimal escapement can be optimal; we confirmed this result numerically.
We also investigated the importance of our assumption that the harvester is a price-
taker (i.e., that 𝑝 is not influenced by the harvester’s actions). We calculated optimal
3The uniform shock had mean 1, lower bound 1− 𝑤 and upper bound 1 + 𝑤 for 0 < 𝑤 < 1.
4For a given realization, the main difference is that if the population is stochastically driven below the
interior solution, it is allowed to rebuild, and if, after 𝑡 the population grows larger than 𝑦∞ for a period, it
is fished down to 𝑦∞ in that period.
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escapements numerically with a price that depends on the size of harvest (isoelastic demand:
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑎(𝑥𝑡− 𝑦𝑡)𝑏). The optimal policies produced are no longer of the ‘constant escapement’
type with a threshold escapement level (i.e., target escapement varies with all stock sizes).
Trajectories through time may be non-monotonic as a vital rate declines.
The optimal exploitation of a continually degrading renewable resource is an interesting
hybrid between a renewable resource problem (in stationary conditions, e.g., Reed (1979))
and an exhaustible resource problem. It resembles the ‘cake-eating’ problem (e.g., Gale
(1967)), in which a finite resource (the cake) has a fixed-lifespan (because it spoils) and
discounted future utility; the optimizer’s choice is how much to consume in each period.
The optimal eating strategy is to eat slightly less cake each period, until the entire cake is
consumed. Our problem differs in that the total amount of the resource to be consumed
depends on the manager’s actions, since escapement determines recruitment in the next
period.
Finally, it has not escaped our attention that our analyses are applicable both to other
taxa and to forms of environmental degradation other than increasing temperature. Com-
mercially exploited species besides fish (e.g., game birds, Bethke and Nudds (2007)) have
been impacted by climate change or environmental degradation. In addition, these types of
analysis are equally applicable to increasingly favorable conditions, which may be encoun-
tered by species invading a newly suitable habitat.
5.7 Appendix: Stochastic Case
Let us consider the case in which the population is influenced also by environmental pertur-
bations, or shocks. These shocks, 𝑧𝑡, at time 𝑡 alter how the population projects to the next
time period. The random variable 𝑧 has expectation 1, and has finite support (𝑧 ≤ 𝑧 ≤ 𝑧
such that 𝑧 ≥ 0 and 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧) > 0 for 𝑥 > 0 (i.e., the shocks will not drive the population to
extinction). We will now denote the population projection function as 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡, 𝑧𝑡):
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡, 𝑧𝑡). (5.29)
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For this example, we used the following function, modified from (5.20):
𝑥𝑡+1 =
(︂
𝜎𝑦𝑡 +
𝜇1𝑒
−𝜇1𝛼𝑦𝑡
𝜇1 + 𝜇2(1− 𝑒−𝜇1)𝛼𝑦𝑡
)︂
𝑧𝑡. (5.30)
Instead of maximizing rent, we maximize the expectation:
𝑉 (𝑥𝑡, 𝜃𝑡, 𝑧𝑡) = max
0≤𝑦𝑡≤𝑥𝑡
[𝑄(𝑥𝑡)−𝑄(𝑦𝑡) + 𝛿𝐸𝑡𝑉 (𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃𝑡, 𝑧𝑡), 𝜃𝑡+1, 𝑧𝑡+1)] (5.31)
where the expectation is taken over 𝑧.
To investigate the influence of these shocks on the model, we specified 𝑧 as a uniform
distribution with lower bound 1−𝑤 and upper bound 1 +𝑤, for 0 < 𝑤 < 1. We calculated
optimal policies numerically, using 50 time steps and 113 stock sizes, which were more closely
spaced near 𝑦∞; we interpolated the value function using spline-interpolation between these
stock sizes. Using the optimal policies calculated, we then simulated the policy forward in
time, with the stock experiencing a shock in each period. Figure 5-7 shows an example of
such a realization. The optimal policy is very similar to that in the deterministic case for
the same biological and economic parameters.
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Figure 5-7: A single realization of an optimal escapement policy with stochasticity (𝑤 =
0.6); compare with Fig. 5-4. Parameter values are the same as in that figure.
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Chapter 6
Adaptive managment in stationary
and changing environments
6.1 Introduction
The study of changing conditions—in particular, of the changing climate—on ecological
processes has underscored how much about ecological systems we have yet to learn. In
fact, uncertainty is such a ubiquitous feature that we often discuss the different types we
may encounter: environmental uncertainty (e.g., from weather), state uncertainty (i.e.,
from imperfect measurements of the system), or structural and parameter uncertainty (i.e.,
wherein the correct model or parameter values are unknown). The last two types, structural
and parameter uncertainty, are ‘reducible’ in that we are able to learn about them over time.
Weather, in contrast, which may still exert a stochastic forcing even if we perfectly know
its properties).
Climate change provides an additional source of this uncertainty; as Conroy et al. (2011)
note, “the challenge posed by climate change is that predictions based on historical obser-
vations and experiences may no longer be appropriate.” Managed ecological systems, like
fisheries, are potentially entering previously unobserved regimes. Such changes may have
profound implications for the management of such systems. For example, choosing a harvest
level without knowing the dependence of vital rates on temperature has been implicated as
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a reason for overfishing (e.g. Pershing et al., 2015). However, the management of natural
resources does not stop while we reduce our uncertainty (e.g., via the collection of addi-
tional observations or the execution of focused experiments). How then, can we achieve
management objectives (such as maximizing yields over time) given imperfect information?
Adaptive management (Holling, 1978)—that is, management in which learning is explicitly
incorporated—is an attractive option.
The basic idea of adaptive management is that management actions are treated as data
collection opportunities, or even as experiments. The processes of managing and studying
a resource occur in tandem and mutually support each other. Lancia et al. (1996) note
that “in adaptive resource management, learning is not simply a byproduct, but is formally
acknowledged as an integral objective of the management process.” Adaptive management
has been investigated for its utility in fisheries (Walters and Hilborn, 1976), threatened
species management (Chades et al., 2012), and the control of invasive species (Haight and
Polasky, 2010; Regan et al., 2011), among others. There are many approaches to adaptive
management, ranging from a periodic model update from routinely collected data (e.g.
Varley and Boyce, 2006; Hobbs et al., 2015), to experimentation on small portions of a
larger management area.
I focus on the simple case of managing a single stock of fish, one management action
(escapement), and uncertainty about the dynamics of the system. I then model both the
stock and our knowledge about the system to choose the optimal series of actions to meet
various objectives (e.g., maximization of rent). In this chapter, let 𝑥𝑡 denote the size of
the stock at time 𝑡. The stock at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑥𝑡+1, will depend on the escapement (the fish
left after harvest that reproduce and survive); a stock-recruitment function 𝑓 projects this
escapement, 𝑦𝑡 to the next period; 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃). 𝜃 denotes a parameter of interest, in
particular, one about which we hope to learn.
Core to adaptive management is the belief state, which quantifies our confidence that a
particular model or parameter value is correct (Figure 6-1). The belief state is typically a
probability distribution over a set of beliefs. For example, if we were unsure if a population
had a high or low carrying capacity, we might assign a probability 𝜌 that the carrying
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Figure 6-1: ‘Why, some-
times I’ve believed as many
as six impossible things be-
fore breakfast.’ – the Queen
in Carroll (1871), who likely
would be comfortable with
the concept of belief states.
The image is a plate from
the 1871 edition of that
book, illustrated by John
Tenniel.
capacity is high and probability (1 − 𝜌) that it is low; the belief state would be 𝜌. If
instead, we were unsure of the population growth rate, we might assign equal probability
to all potential values within a reasonable range–say a uniform distribution across 𝜆𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙
to 𝜆𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒. We would then treat this belief state as a part of the model in the same way we
would treat a state like the size of the population.
Now, in addition to modeling population or harvesting dynamics, we can also model how
the belief state changes over time. To do this, we need a mathematical construct that will
allow us to update the belief state as new observations are collected. One straightforward
way to do this, that I will employ throughout this chapter, is through Bayesian updating.
If I (𝜃) is the belief state for some parameter value 𝜃 and we observe a stock size 𝑥, we can
update the the belief state to I + using Bayes’ rule:
I +(𝜃) =
𝑃𝑟(𝑥|𝜃)I (𝜃)
𝑃𝑟(𝑥)
. (6.1)
If the probability of 𝑥 is low for a given value of 𝜃, say 𝜃, we may reduce our belief that 𝜃
is correct (i.e., I +(𝜃) < I (𝜃)). On the other hand, as we accumulate data points that are
in agreement with a different value, we may increase our belief that that value is correct.
With a way to update belief states in hand, we can incorporate the belief state into our
management framework. Let us consider a (closed-loop, sensu Bertsekas (2000)) system in
which at each period we use the belief state and information about the current state of the
stock to make a decision for that period. The next period, we again observe the system and
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may update our belief state. Our goal is to characterize the optimal policy, or rule dictating
what escapement to choose if we encounter a specific state in any given period, given our
management objective.
We typically update the belief state in one of two ways: passively or actively. While
passive adaptive management is easier to implement numerically, active adaptive manage-
ment is more intuitive. Under active adaptive management, we forecast the impact of a
management action on both the dynamics of the ecological system (e.g., the population size)
and the belief state. We can imagine considering an action, such as harvesting intensely,
that would allow us to learn more about the population dynamics at low density, thereby
changing our belief state. The resulting improvement in the accuracy of our belief state
may then allow us to make better decisions in the future. This feedback between the action
and the belief state is what makes a policy ‘active’. However, we can also imagine a case in
which we do not model the feedback of our action on the belief state; we make our decision,
ignoring the possibility that modulating our actions could produce learning benefits, but
then update our belief state after our decision and its outcome have been observed. This
may seem to be a subtle difference, but the computational differences between these types
of policies can be marked!
In adaptive management, learning for learning’s sake is typically not the objective, but
rather is ancillary to achieving our primary objective, whether that be a large yield through
harvest or a large population size to be conserved (Walters, 2002). In this chapter, I will
focus on yield or profit maximization from a harvested species. While there are many other
potential objectives, this formulation has a long history (e.g., Clark, 2010; Reed, 1979;
Costello et al., 2001) with which to compare and build our intuition.
I start by describing the general properties of adaptive management solutions in a sta-
tionary environment and develop a few tractable examples to build our intuition about
how these systems are optimally managed. They also serve as a comparison with the later
models, in which we introduce a trend in the growth-recruitment function.
I find that the differences between adaptive and non-learning policies may be particularly
dramatic when vital rates change in time, as the choice of the correct parameter value
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determines when the stock should be depleted; depleting the stock too early can cause
severe population and yield losses.
6.2 Stationary Case
6.2.1 Model
Let us consider a population that is of size 𝑥𝑡 at time 𝑡. A harvester fishes this population
down to the escapement 𝑦𝑡. This escaped population then changes as result of reproduction
and possibly survival according to the stock recruitment function 𝑓(𝑦𝑡). Population change
may have a stochastic component; at time 𝑡, an independent and identically distributed
random shock, 𝑍𝑡, modulates the population size.
1 Let 𝜃 be a parameter of the stock
recruitment function. The growth process is thus
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑍𝑡, 𝜃) (6.2)
and a particular realization of that process is
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑧𝑡, 𝜃). (6.3)
The management of such a stock has been extensively studied in the theoretical fisheries
literature. Reed (1979) studied the problem of maximizing the net present value of the
rent generated by the harvest of a fish stock governed by a stock recruitment function
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃)𝑍𝑡 over an infinite time horizon. He showed that when the growth of the
population is compensatory (that is, 𝜕𝑓/𝜕𝑦 > 0 and 𝜕2𝑓/𝜕𝑦2 < 0) and the marginal cost of
harvest is a non-increasing function of stock size, then the optimal harvest rule is a ‘constant
escapement’ policy,2. Other authors (e.g., Costello et al., 2001) have extended this result
to more general functional forms, including when the shock does not multiply 𝑓 . I too will
1Throughout this chapter we will use capital letters to denote random variables and a lowercase letters
to denote realizations of those random variables
2In Chapter 5 I further describe a constant escapement policy. As a reminder, a constant escapement
policy is a type of threshold policy or bang-bang rule. When the stock size at a time 𝑡 is larger than some
time-invariant optimal escapement level, that escapement is optimal; if the stock size is lower than that
threshold, no harvest occurs until the stock rebuilds.
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focus on the maximization of the present value of a stock governed by a compensatory stock
recruitment function and non-increasing marginal harvest costs. Reed, however, assumed
that all parameters were perfectly known. I seek to describe some general properties of
optimal escapement policies when there is also uncertainty regarding a parameter that we
hope to learn about.
Let us assume the parameter 𝜃 is imperfectly known. We model our uncertainty in
𝜃 at time 𝑡 by treating it as a random variable Θ𝑡 and describing our belief that 𝜃 is
the true value, 𝜃, as I𝑡(𝜃) = Pr(Θ𝑡 = 𝜃). We update this belief state as we accumulate
observations of the system. In particular, for each perfectly known escapement 𝑦𝑡 and
resulting perfectly observed population size 𝑥𝑡+1 we learn about this unknown parameter.
I define the information state’s update as
I𝑡+1 = 𝑔(I𝑡, 𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡+1). (6.4)
We will use Bayes’ rule (equation 6.1) to update I𝑡. Note that we do not observe the
value of 𝑧𝑡; we only know the distribution of 𝑍𝑡. We therefore may not be able to tell if a
particular 𝑥𝑡+1 is the result of a large shock or an extreme value of Θ𝑡.
Our goal is to maximize the expected stream of discounted rents over a fixed time
horizon ending at 𝑇 or over an infinite time-horizon by choosing a sequence of escapements
𝑦𝑡. We take the expectation of both the shock and our belief state. The objective is thus
Π(𝑦𝑡, 𝑥0,I0) =
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=0
(︂
𝐸
𝑍𝑡,Θ𝑡
[︂
𝑝(𝑋𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡)−
∫︁ 𝑋𝑡
𝑦𝑡
𝑐(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
]︂)︂
𝛿𝑡 (6.5)
where 𝑝 is the price per unit harvest, 𝑐(𝑥) is the marginal cost of harvesting a stock of size
of size 𝑥, and 𝛿 is the discount factor.
Infinite Time Horizon
First, let us explore the properties of the optimal management policy over an infinite time
horizon. In this case, I will assume that we have a discount factor 𝛿 < 1. In addition, I
will restrict the shocks, 𝑍𝑡, to have finite support. Because the shocks are multiplicative, I
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specify that their expectations are unity.
In this case, a ‘stationary’ policy is optimal; that is, in each period, the stock size and
the belief state determine the optimal escapement rule, but this rule does not vary over
time. This result follows from the basic theory of dynamic programming on infinite time
horizons ([e.g., Bertsekas, 2000). Because there is a finite profit (or yield)3 per time period
and the discount factor is less than 1, a stationary policy is optimal .
Finite Time Horizon
We turn our attention to the finite time horizon. This case is particularly interesting because
‘real-world’ managers often have fixed time horizons over which to manage a resource. The
finite time horizon case also facilitates comparison to my later analysis in which there is a
trend in the vital rates over time.
I show that, for a broad class of models, the optimal escapement at time 𝑡 depends on
the stock size 𝑥𝑡 only in through constraint 𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡. That is, it is not optimal to take
advantage of unusually large or small stock sizes to gain information.
To solve for the optimal harvest policy, I reformulate the problem (equation 6.5) as a
sequence of single decisions that capture the payoff from the current decision plus the result
of the optimal choices going forward in time (see Chapter 5 also). It will be convenient to
define an immediate harvest value (a` la Reed, 1979) as
𝑄(𝑥) = 𝑝(𝑥− 𝑦∞)−
∫︁ 𝑥
𝑦∞
𝑐(𝑠)𝑑𝑠. (6.6)
𝑦∞ is the lowest economically viable escapement or ‘zero profit level’ where 𝑝 = 𝑐(𝑦∞);
harvesting below 𝑦∞ costs more than it it is worth. When 𝑝 > 𝑐(0), 𝑦∞ = 0.
The value from harvesting the stock at time 𝑡 down to 𝑦𝑡 is simply 𝑄(𝑥𝑡) − 𝑄(𝑦𝑡). To
this value, I add the future value from harvesting 𝑦𝑡 or its progeny later; we define this
future value as 𝑉 (𝑥𝑡+1,I𝑡+1), as the value also depends on the belief state. The right side
of equation 6.5 is thus 𝑉 (𝑥0,I0). However, this recursive approach is more useful when we
3The finite profit or yield per stage is guaranteed by the concavity of growth function and the finite
support of the shocks.
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start at the end of the time horizon. At the ultimate time 𝑇 the value function is
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇 ,I𝑡) = 𝑄(𝑥𝑇 ); (6.7)
future harvests have no value to us.
At time 𝑇 − 1 it is thus
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−1,I𝑇−1) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︂
𝑄(𝑥𝑇−1)−𝑄(𝑦𝑇−1) + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
(𝑉 (𝑋𝑇 ))
}︂
(6.8)
= max
𝑦𝑇−1
{︂
𝑄(𝑥𝑇−1)−𝑄(𝑦𝑇−1) + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
(𝑄(𝑋𝑇 ))
}︂
(6.9)
= 𝑄(𝑥𝑇−1) + max
𝑦𝑇−1
{︂
−𝑄(𝑦𝑇−1) + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
[︁
𝑄(𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑍𝑇−1, 𝜃))
]︁}︂
(6.10)
= 𝑄(𝑥𝑇−1)−𝑄(𝑦*𝑇−1) + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
{︁
𝑄(𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑍𝑇−1, 𝜃))
}︁
, (6.11)
where 𝑦*𝑡 is the optimal value of the escapement at time 𝑡.
A candidate for 𝑦*𝑡 is the interior optimum that satisfies the first-order conditions:
0 = −𝜕𝑄(𝑦𝑇−1)
𝜕𝑦𝑇−1
+ 𝛿
𝜕 𝐸𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
[︁
𝑄(𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑍𝑇−1, 𝜃))
]︁
𝜕𝑦𝑇−1
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
𝑦𝑇−1=𝑦*𝑇−1
. (6.12)
Note that equation 6.12 is independent of the value of 𝑥𝑇−1; unless 𝑦*𝑇−1 is less than 𝑥𝑇−1
it is the optimal escapement at 𝑇 − 1.
Stepping back one more time period, we have
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−2,I𝑇−2) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−2≤𝑥𝑇−2
{︂
𝑄(𝑥𝑇−2)−𝑄(𝑦𝑇−2) + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2
[𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−1,I𝑇−1)]
}︂
(6.13)
= max
𝑦𝑇−2
{︃
𝑄(𝑥𝑇−2)−𝑄(𝑦𝑇−2) + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2
[︁
𝑄(𝑓(𝑦𝑇−2, 𝑍𝑇−2, 𝜃))−𝑄(𝑦*𝑇−1)
+ 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
[︁
𝑄(𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑍𝑇−1, 𝜃))
]︁ ]︁}︃
(6.14)
(6.15)
In the last line, note that the distribution of Θ𝑇−1 will be modelled using 𝑔(I𝑇−2, 𝑦𝑇−2, 𝑥𝑇−2,
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where 𝑥𝑇−1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑇−2, 𝑍𝑇−2, 𝜃).
The first order conditions for a maximum for this time-period are more complicated–
there is now a term representing the control’s influence on the future information state:
0 =
{︃
− 𝜕𝑄(𝑦𝑇−2)
𝜕𝑦𝑇−2
+ 𝛿
𝜕 𝐸𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2
[︁
𝑄(𝑓(𝑦𝑇−2, 𝑧𝑇−2, 𝜃))
]︁
𝜕𝑦𝑇−2
+ 𝛿2
𝜕 𝐸𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2 𝐸𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−1 [𝑄[𝑓(𝑦
*
𝑇−1, 𝑧𝑇−1, 𝜃)]]
𝜕𝑦𝑇−2
}︃⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
𝑦𝑇−2=𝑦*𝑇−2
(6.16)
As we go further back in time, each information state over which we take the expectation
will depend on the current control and its projected influence multiple time steps into the
future on the belief state (e.g., at time 𝑇 − 3, I𝑇−1 will be 𝑔𝑇−2(𝑔𝑇−3(I𝑇−3, 𝑦𝑇−3), 𝑦*𝑇−2).
However, we note that none of these terms depend on the current stock; the optimal (inte-
rior) solution is independent of the size of the stock.
Passive versus Active Adaptive Management
In passive adaptive management, we do not model the impact of the control (𝑦𝑡) on the
future information state, so the expectation of the future information state is always the
current information state; that is, the first-order conditions for a maximum are equivalent
(for all time) to those for 𝑇 − 1 for the active case. In general, the passive and active
policies are equivalent at other times if the expectation of the future information state is
independent of the control. In equation (6.16), we can see that if this is the case, the 𝛿2
term will be zero, reducing the first-order conditions to that of the passive management.
Thus, we expect the active and passive strategies to be identical always in the penulti-
mate period, while they typically will differ earlier. In the special case when the pre-posterior
is not a function of the control, the policies are the same. This is particularly relevant be-
cause it is (much) computationally easier to calculate the passive adaptive management
strategy.
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6.3 Yield Maximizing Beverton-Holt Growth with Uniform,
Multiplicative Shocks
Let us develop a simple model that is relatively tractable so that we may gain insight into
its optimal harvesting policy. Because adaptive management solutions typically are solved
exclusively numerically, gaining an intuition about them can be difficult. To this end, I
make several simplifying assumptions that make our task easier: (1) we will maximize yield
(so, 𝑝 = 1, 𝑐(𝑥) = 0 for all 𝑥), (2) the shock is uniform, (3) it multiplies a growth function
as in Reed (1979), and (4) the uncertain parameter has only two candidate values. Taken
together, these assumptions create a fishery with an adaptive management policy that is
fairly tractable to calculate.
Let us imagine that the stock grows according to a Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment
curve (𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑏) = 𝑦𝑡/(𝑏 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡)). I introduce environmental stochasticity by assuming that
population is perturbed by a multiplicative, uniform shock; that is,
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑏)𝑍𝑡, (6.17)
where 𝑍𝑡 are independent, identically distributed uniform random variables with lower
bound 1 − 𝑤 and upper bound 1 + 𝑤 (with 0 < 𝑤 < 1). We consider uncertainty about
the value of the parameter 𝑏, which is the inverse of the growth rate at low density (i.e.,
𝑓 ′(0) = 1/𝑏). We are unsure whether 𝑏 takes one of two candidate values 𝑏1 and 𝑏2. Let
us assume, without loss of generality, that 1/𝑏1 < 1/𝑏2 so that 𝑏1 represents the low-
productivity model. For this simple form of uncertainty, we can then fully describe the
information state with a single variable, 𝜌𝑡, which is the probability at time 𝑡 that 𝑏1 is the
true value, 𝑏, i.e., Θ𝑡 ∼ Bernoulli(𝜌𝑡).
At 𝑇 , the optimal escapement 𝑦*𝑇 is 0; future fish have no value, so, since 𝑐 = 0 and
therefore 𝑦∞ = 0, we harvest all remaining fish. Thus 𝑉 (𝑥𝑇 , 𝜌𝑇 ) = 𝑥𝑇 . We then step
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backwards, to time 𝑇 − 1, and find:
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−1, 𝜌𝑇−1) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︂
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1 + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇 , 𝜌𝑇 )
}︂
(6.18)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︂
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1 + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
𝑥𝑇
}︂
(6.19)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︃
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1
+𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1
[𝜌𝑇−1𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏1)𝑧𝑇−1 + (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏2)𝑧𝑇−1]
}︃
(6.20)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︁
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1
+𝛿 [𝜌𝑇−1𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏2)]
}︁
(6.21)
= 𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦*𝑇−1 + 𝛿
[︀
𝜌𝑇−1𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏2)
]︀
. (6.22)
To find 𝑦*𝑇−1, we differentiate the maximand of (6.21) with respect to 𝑦𝑇−1 to obtain the
first-order conditions for a maximum:
1
𝛿
=
[︂
𝜌𝑇−1
𝜕𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏1)
𝜕𝑦𝑇−1
+ (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝜕𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏2)
𝜕𝑦𝑇−1
]︂ ⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
𝑦*𝑇−1
. (6.23)
We then turn to time 𝑇 − 2 when the value function is
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−2, 𝜌𝑇−2) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−2≤𝑥𝑇−2
{︂
𝑥𝑇−2 − 𝑦𝑇−2 + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−1, 𝜌𝑇−2)
}︂
(6.24)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−2≤𝑥𝑇−2
{︃
𝑥𝑇−2 − 𝑦𝑇−2 + 𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2
[︁
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦*𝑇−1 +
𝛿
(︀
𝜌𝑇−1𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏2)
)︀ ]︁}︃
(6.25)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−2≤𝑥𝑇−2
{︃
𝑥𝑇−2 − 𝑦𝑇−2 + 𝛿
[︃
𝜌𝑇−2𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−2, 𝑏1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−2)𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−2, 𝑏2)− 𝑦*𝑇−1 +
𝛿
(︃
𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
𝑔(𝜌𝑇−1, 𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏𝑖)𝑍𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏1) +(︂
1− 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−1
𝑔(𝜌𝑇−1, 𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝑏𝑖)𝑍𝑇−1)
)︂
𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏2)
)︃]︃}︃
. (6.26)
Now, we need to know the expectation of 𝜌𝑇−1 in period 𝑇 − 2. We can use Bayes
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Theorem to update 𝜌𝑡;
𝜌𝑡+1 = 𝑔(𝜌𝑡, 𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡+1) (6.27)
=
Pr(𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏1)𝜌𝑡
Pr(𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏1)𝜌𝑡 + Pr(𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏2)(1− 𝜌𝑡) . (6.28)
The expectation of the posterior distribution, 𝐸𝑍𝑡,Θ𝑡(𝜌𝑡+1) is called the ‘pre-posterior’
and is a critical component of active adaptive management, because it maps the expected
effect of a management action onto the information state.
From equation (6.28) and (6.17), the pre-posterior can be written as:
𝐸
𝑍𝑡,Θ𝑡
(𝜌𝑡+1|𝑦𝑡) =
∫︁ 1+𝑤
1−𝑤
∑︁
𝑏𝑖
Pr(𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑏𝑖)𝑧𝑡|𝑏1)𝜌𝑡
Pr(𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑏𝑖)𝑧𝑡|𝑏1)𝜌𝑡 + Pr(𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝑏𝑖)𝑧𝑡|𝑏2)(1− 𝜌𝑡)Pr(𝑏𝑖)
1
2𝑤
𝑑𝑧.
(6.29)
Let us start assembling the pieces to calculate this pre-posterior. First, the probability
that we achieve a given population size is calculated as follows:
Pr(𝑋𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏𝑖) = Pr
(︂
𝑦𝑡𝑍𝑡
𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡
)︂
(6.30)
= Pr
(︂
𝑍𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑡+1(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡)
𝑦𝑡
)︂
(6.31)
=
∫︁ 𝑥𝑡+1(𝑏𝑖+𝑎𝑦𝑡)
𝑦𝑡
1−𝑤
1
2𝑤
𝑑𝑧 (6.32)
=
1
2𝑤
[︂
𝑥𝑡+1(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡)
𝑦𝑡
− (1− 𝑤)
]︂
(6.33)
and
Pr(𝑋𝑇+1 = 𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏𝑖) = 𝑑Pr(𝑋𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑡+1
(6.34)
=
1
2𝑤
𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
. (6.35)
Combining (6.35) with the bounds on 𝑋𝑡+1 that it inherits from the bounds on 𝑍𝑡, we have
Pr(𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡+1|𝑏𝑖) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑏𝑖+𝑎𝑦𝑡
2𝑤𝑦𝑡
, if (1−𝑤)𝑦𝑡𝑏𝑖+𝑎𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
(1+𝑤)𝑦𝑡
𝑏𝑖+𝑎𝑦𝑡
0, otherwise.
(6.36)
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Some values of the shock will drive the population to extreme sizes that are only con-
sistent with one model. In this case, we immediately learn which model is true. 4
The probability of being in the region where only 𝑏1 is consistent is
𝜌𝑡(1−𝑤)
2𝑤
𝑏1−𝑏2
𝑏2+𝑎𝑦 ; the
probability of being in the region where only 𝑏2 is consistent is
(1−𝜌𝑡)(1+𝑤)
2𝑤
𝑏1−𝑏2
𝑏1+𝑎𝑦 . The
expectation of 𝜌𝑡+1 is thus
𝐸
𝑍𝑡,Θ𝑡
(𝜌𝑡+1) =
𝜌𝑡(1− 𝑤)
2𝑤
𝑏1 − 𝑏2
𝑏2 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡
+ (6.37)(︂
1− 𝑏1 − 𝑏2
2𝑤
[︂
𝜌𝑡(1− 𝑤)
𝑏2 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡
+
(1− 𝜌𝑡)(1 + 𝑤)
𝑏1 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡
]︂)︂(︃ 𝑏1+𝑎𝑦𝑡
2𝑤𝑦𝑡
𝜌𝑡
𝑏1+𝑎𝑦𝑡
2𝑤𝑦𝑡
𝜌𝑡 +
𝑏2+𝑎𝑦𝑡
2𝑤𝑦𝑡
(1− 𝜌𝑡)
)︃
= 𝜌𝑡. (6.38)
Now, we return to equation 6.24 by substituting (6.38) for 𝐸𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1 𝜌𝑇−1:
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−2, 𝜌𝑇−2) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−2≤𝑥𝑇−2
{︃
𝑥𝑇−2 − 𝑦𝑇−2+ (6.39)
𝛿
[︃
𝜌𝑇−2𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−2, 𝑏1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−2)𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−2, 𝑏2)− 𝑦*𝑇−1 +
𝛿
(︃
𝜌𝑇−2𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−2) 𝑓(𝑦*𝑇−1, 𝑏2)
)︃]︃}︃
. (6.40)
The derivative of the pre-posterior with respect to the control is 0, so the first-order con-
ditions are equivalent to equation 6.23 (with updated time subscripts). Now, we not only
have our optimal threshold escapement, but also know that the active and passive adaptive
management policies are equivalent (recall section 6.2.1). We can repeat this procedure
backwards in time and will find the same first-order conditions each period.
In figures 6-2 and 6-3, I show a single realization of how these optimal policies perform
when either 𝑏1 or 𝑏2 is true. Note that, when 𝑏2 is the correct parameter value, the value of
the belief state may not be monotonic 6-3. This is because any value of the recruitment that
is consistent with both 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 is more likely to have come from 𝑏1’s being true, since–by
4Note that for some small 𝑤 and 𝑦𝑡, it is possible that the bounds of these two distributions will not
intersect. In that special case, the probability that 𝑥𝑡+1 is consistent with 𝑏1 is equivalent to our belief that
𝑏1 is the true value (i.e., 𝜌𝑡).
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Figure 6-2: A single realization of the optimal policy and its outcomes through time when
𝑏 = 𝑏1. The first panel shows the shocks that occurred in each time period. In the next
panel, red circles show the optimal escapement, while blue dots show the population size.
The black line shows the belief state, while the orange line shows yield. Note that at 𝑡 = 5,
a sufficiently large shock occurred that fell outside the range of recruitments consistent with
𝑏2, causing a slight ‘jump’ in the information state and optimal policy. Parameter values
are 𝑎 = 0.02, 𝑏1 = 0.15, 𝑏2 = 0.03, 𝑤 = 0.6, 𝛿 = 0.9, 𝑥0 = 31.51.
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Figure 6-3: A single realization of the optimal policy and its outcomes through time when
𝑏 = 𝑏2. The first panel shows the shocks that occurred in each time period. In the next
panel, red circles show the optimal escapement, while blue dots show the population size.
The black line shows the belief state, while the orange line shows yield. Note that at 𝑡 = 4,
a sufficiently large shock occurred that fell outside the range of recruitments consistent with
𝑏2, causing a ‘jump’ in the information state and optimal policy. Parameter values are the
same as in figure 6-2.
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construction–𝑏1 has higher probability density over the smaller range of recruitment values
that are possible for it. This is interesting, since the manager is essentially being ‘mislead’
by the data she collects for a period of time!
I ran 500 simulations and aggregated the results in terms of stock and yield sizes. The
initial population size was assigned as the expected recruitment from choosing the optimal
escapement associated with 𝜌0 = 0.5. While having perfect information does outperform the
adaptive management policy (see figures 6-4 and 6-5), once the parameter is well known,
the performance is equal. For these parameter values, the correct model only narrowly
outperforms the adaptive management case, while the ‘average’ policy only underperforms
slightly. However, managing as if the incorrect model is true does markedly worse.
Since the passive and active adaptive management policies are identical, there is no
experimentation. In this case, note that we learn rather quickly; within 10-15 time steps,
we have close to perfect knowledge regardless of the true underlying model.
6.4 Sustainable or not? Yield Maximizing Piecewise Linear
Growth Function with Multiplicative, Uniform Shocks
An interesting case is one in which we are unsure if a stock is sufficiently productive to
sustainably harvest, or, on the other hand, would be optimally extirpated (e.g., Clark
(1973)). If we are unsure which type of stock we are managing, how should we proceed?
To investigate this, I chose a simple piecewise linear growth function (Figure 6-6). Let 𝛼𝑖
be the growth rate at low densities and 𝑘 be the carrying capacity 𝑘, which is reached at
an escapement of 𝜂𝑖. The growth is thus
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝛼𝑖)𝑍𝑡 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑡𝑧𝑡 if 𝑦𝑡 < 𝜂𝑖
𝑘𝑧𝑡 if 𝑦𝑡 > 𝜂𝑖.
(6.41)
𝑍𝑡 is a uniformly distribution iid shock, with lower bound 1− 𝑤 and upper bound 1 + 𝑤.
Without loss of generality, we assume that 𝛼1 > 𝛼2, such that 𝛼1 > 1/𝛿 (i.e., it is
viable to harvest) and 𝛼2 < 1/𝛿 (i.e., it is optimal to fish out the stock). If 𝛼1 is the true
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Figure 6-4: Performance of adaptive and non-adaptive management strategies when 𝑏 = 𝑏1.
The top panel shows the adaptive policy’s performance in terms of stock size (left) and yield
(right) versus perfect information. The black lines show average results; the grey lines show
the minimum and maximum values. The middle panels contain the results for the adaptive
and ‘incorrect’ model. Finally, I show the performance of the adaptive model and a model
that assigns equal weight to each model and does not update this weight. Parameter values
are 𝑎 = 0.02, 𝑏1 = 0.15, 𝑏2 = 0.03, 𝑤 = 0.6, 𝛿 = 0.9, 𝑥0 = 31.51, as in figure 6-2.
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Figure 6-5: Performance of adaptive and non-adaptive management strategies when 𝑏 = 𝑏2.
The top panel shows the adaptive policy’s performance in terms of stock size (left) and yield
(right) versus perfect information. The black lines show average results; the grey lines show
the minimum and maximum values. The middle panels contain the results for the adaptive
and ‘incorrect’ model. Finally, I show the performance of the adaptive model and a model
that assigns equal weight to each model and does not update this weight. Parameter values
are as in figure 6-4.
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Figure 6-6: A schematic of the potential growth functions (Equation 6.41). Option 1 (growth
rate 𝛼1) is an economically viable stock (𝛼1 > 1/𝛿), while option 2 (growth rate 𝛼2) is not.
The onset of density dependence is at an escapement of 𝜂1 and 𝜂2 respectively.
growth rate at low density, then the optimal escapement in each period is 𝜂1. (To see why,
consider harvesting–even for a single period–above 𝜂1; we forgo harvest to do so, but there
is no expected gain, since the expected recruitment is still 𝑘. Harvesting at lower levels is
similarly disadvantageous, but because we are havesting too hard.)
Now let us consider the case in which we are unsure which parameter is correct. Let 𝜌𝑡
be our belief at time 𝑡 that 𝛼1 is the correct model. Note that it will never be optimal to
leave an escapement larger than 𝜂1; if 𝛼1 is the true value, then we will gain no more fish
by sacrificing harvest, while if 𝛼2 is the correct value, we want to escape no fish. Thus, we
may restrict our attention to a truncated range of escapements (𝑦 < 𝜂1).
We find that the optimal policy is to harvest either down to 𝜂1 or to 0, depending on
the value of the belief state5 The following section shows how we determined this.
Let us consider a stock of size 𝑥0. If it is fished down to a level 𝑦, the expected
recruitment in the next period is 𝜌0𝛼1𝑦 + (1− 𝜌0)𝛼2𝑦. Because the environmental shock is
again uniform and our uncertainty constrained to two values, the expectation of 𝜌1 = 𝜌0.
So, if we again harvest down to an escapement of 𝑦, the expected yield is again 𝛿(𝜌0𝛼1𝑦 +
5If the stock size is below 𝜂1, no harvest occurs.
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(1− 𝜌0)𝛼2𝑦 − 𝑦). The expected yield from harvesting at 𝑦 is then
𝜋 = (𝑥0 − 𝑦) + 𝛿
1− 𝛿 (𝜌0𝛼1𝑦 + (1− 𝜌0)𝛼2𝑦 − 𝑦) . (6.42)
We may then compare the yield of a policy with an escapement of 𝜂1 and one with an
arbitrarily smaller 𝑦1:
𝜋𝜂1 = (𝑥0 − 𝜂1) +
𝛿
1− 𝛿 𝜂1 (𝜌0𝛼1 + (1− 𝜌0)𝛼2 − 1) , (6.43)
versus
𝜋𝑦1 = (𝑥0 − 𝑦1) +
𝛿
1− 𝛿 𝑦1 (𝜌0𝛼1 + (1− 𝜌0)𝛼2 − 1) . (6.44)
The difference in yield is
(𝜂1 − 𝑦1)
[︂
−1 + 𝛿
1− 𝛿 (𝜌0𝛼1 + (1− 𝜌0)𝛼2 − 1)
]︂
. (6.45)
The policy of harvesting at 𝜂1 is greater if
𝜌0 >
1/𝛿 − 𝛼2
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 ; (6.46)
since we considering an infinite time horizon, this calculate holds for any starting 𝜌0, so
if at any time our updated belief state falls below that threshold, an arbitrarily smaller
escapement is optimal. In fact, we should harvest all the fish at that point, as the expected
value of all future harvest is less than the value of fishing down immediately.
6.5 Non-stationary case
Now we turn our attention to adaptive management in a deteriorating environment. The
distinguishing feature here is that the growth function, 𝑓 , changes through time. In Chapter
5 we considered this problem under the assumption that we had perfect information. Here,
we relax this assumption, instead assuming that one of the parameters is imperfectly known.
As environmental conditions vary outside the range observed in the historical record, we
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are likely to see a different type of parametric uncertainty: uncertainty as to how the vital
rates depend on these environmental variables. For concreteness, I will focus on temperature
as the driver of changing vital rates. For fisheries, this is a sensible choice, because fish are
poikilothermic, meaning their internal temperature varies with ambient conditions. The
vital rates of fish have been shown to be be strongly temperature dependent (e.g., Munday
et al., 2008; Houde, 1989; Donelson et al., 2010; Tanasichuk and Ware, 1987; Reist et al.,
2006). However, species respond to temperature changes idiosyncratically (Persson, 1986,
e.g.,). For a specific stock, under specific historical and future conditions, we are unlikely
to know precisely the dependence of its vital rates on the temperature changes.
The application of adaptive management to populations impacted by climate change
is expected to be a complicated task, as climatic changes occur over long time-scales and
may involve a high degree of uncertainty from sources other than the parameter of interest
(Gregory et al., 2006). On the other hand, as Conroy et al. (2011) emphasizes, adaptive
management holds promise for better management in the face of conditions managers have
yet to encounter. In this chapter, I attempt to investigate how deteriorating conditions
impact adaptive management policies. To this end, I construct a simple example to try
to build our intuition about how adding this temporally changing component alters the
intuition we built earlier in this chapter. However, note that the logic we used to deter-
mine when the active and passive strategies are equivalent still holds–those strategies are
equivalent when the preposterior of the belief state does not depend on the control.
The reader may not be surprised to learn that the optimal policy in a changing envi-
ronment is no longer stationary; this makes sense because we expect that it will be optimal
to respond to changes in stock dynamics. Second, building on the results of Chapter 5, we
expect that at some time, the optimal action will be to fish the stock down to a low level,
perhaps even to extirpation.
6.6 Non-stationary Yield Maximizing Beverton-Holt Model
Here, I extend the simple Beverton-Holt model I developed in section 6.3 to include a vital
rate that varies over time. In particular, 𝑏, the inverse of the growth rate at low-density,
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Figure 6-7: The average stock recruitment function over time for two different values of 𝜃.
In the first case, 𝜃 is 1.26; in the second, it is 1.07. Other parameters are 𝑎 = 0.02, and
𝑏0 = 0.03. Cool colors indicate early times, while warm colors indicate recruitment at later
times.
varies over time so that the growth rate decreases over time. I specify that 𝑏 = 𝑏0𝜃
𝑡, so that
as time (which I assume, for simplicity, is correlated perfectly to temperature) goes on, the
growth rate decreases. Figure 6-7 shows how how such recruitment curves may look for
different parameter values (without stochasticity).
Again, we imagine a Beverton-Holt recruitment function is multiplied by an iid uniform
shock (with bounds 1− 𝑤 and 1 + 𝑤):
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡, 𝜃, 𝑡)𝑍𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡
𝑏0𝜃𝑡 + 𝑎𝑦𝑡
𝑍𝑡. (6.47)
Let us consider uncertainty about the sensitivity, 𝜃, of the low-density growth rate to
the temperature. We have two candidate values–𝜃1 and 𝜃2. 𝜌𝑡 will describe our confidence
at time 𝑡 that 𝜃1 is the correct value. Without loss of generality, let us assume that 𝜃1 > 𝜃2,
so that 𝜃1 is the ‘high sensitivity’ model.
At the ultimate time-step, the optimal action is to harvest whatever fish remain, as they
have no value to us in the future. Note that the value functions and first order conditions
that we derive here are similar to those in the stationary case, excepting that the growth
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function now has a time-dependent term.
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−1, 𝜌𝑇−1) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︁
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1+
𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−1,Θ𝑇−1
[𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃𝑖, 𝑇 − 1)𝑧𝑇−1]
}︁
(6.48)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︁
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1 +
𝛿 [𝜌𝑇−1𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃1, 𝑇 − 1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃2, 𝑇 − 1)]
}︁
(6.49)
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
1
𝛿
= 𝜌𝑇−1
𝜕𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃1, 𝑇 − 1)
𝜕𝑦𝑇−1
+ (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝜕𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃2, 𝑇 − 1)
𝜕𝑦𝑇−1
. (6.50)
Going back on period in time, the value function is
𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−2, 𝜌𝑇−2) = max
0≤𝑦𝑇−2≤𝑥𝑇−2
{︁
𝑥𝑇−2 − 𝑦𝑇−2+
𝛿 𝐸
𝑍𝑇−2,Θ𝑇−2
[𝑉 (𝑥𝑇−1, 𝜌𝑇−1)]
}︁
(6.51)
= max
0≤𝑦𝑇−1≤𝑥𝑇−1
{︁
𝑥𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑇−1 +
𝛿 [𝜌𝑇−1𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃1, 𝑇 − 1) + (1− 𝜌𝑇−1)𝑓(𝑦𝑇−1, 𝜃2, 𝑇 − 1)]
}︁
. (6.52)
As in the stationary analog, the expectation of the 𝜌𝑡+1 is 𝜌𝑡, which allowed us to simplify
equation 6.52 so easily. The lack of dependence of the pre-posterior on the control also
implies that the passive and active adaptive management policies are identical. If we repeat
this procedure backwards in time, we find that the first-order conditions from 𝑇 − 1 are
repeated at each time step (with their respective growth values at that time).
Figure 6-8 shows the optimal policy over time and over different information states; at
a given time, if a stock associated with a particular information state is larger than this
value, the stock is fished down to this level, otherwise no harvest occurs. Note that if we
are confident (𝜌 close to 1) that the high sensitivity parameter is true, we fish hard early;
the more confident that we are that the low sensitivity model is true, the longer we delay
fishing out the stock.
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Figure 6-8: Optimal escapement over time and information state. The white area corre-
sponds to the area where the first-order conditions for an optimum no longer exist; optimal
escapement is 0. Parameter values 𝑎 = 0.02, 𝑏0 = 0.03, 𝜃1 = 0.1, 𝜃2 = 0.05, 𝛾 = 0.1,
𝑤 = 0.6, and 𝛿 = 0.9.
In figures 6-9 and 6-10 I show the realizations of this policy forward in time under
the high and low sensitivity models respectively. As in the stationary model, the informa-
tion state often changes abruptly, as a sufficiently large (or small shock) reveals the true
parameter value instantaneously.
As in the stationary case, I compare the performance of the adaptive policy to a variety
of non-learning policies (figures 6-11 and 6-12). When the high-sensitivity model (𝜃1 = 𝜃)
is true, the adaptive policy does not differ greatly in performance from the non-learning
policies (either incorrect or average). However, when the low-sensitivity model is true,
the adaptive policy far outperforms the incorrect and average models in both population
size and yield, because the harvester does not anticipate a population decline that is not
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Figure 6-9: A single realization of the optimal policy and its outcomes through time when 𝜃1
is the true parameter value. The first panel shows the value of the shocks over time. In the
second panel, red circles show the optimal escapement, while blue dots show the population
size at that time. Finally, in the third panel, the black line shows the belief state, while
the orange line shows yield. Note that at 𝑡 = 6, a sufficiently large shock occurred that fell
outside the range of recruitments consistent with 𝜃2, causing a slight ‘jump’ in the belief
state and optimal policy. Parameter values are the same as in Figure 6-8.
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Figure 6-10: A single realization of the optimal policy and its outcomes through time when
𝜃2 is the true parameter value. The first panel shows the value of the shocks over time. In the
second panel, red circles show the optimal escapement, while blue dots show the population
size at that time. Finally, in the third panel, the black line shows the belief state, while
the orange line shows yield. Note that at 𝑡 = 8, a sufficiently large shock occurred that fell
outside the range of recruitments consistent with 𝜃1, causing a large ‘jump’ in the belief
state and optimal policy. Parameter values are the same as in Figure 6-8.
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occuring.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I outline a few basic properties of adaptive management policies applied
to simple, classic bioeconomic fisheries models. In particular, my results highlight that
policies should often be pseudo-independent of the initial stock size and highlights cases (in
particular, when the shock is uniform) in which the passive and active adaptive management
policies are the same. We also extended these analyses to include a trend in time, which
is an area that deserves more attention, given its relevance to management in the face of
climate change.
The use of a uniform shock significantly simplified calculations such that I could solve
for first-order conditions for the optimal policy rather than numerically calculating the
entire policy using stochastic dynamic programming. This simplification also comes at a
cost–the passive and active policies are equivalent. Changing the functional form of the
stock recruitment function (e.g., to a Ricker model) or allowing the shock to multiply a
parameter (e.g., 𝑓 = 𝑦𝑍/(𝑏 + 𝑎𝑦𝑍)) did not change the preposterior’s independence from
the escapement. When the active and passive policies differ, the analytical solution does not
decouple between periods as it does in this case; the dependence of the belief state on past
states creates a sort-of serial dependence among periods. Ignoring this dependence and only
forecasting the belief state one-period ahead tends to create very poorly performing policies
(the examples I tried had much lower yields than the passive adaptive management policy).
Analytical and computational difficulties aside, calculating the active adaptive policy (when
it differs from the passive policy) is attractive because it allows us to tackle questions about
optimal experimentation, which I was unable to do in this chapter.
In doing this work, I found that the computation of optimal policies was quite sensitive
to how finely discretized the state space was. This sensitivity became more pronounced
when parameter uncertainty was added. One difficulty that this highlights is that when
analytical results are not available to compare–as is most often the case–it is difficult to
tell if a complicated policy is a numerical artifact or if it is reflective of the true policy. I
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Figure 6-11: Performance of adaptive and non-adaptive management strategies when 𝜃 = 𝜃1.
The top panel shows the adaptive policy’s performance in terms of stock size (left) and yield
(right) versus perfect information. The black lines show average results; the grey lines show
the minimum and maximum values. The middle panels contain the results for the adaptive
and ‘incorrect’ model. Finally, I show the performance of the adaptive model and a model
that assigns equal weight to each model and does not update this weight. Parameter values
are as in Figure 6-8.
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Figure 6-12: Performance of adaptive and non-adaptive management strategies when 𝜃 = 𝜃2.
The top panel shows the adaptive policy’s performance in terms of stock size (left) and yield
(right) versus perfect information. The black lines show average results; the grey lines show
the minimum and maximum values. The middle panels contain the results for the adaptive
and ‘incorrect’ model. Finally, I show the performance of the adaptive model and a model
that assigns equal weight to each model and does not update this weight. Parameter values
are as in Figure 6-8.
153
believe that this mismatch is another reason to push in the direction I’ve been working, so
that we may build better intuition as to when this is the case.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
Charles E. Fryer noted that “it is difficult, but who shall say that it is impossible, to dis-
cover...the causes of these fluctuations and occasional failures of a fishery...” (Fryer, 1883).
Now technologies have improved our ability to monitor both fish and their environments
(underwater vehicles, satellites, etc.), and sophisticated models have helped uncover the pro-
cesses that influence population dynamics. Moreover, the scientific community has moved
beyond simply seeking to understand ‘the causes’ of stock fluctuations towards controlling
them and optimally managing wild fish stocks.
In this thesis, I have created and analyzed a collection of models concerning the man-
agement of fish stocks undergoing change. As a whole, my work suggests that accounting
for change in fisheries fundamentally alters optimal management. Thus, the identification
of fisheries that are impacted by, for example, habitat damaging harvest or rising temper-
atures is critical to optimal management. Here, I briefly summarize key findings from each
chapter and suggest some promising directions for further investigation.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I developed models in which the changes result directly from
harvesting.
In Chapter 2, I found that including harvest-induced habitat damage in a spatially-
implicit patch-occupancy model did not incentivize the creation of no-take marine reserves
as part of a profit-maximizing harvesting strategy. Reserves were, however, a relatively low-
cost way to protect biodiversity. The approach I took is novel in its coupling of a patch-
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occupancy model to an economic model, which allowed me to include multiple species
in a spatial context. This approach could be used to study other multispecies systems
with different trophic interactions (see, for example, competition, in Hastings (1980), who
studied an unharvested multispecies competition model) or objective functions. In addition,
I studied the equilibrium dynamics and harvest rates, all in a spatially implicit framework.
An investigation of the transient dynamics or explicit spatial interactions (e.g., with a
cellular automaton model) would provide additional insight. For example, we could ask
how long after the establishment of marine reserves would diversity benefits be realized.
Or, does the spatial arrangement of patches and the dispersal ability of species change the
general results I found in the spatially implicit model? Given the paucity of studies on the
optimal management of multi-species fisheries (especially using spatial models), I believe
there are many attractive, open questions that can be fruitfully addressed with a similar
methodology.
Next, in Chapter 3, I constructed a two-patch model and included the rapid evolution of
dispersal in response to harvest pressure. The evolution of dispersal essentially decoupled
the two patches so the closure of a patch as a marine reserve ceased to be part of the profit
maximizing strategy. However, I found that the evolutionary stable optimal harvesting
strategy is not economically stable over shorter time scales, since such a strategy is sub-
optimal between rare mutation events. To my knowledge, this is the only work that couples
the optimal harvest of a stock with the evolution of dispersal.
To start, my co-authors and I made several simplifying assumptions. We investigated the
optimal harvest at equilibrium and assumed that the evolution of dispersal was very rapid.
We also did not treat dispersal or its evolution mechanistically. An investigation of optimal
harvesting dynamics over time, when the rate of evolution–depending on rare mutations–is
slow, might produce different optimal harvesting strategies. In contrast, allowing selection
over the existing phenotypes may produce different results.
In Chapters 4 through 6, I considered climate change as example of an exogenous (to
the harvester) source of change to the fishery.
I first describe in (Chapter 4) a statistical test for detecting unambiguous shifts of
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populations in space. The extension of the concept of stochastic dominance into distribution
ecology promises to useful. If a later distribution is stochastically dominant to an earlier
one, the population distribution moved only in the direction of interest, making stochastic
dominance a stronger condition than the shift of the centroid or tail of the distribution
alone. Applications of this methodology are particularly promising. A comparison of the
results of studies using other metrics of change (e.g., movement of the centroid) with the
results of my stochastic dominance test, would reveal the circumstances under which the
methods produce contradictory conclusions.
In Chapter 5, I investigated the impacts of a continuously deteriorating environment
on the optimal harvest of a fish stock. This work demonstrated how complicated the opti-
mal response to changing vital rates may be; I found a non-monotonic optimal escapement
schedule was optimal when fecundity declined over time, while monotonically decreasing
escapement was optimal when mortality increased. I showed that density dependent dy-
namics are particularly important in structuring the shape of the optimal response. My
results also suggest that the extirpation of a stock may be economically optimal, which
highlights the importance of specifying the management goals for a fishery as well as the
management time scale. My general results hold for a large class of growth and cost func-
tions, but extending these analyses to more complicated growth functions would be useful.
In addition, the objective I analyzed was profit (or yield) maximization. This objective is
one of many potential objectives; one can imagine placing value on the size of stock for
conservation, for tourism, or for other ecosystem services. Changing the objective function
to account for such “existence value” may qualitatively change the optimal harvest (e.g.
Kellner et al., 2011). The alteration of the objective function may be particularly interest-
ing in the deteriorating habitat cases, valuing because the existence value would offset the
eroding in situ value derived only from future harvest.
Finally (in Chapter 6), I extended the models I described in Chapter 5 to include un-
certainty about the parameters. I attempted to characterize basic properties of optimal
harvest policies for unchanging stocks and to contrast these with the properties for stocks
that change over time. I focused on very simple models that were relatively analytically
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tractable to attempt to understand how the optimal adaptive management policy arises.
Even small complicating additions (e.g., non-uniform shocks, maximizing profit instead of
yield) necessitate numerical methods. Given the analytical and computational challenges
associated with adaptive management, this work merely scratches the surface of the ques-
tions we might pose. In particular, further attention to the relative impacts of different
types of uncertainty (e.g., parameter versus state uncertainty) on the form of optimal har-
vest policy. Investigation of a broader range of examples and case studies may also help
highlight qualitative differences among optimal policies and the the systems that give rise to
those policies. As others have suggested (e.g., Chades et al., 2012), adaptive management
problems are computationally difficult, and improvements in numerical methods, including
heuristics, are needed.
I have incorporated single sources of change in analyses. In reality, fish stocks are
subjected to multiple stressors operating simultaneously. For example, a stock experiencing
warming temperatures may be also impacted by trawling that damages spawning habitat.
Analysis of singe stressors is foundational to further understanding, which may include
modeling the interactions among these stressors or the comparison of more complicated
management tools to achieve different objectives. We continue to accumulate longer-term
data on fish stocks and gain more knowledge about the dependence of fishes’ life-histories on
environmental stressors. It is important to couple these observations with models that will
help us determine which stressors are likely to impact management and what management
changes might result.
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